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 ABSTRACT 
 
             This thesis answers the question as to how, and to what extent, women‟s social 
welfare needs are provided for in Jordan. Using a liberal feminist approach to social welfare 
policy, and acknowledging the role played by the specific historical and political experiences 
of states in the developing world, the thesis examines the provision of Jordanian women‟s 
social welfare needs by the state in the public arena, by the family in the private arena and by 
Civil Society Organisations which negotiate the space between the two arenas. The thesis 
demonstrates that the state has systematically failed to translate constitutional commitments to 
women as equitable citizens deserving of equitable social welfare provisions into reality. Its 
symbiotic relationship with traditional social forces has ensured that patriarchal social norms 
and practices have infused public social policy and created internal contradictions in the legal 
institutions and processes of implementation. These same patriarchal norms and practices 
continue to prevail within Jordanian family and tribal life, creating a situation in which 
women exchange the provision of their basic social needs by the family in return for 
subordinating themselves to a second-class status of dependency and vulnerability. Civil 
Society Organisations are similarly constrained by the patriarchal influences within the state, 
and have developed strategies which acknowledge that women‟s social welfare provision in 
the long term is dependent on democratisation processes which build direct relations between 
the state and its citizens, unmediated by vested tribal interests and protected by the rule of 
law. The thesis concludes that liberal feminist understandings of women‟s social welfare 
provisions as being located within the state-citizenship dichotomy enable us to identify the 
particular issues arising for developing states in meeting women‟s needs.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
                                              The Research Question & Purpose of the Study  
 
               This study examines the status of social welfare provisions for women in Jordan. As a 
modern constitutional state, one might expect the Jordanian state itself to provide a minimum and 
equalitable level of social welfare provisions for women. In fact, as this thesis will demonstrate social 
welfare provisions for Jordanian women remain underdeveloped.  Despite formal and constitutional 
commitments to providing  for women’s social welfare needs (especially  in education, health, 
employment, and legal status), in fact the state’s provision is heavily limited by the influence of 
patriarchal conservative, traditional elites, which themselves provide the structural support for the 
state itself. 
            This conservative patriarchalism similarly constrains the provision of social welfare needs of 
women in the private, family and tribal domains. Women remain discriminated against, controlled 
by, and dependent on their male relatives, and are deprived of social autonomy and economic 
independence. Islamic institutions such as the Personal Status laws reinforce and reproduce this 
social conservatism in both the public and private areas. Between the state and the family, are 
situated the civil society organizations (CSOs, or non- governmental organizations NGOs) which seek 
to fill the subsequent gaps in women’s social welfare provisions. The extent to which they can assist 
women remains dependent, however, on the degree to which the state is willing or able to promote 
broader social change. 
           The thesis argues that the prospects for this are dim: the same patriarchal influential social 
components which form the core of the state structure, those conservative, traditional elites, are 
strongly positioned within the key state institutions which might in theory attempt to introduce such 
social reform policies. In practice they rigorously oppose any sort of social change which might 
undermine their own status, using religion (Islam) and tradition as the pretext for their resistance. 
The result is that the women of Jordan are discriminated against at all levels, in the family, the labour 
market, and educational spheres – all those areas which might otherwise allow them to develop 
autonomy, independence and improved socio-economic status. 
 
            The question of the study is important because, as a female Muslim social researcher, (albeit 
one who is secular in her approach to social solutions), I am disturbed by arguments within the Arab 
region that – for cultural or religious reasons – the status of women cannot or should not be 
 improved.  In common with fellow-feminists who come from many other schools of thought, 
including Islamist feminism, I would argue strongly – and I believe this thesis demonstrates – that 
there are not fundamental cultural or religious reasons why Arab Muslim women should not achieve 
the same developed status as women elsewhere, and that it is therefore incumbent on researchers 
to show how the political and social structures of a country can and should be altered within the 
rubric of cultural authenticity. In the current global climate, it is important to show that Islam is not 
the enemy of women or the cause of the oppression, but rather the political and social structures 
which seek to reproduce themselves through patriarchal interpretations of Islam. As Haifaa Jawad 
emphasises  “...contrary to the general misconceptions, women in Islam – at least theoretically 
speaking – are entitled to full rights as citizens. These rights were put into practice during the 
Prophet’s time and in the period of early Caliphate, during which women enjoyed the privilege of 
fulfilling their private as well as their public duties. ...In other words, it was a healthy society, 
primarily because women were highly revered and honoured, for they realised that spiritual, material 
and intellectual progress of a society is closely linked with the position of its women, and that no 
society which enslaves its women would ever prosper”. (1) Thus, Arab women researchers despite 
the difference in their approaches can agree on the factors and solutions as to what could be best for 
Arab women and this is of great importance. As they are all attempting to provide solutions to end 
the oppression of Arab women in the Arab World and enrich the studies that help the coming 
generations to bring about key solutions to the development of Arab society and women in 
particular, we can focus collectively on the real problem areas of politics and social organisation as 
this thesis attempts to do. 
            The thesis provides a liberal feminist perspective which is based on the argument that the 
state is the key means for providing women with their social welfare needs.  The state’s role should 
be to organise and protect the relationship between the family and the market – between public and 
private activity. Ensuring that this relationship provides adequately for women’s welfare needs is the 
key factor in enabling women’s empowerment.  This approach stands in contrast to other feminist 
approaches such the socialist one which argues that the state is responsible for undermining 
women’s social progress by making them depending on itself. As the thesis will show, liberal 
feminism offers us the most convincing framework within which to understand the full range of the 
competencies of the state including the three powers, the legislative, the executive and the judicial 
ones. Through these, it can bring enormous change to the lives of women when the will exists.    
            The thesis consequently pursues a methodological approach which focuses then on the role 
and nature of the state, as the principal organiser of the public realm, and – in contrast – the role and 
nature of the family in its broadest sense (including the tribe) as the principal unit of the private 
 social organisation. Standing between these two are the voluntarist associations of civil society, 
which seek to mediate between state and private realm. Thus the thesis begins with a study of the 
development and structures of the state, and then proceeds to examine the private and civil society 
realms in relation to the state.  
         Chapter one examines the notion of women’s social welfare provisions, specifically as it has 
developed within conceptions of the welfare state.  The historical development of social policy 
suggests a number of possible models for the role of the state in provision, whilst feminist 
approaches add additional critiques of the welfare state and social policy. By using a liberal feminist 
critique of a typology of welfare state regimes developed by Gosta Epsing-Anderson, the chapter 
proposes that the role of the state must be recognised within the context of its relations with other 
social welfare providers such as the church, civil society organisations, the market and the family, as 
well as through analysis of the political structures which determine these relations. However, the 
second part of the chapter acknowledges the need to recognise alternative historical, economic and 
cultural environments as well, by looking at the comparative experiences of South East Asia and Latin 
America. This allows us to adapt our definition of social welfare beyond what has historically been 
the domain of the industrialized Western world. Specifically, it will demonstrate how this has been 
understood in relation to the state.  The chapter will explain the importance of understanding the 
specific historical development of the (welfare) state, in determining what and how social welfare 
should be provided and the state’s role in its provisions. It is not being argued that Jordan exhibits 
the characteristics of a welfare state–– rather that the existing literature on welfare states offers us 
some insights into what the role of the state is in terms of welfare provisions in Jordan. The 
comparative analysis of the welfare regimes in South East Asia and Latin America demonstrate 
alternative experiences of the developing world, where the state has not historically been a key 
welfare provider and where family, religious institutions and civil society organizations are more 
likely to play a key, if not the main, provider role, even today. Finally, the chapter examines the 
merits of the liberal feminist approach to welfare regimes, as opposed to alternative feminist 
positions.  In short, this chapter constructs a methodology based on liberal feminism and focuses on 
the political attributes of the state in relation to other key social players; this theoretical framework 
can then be applied to Jordan in regard to answering the central research question of this thesis. In 
sum, The development of social welfare system in the industrialised Western countries 
demonstrated that it takes place within the context of political democracy and liberal economic 
system and how this has been reflecting on the development of a social welfare system that it is 
based on sharing the responsibilities between the citizens and the state based on the constitutional 
 rights between females and males without the interference of influential social components forces in 
the decisions of the state social welfare policies.    
             Chapter two provides a vision of the political history development of the state of Jordan, its 
strong ties with the East Bank tribes and significantly how the tribal mainstream cultural affiliation of 
traditions and conservatism influences the state’s social policies regarding women’s social welfare 
needs. It also explains what type of economic system the state of Jordan pursues and how that 
reflects upon the priorities identified in regard to social welfare policies and decisions at the expense 
of women’s social welfare needs. The political and the economic roles of women of Jordan are a 
reflection of the political structure of the state of Jordan and its ties to the tribes where women are 
excluded from taking part in the political decisions, and the economic system which is of privatization 
that excludes and sharply discriminates against women’s in taking any significant role in the labour 
market. The outcome is that the state of Jordan has developed both political and economic 
frameworks which do not favour women or the satisfaction of their social welfare needs. Economic 
development has served the principal function of preserving the stability and security of the state, 
and the elite’s position at its head, rather than an ideological vision of development. Despite a 
constitutional framework favouring equality of citizenship rights for women, there exists a less 
formal power-structure which is based on traditional and cultural values and which determines that 
women should have a second-class status in reality. Significantly, an understanding of the political 
history development of the state of Jordan and as well as its economic system reflects on the 
orientation of a welfare social policy, with regard to women’s social welfare needs.  
            Chapter three elaborates on how patriarchal concepts embodied within political structures are 
then cemented within the implementation of social policies of the state of Jordan against women 
and in favour men. Having defined patriarchy, it illustrates further how citizenship laws affecting the 
social status of women, particularly in the fields of education and employment, apparently in favour 
of their equality, are actually subverted by patriarchal incentives that effectively place men in 
positions of control over women’s life. It offers significantly a demonstration that men’s power has 
been reinforced by the state, even through laws which claim to advance the status of women. Men 
are also permitted a free hand in the private (family) realm as well as in represent the institutional 
overlap between the public and private realms, specific physical and mental roles and notions are 
designed for men and women. It supports Suad Joseph’s (2) argument that “when women and 
motherhood are used as icons of the nation, they too frequently become captive to the structures 
and ideologies of patriarchy, particularly when men and fatherhood are associated with the state”. 
(3)  It therefore, enforces the “production of gendered hierarchy and facilitated the 
institutionalization of gendered citizenship in state building projects”. (4) The outcome is that 
 women of Jordan are discriminated against and exploited in both public and private realms and 
overwhelmed by cultural attitudes and practices rather than by the force their constitutional rights. 
Women are fundamentally considered to be less human than men and the state manifests less than 
enthusiasm to bring about a real change in this situation.  
            Having established that, despite its constitutional commitments, the state offers women a 
legal framework which denies them equitable social welfare provisions, the thesis turns to the 
private realm of family and tribe to see whether such provision is made elsewhere. 
            Chapter four highlights, the importance of family and tribal traditions in the life and welfare of 
women in Jordan. Jordanian women’s social’s welfare basic needs are in effect provided by the 
family rather than the state, although the chapter demonstrates the limitations again played by 
patriarchal organisation in this provision. The chapter first examines the family in the Arab context, 
and then examines more specifically the nature and role of family in Jordanian social life. A key 
aspect of this is the role played by the larger family unit, the tribe which plays an essential role in 
both the social and political life of Jordanian citizens. Arguably, the tribe carries two key functions. It 
shields the family and its members, especially women; and second, it protects the national security 
of the state of Jordan. This relationship between the tribe and the state is reflected in the way the 
tribe provides for women’s social welfare needs but more importantly on the limitations to that 
provision. By using the example of tribal support for the tradition of honour crimes, the chapter 
shows how the tribes have used their position within state structures to resist social change which 
could have meaningful benefits for women.  In sum, the tribe’s traditional and patriarchal strength 
regarding women’s social position stems from the state’s informal approval of it.  Since the tribe is 
crucial for the national security of the state, there is (relatively) no pressure on the tribe to alter 
traditional value system which segregate and discriminate against women.  Therefore, the relation 
between the state, family, tribe and women’s status is of crucial interests to all parties involved. For 
women, securing their social welfare needs through either the tribe and family or the state requires 
acquiescence with a traditional culture which subordinates them and considers them to be less than 
equal, and which can revoke their rights to provision if they fail to conform. 
             The limitations of the state with  regards to women’s social welfare provisions as well as the 
limitations of the family regarding women’s basic social welfare needs, mean that  civil society 
organizations (CSO)s  have taken the role of negotiating between the state and the family to improve 
and provide women of Jordan with their social welfare basic needs.  
            Chapter five explicitly discusses the role of the Jordanian civil society organizations (CSOs), in 
terms of their functions, and the roles they play in empowering women of Jordan and enabling them 
 to take an active participation in the political and economic spectrums of the state. The chapter 
develops profiles of a number of prominent CSOs in Jordan and their goals and activities. It shows 
that, whilst there is a profound awareness of the nature of the challenges facing women in securing 
provision of their social welfare needs, CSOs are tightly constrained in what they can do by those 
same patriarchal social attitudes which also feed through into political constraints on civil society. 
Ultimately, despite their magnificent efforts, they are forced to resort to strategies of being actually 
or effectively quasi-non-governmental organisations rather than the NGOs they aspire to be. They 
are able to manoeuvre for gains for women by working within a system of existing political and 
cultural norms rather than by challenging them outright. Their strategy is increasingly to work for 
long-term erosion of patriarchal social attitudes whilst achieving small gains in the short-term. Real 
change, which requires the state to free itself from its political dependence on patriarchal social 
forms like the tribes, can only take place over generations and through the education of both men 
and women. 
          Thus, the thesis achieves its main goal by unveiling and bringing into the light the powerful 
social forces that are constraining social policy in Jordan specifically concerning the provision of 
women’s social welfare needs. It concludes that the women of Jordan still face tremendous social 
and economic difficulties as a consequence of an un-developed political system where informal 
power structures which preferentialise men, infuse and even subvert formal political structures 
which claim to aspire to gender equality. This signifies the absence of meaningful democracy and 
equitable social rights, despite the constitutional claims of the Jordanian state, and without that 
meaningful democracy – in other words the exclusion of informal political influences, as well as 
formal conservative and tribal influences, women have little chance of achieving more than 
incremental gains in the provision of their social welfare needs. The thesis therefore demonstrates 
that the literature on social welfare states referred to in chapter one was fully justified in asserting 
the importance of democratic political experience in determining the social policy of states. 
           The thesis pursues a predominantly qualitative methodological approach, not least since 
gathering fully representative statistical data would be both practically impossible for the researcher 
but also most likely too politically sensitive to be allowed. Where statistical data is available it has 
been drawn upon, although the reliability of statistics based on government-provided data must be 
questioned at times. A qualitative approach was considered more suitable to developing an in-depth 
understanding of the experiences of women in Jordan, albeit necessarily a limited sample of women. 
This interpretive methodology means that the liberal feminist framework may interpret data 
differently from alternative frameworks and may therefore be contested, although the thesis aspires 
to present a conclusive argument.  
              This thesis has been a prolonged effort conduced through “part-time” research whilst the 
researcher was also fully employed. Whilst this means that much of the primary data collection was 
carried out between 2005 and 2007, and may therefore be considered not entirely contemporary, I 
would argue that, as well as seeking to introduce more immediately up-to-date data where possible, 
the thesis provides a rather longer-term “window” on women’s experiences than might otherwise 
have been the case and in doing so demonstrates precisely how little has changed over that time. 
             In writing this thesis, I have tried to offer a re-thinking of the current social policies regarding 
gender and women’s provisions in Jordan, moving away from the descriptive approaches which focus 
on either government statements and statistics, or alternatively the social conservatism of family, 
tribe or religion. This thesis examines social welfare provisions in a more rounded way which is 
inclusive of the range of providers, state, family and civil society organisations, examining the roles of 
each and their relations with one another. I believe it fills  a gap in  the existing  literature on 
women’s social welfare provisions in Jordan and contributes to a broader understanding of the role 
of the state in non-democratic political systems in meeting (or failing to meet) those needs.  
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                                                        CHAPTER ONE 
                                                            
                
        The Social Welfare State: Concepts, Literature & the Case of the Third World. 
 
1.1.   Introduction  
           The first undertaking of the study concerns the construction of a conceptual frame of 
reference through which we can understand the state‟s role and its importance in providing for 
the social welfare requirements of  its citizens, and in particular of women. To do this, a 
number of questions must be addressed.  Firstly, what are the social needs and requirements 
of women? Secondly, how is the state involved in providing for the welfare of its citizens, and 
particularly in terms of women? How significant is its role and who or what determines the 
nature and extent of the role that the state plays? What impact do the political structures and 
the nature of the state (including its welfare provisions) play in the lives of women? How does 
the state devise, implement, and enforces its policies and how significant is the state‟s 
provision relative to the private provision of women‟s welfare needs? 
           In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to determine a theoretical framework 
which allows us to understand and contextualise the nature of the state in Jordan, the 
relationship between the state and its citizens, the status of women in this relationship and 
within Jordan more generally (including their rights and responsibilities), and the social 
welfare obligations of the state.  There is a need to determine what women‟s welfare needs 
are, and how and to what extent they are being met. Thus a discussion of the literature that 
examines the state role is warranted. The literature must examine theoretical discussions 
relating to the making of social welfare policy more widely and, in particular, the nature, role 
and impact of the state on the lives of its citizens. 
          Defining social welfare has historically been the domain of the industrialized Western 
world. Specifically, the chapter will demonstrate how this has been understood in relation to 
the state.  Based on Gosta Esping-Andersen‟s book, The Three Worlds of Capitalism, (1) the 
chapter will explain the importance of understanding the historical development of the 
welfare state in order to determine how social welfare and the state‟s role in the provision of it 
can best be understood. It is not being argued that Jordan exhibits the characteristics of a 
 welfare state –– rather that the existing literature on welfare states offers us some insights into 
what the role of the state is – or might be - in terms of welfare provision.   
          Andersen‟s model of welfare regimes further enables us to categorise particular forms 
of welfare provision, again bringing the state to the center of the debate.  This model will be 
critiqued from a feminist and non-feminist perspective in order to demonstrate how important 
the perception of women‟s needs is in determining what role the state should or does, in fact, 
play. One crucial aspect of this evaluation is our understanding of the relative functions of the 
public and private spheres in determining and meeting women‟s needs.  
          The first part of this chapter elaborates on the experience of welfare state and its 
definitions, welfare regimes, ideologies relevant to welfare, and welfare provisions in the 
industrialized world. The second offers the alternative experiences of the developing world, 
where the state has not historically been a key welfare provider and where family, religious 
institutions and civil society organizations are more likely to play a key, if not the main, 
provider role, even today. The chapter draws on comparative analysis of the welfare regimes 
in South East Asia and Latin America to demonstrate this point. This discussion allows the 
researcher to do two things: firstly, to define the nature of the welfare state, its specificities in 
terms of its history and structure, and its relationship to other key providers in society comes 
to the fore of the research framework. Secondly, any researcher should identify deficiencies in 
the main body of literature on welfare provision which arise from the fact that most literature 
on the provision of welfare is dominated by the experience arising from the developed world. 
Thus researchers should bear this in mind when applying current welfare theory to the 
experience of countries in the developing world or to countries whose economies are in 
transition.  
           Finally, the first part of the chapter examines the merits of a liberal feminist approach 
to welfare regimes, as opposed to alternative feminist positions. In short, this part constructs a 
methodology based on liberal feminism and focuses on the political attributes of the state in 
relation to other key social players; this theoretical framework can then be applied to Jordan 
in regard to answering the central research question of this thesis.  
          A crucial point that should be made is that the concept of the welfare state as it has 
developed in Western industrialized societies should be distinguished from the concept of the 
social welfare regime.  A welfare state, as it will be shown, may only be understood as a 
product of the unique historical development of the national state itself. It is, in sum, a form or 
category of the state defined by the perceptions of its role and functions. A social welfare 
regime is the system of social welfare provision offered by the state.  The differences between 
 various social welfare regimes can be accounted for by the relative extent of the state‟s role 
compared to that of other welfare providers such as the church, family and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  In this respect, the role which the state is expected or able to play 
relative to society as a whole is crucial in determining the social welfare regime with which it 
is identified. In order to answer the main question–– What role does the state play in 
providing for women‟s social requirements in Jordan? ––we thus need to start by examining 
what social welfare regime it claims to have, why and under what constraints it must operate 
within the context of the nature of the Jordanian state itself and its relationship to society as a 
whole. 
 
1.2.   Defining the Welfare State 
           The welfare state has been defined from a number of perspectives, most notably by 
social theorists and economists. There has thus far not been one consistently agreed-upon 
definition. Definitions have been dependent upon a variety of considerations: the degree of 
economic development, the political structures of the state, and the historical period that is 
being examined.  Moreover, neither economists nor academics in the field of social policy 
have been able to agree entirely on what the state should or should not provide, irrespective of 
whether it has the economic means to offer welfare provision.   
           However, the concept of the welfare state depends essentially on the notion that the 
welfare of any country‟s citizens should be guaranteed and protected to a greater or lesser 
extent from economic and social disruption by a set of legal propositions and means of 
economic relief, and that the state should play a key role in determining and implementing the 
social policies which make this possible. Other social providers, such as the family, the 
church, or NGOs will also play a role, but one which is subordinate or subsidiary to the role 
that the state plays.    
            This notion is not uncontroversial. As it is evident in Andersen‟s clustering theory of 
welfare states, (2) it is a notion primarily relevant to the advanced industrialized societies. 
Societies in which actors other than the state play a key role in the provision of social 
requirements cannot be classified as operating welfare states. Moreover the limitations which 
inhibit states from assuming a key role in social-welfare provision are not considered by such 
definition of a welfare state. Robson (3) offers a more nuanced definition. The term of welfare 
state is used to indicate a situation in which the state bears the “responsibility to nurture 
welfare of being”. Robson argues that the welfare state is “a form of society characterized by 
a system of democratic, government-sponsored welfare … offering a guarantee of collective 
 social care to its citizens, concurrently with the maintenance of a capitalist system of 
production”. (4) For Robson, “the state in effect determines the form of the economic and 
social structure of society”. Indeed, “the use of word „state‟ is an acknowledgement of the 
active part played by the state in the social sphere”. (5) In short, Robson‟s definition reflects 
the fundamental role of the state in ensuring the welfare provisions of the citizens within a 
democratic context. 
            The importance of a democratic context is also emphasized by Eisenstaedt and 
Ahimeir (6) in their more economically oriented definition. They define the welfare state 
within the context of “economic surplus”. They argue that the development of the Western 
welfare state is largely linked to a combination of democratic and capitalist developments.  In 
their view, a welfare state is based firstly on “the economic surplus produced in the capitalist 
market of economy and that its structure must be adapted to the basic laws governing this 
economic system”. (7)  Secondly, it is based on “the political consensus produced in the 
democratic mass polity, and its structure must reflect the basic nature of this consensus”. (8) 
In short, this definition highlights the importance of the role of the state in organizing the 
relationship between the political will based on the vote of the majority and the distribution of 
the economic surplus. 
          Andersen‟s definition of the welfare state also brings together the economic and 
political realms. It stems from the position that a welfare state cannot be understood just in 
terms of the rights it grants; rather it should be seen in terms of “how state activities are 
interlocked with the market‟s and the family‟s role in social provision”. (9) In a sense the 
welfare state is an active force in the ordering of social relations. Andersen further argues that 
only a democratic means of governance and a capitalist mode of production can play an 
appropriate key role in social-welfare provisions. The welfare state is in this respect means “a 
form of a state in its own right”. 
          Kaufmann (10) stresses that the welfare state is not the exclusive domain of the state:  
indeed, the “term of welfare state must not be confined to the state only but it includes the 
civil society”. He argues that “a theory of a welfare state has to take into account the 
interactions among household production, market production and associative forms of welfare 
production, on the one hand, and political interventions on the other”. (11) 
          Marsh meanwhile (12) argues that, in a welfare state, the state‟s role is not only to 
ensure a “high material standards of living for all”, but also to intervene to secure the 
provisions of health, education, social insurance, and income distribution. (13)  Between 
them, Kaufman and Marsh put forward the idea that the welfare state is not only about 
 organizing the relationship between the citizen and the resources of the national economy, but 
also about playing a key role in the provisions of health, education, and social security, and 
that the provision of these social goods is the responsibility not only of the state but also of 
civil society and the family.  
          Rose‟s goes further. (14) He argues that “the state is not the chief institution to which 
most people turn for their welfare even though the major family concerns identified by 
opinion surveys-employment, health, education, and income are the subject of public policies. 
When people are asked who can help them most to deal with their problems, the great 
majority look to their own actions, to other members of their family, or to friends and 
neighbors and not to the state” (15)  
         Finally Marshall (16) made a linkage between citizenship on the one hand and key civil, 
political and social rights on the other. For him, without recognition of, and respect for, these 
key rights, there is no welfare state. This suggests that societies which develop and respect 
those three key rights within the framework of constitutional law may be, by definition, 
welfare states. 
 
          What these various definitions have in common is that they reflect the material and 
political experiences of welfare states as they have emerged in Western industrialized 
societies where the regulation of economic life by the state, combined with democratic 
political rules and recognition of social rights of all its citizens, underpin a powerful, 
institutionally strong state with a capacity to orchestrate social policy (a point which will be 
taken up later). 
           Historically welfare states have developed out of an historical process of social policy 
formation. Historical events and dynamic social forces led to the emergence and consolidation 
of welfare states in the Western industrialized states, and the achievements of today‟s welfare 
states have their roots in the past. The next section of this chapter considers the development 
of social policy and its translation into the welfare state to see what more can be learned about 
the welfare state itself. 
 
1.3.   The Historical Development of Social Policy 
           Social policy, as Marshall explains it, is that “policy of governments with regard to 
action having a direct impact on the welfare of the citizens, by providing them with services 
or income.” (17) Thus, social policy by and large seeks to provide the economic support, 
health, education, and social services for the citizens in order to ensure their welfare. The 
 aims of a social policy are to overcome poverty, “the maximization of welfare and the pursuit 
for equality”. (18) Social analysts concede that social policies are not always adequate and 
perfect. Social policies may, in effect, reduce the level of poverty and achieve better 
opportunities. Government has in reality only limited power and therefore the objective of 
social policy is in fact usually the more limited goal of “the improvement of the condition of 
life of the individual.”  (19) However, from the late nineteenth century until the 1970s, social 
policy developed according to a range of various political ideologies and went through a 
number of identifiable “stages”, the culmination of which may be said to be the welfare state. 
Vic and Wilding have identified six welfare ideological “positions” on social policy in which 
they assert that ideological debates have played a part the growth and the nature of the welfare 
states in shaping the modern welfare state. (20) These ideologies are as follows: “the new 
right”; “the middle way”; “democratic socialism”; “Marxism”; “feminism”; and “the 
“Greens”. (21) 
 
The New Right: War & Industrialization Presuppose Social Policy  
             From a “New Right” perspective, war and industrialization are considered to have 
been the key determinants of social policy. (22) This approach argues that the combined 
effects of wars and industrialization have forced the state to act at the social level. The lives of 
the working classes had to be improved as a preventive measure to maintain public order and 
political stability through transformative times. Nonetheless, the New Right rejects the view 
that the market and/or the government are themselves responsible for the ills of society. For 
them, if the state were to provide citizens with all the requirements of their welfare, the 
majority of the citizens would become dependent. Instead, they believe that individuals hold 
the primary responsibility for managing their lives, while the market economy will provide 
the conditions for promoting their economic welfare. Promotion of individual responsibility 
and the market economy are stressed as the basis for a social-policy framework, with the state 
taking a minimalist and “safety-net”-type role in welfare provision. Rather, the private sector 
is, in their view, the appropriate major provider of social provisions (i.e., health, education, 
and social benefits/pensions). The welfare state in the United States of America is offered as a 
prime example. In this respect, the state only intervenes in the market to protect the most 
economically needy or socially vulnerable citizens.  
           Pierson (23) provides an example of this approach to the welfare state in the body of 
existing literature on it. He argues that industrialization and the development of the capitalist 
mode of production were the key forces that triggered the development of social policy and 
 the ultimate formation of a welfare state in the United Kingdom. He regards Sir Williams 
Beveridge‟s report on social insurance on the unemployed, illness, old age and disability in 
1942 as the specific starting point from which the state began to play a key role in three areas. 
The first, and directly as a consequence of Beverage‟s report, was the introduction of a system 
of social insurance. The second was the “the extension of citizenship and the depauperization 
of public welfare”; and the third was in the growth of social expenditure”.  (24) The 
combination of these three measures led to the notion that the state should develop “national 
prosperity and be responsible for the labouring poor (who are deprived by the conditions of 
the labour markets) as a source of the national health”. (25) The state‟s intervention, 
according to Pierson, created a relationship of “duties and rights”. (26)  Pierson has identified 
the early approach to welfare provision which underpinned Britain‟s early social policy. For 
him, the combination of the industrial revolution with the political revolutions in France and 
America (in the 18
th
 century), and the “extension of democracy” in Britain (in the late 19th and 
early 20
th
 century) together created the logic and dynamic behind these early social policies. 
(27)  
            Flora and Heidenheimer in support of Pierson have similarly identified these forces: 
they convey that the formation of national states and their transformation into democracies 
after the French Revolution; and secondly, the “growth of capitalism”, led to  
….a great phenomenon of modernization-as a product 
of the increasing differentiation and the growing size  
 of societies on the one hand and of processes of social 
                                 and political mobilization of the other. (28) 
 
             Yet while early social policies were fairly limited in scope, the New Rightist idea that 
they should remain so has not gone unchallenged. Feminists oppose to this unsatisfactory 
explanation, since women are not identified as vulnerable per se and there are few state 
interventions to protect them. Women are the victims rather than beneficiaries of a welfare 
state based on this ideology when they are forced to combine entrenched social roles as 
mothers and homemakers with wage labour in an unprotected and competitive environment. 
The New Right school of thought suffers from a number of limitations. It creates privileges for 
the more powerful groups in the society, especially those who own the resources in the 
capitalist market (which could be the state itself and its apparatus). Without the intervention 
of the state to redress imbalances, such as educational and gender differentials, the poor will 
remain relatively poor, and the less privileged will remain so.  
 
 The Middle Way: Market Presupposes Social Policy 
         Perhaps a more pragmatic approach to social policy, this approach considers the market 
to be a desirable but fallible mechanism for provision of social requirements. When the 
market fails, it causes both misery and social instability. Social policy is used to restore and 
maintain social stability and alleviate the misery and hardship.  For advocates of the middle 
way, the welfare state  
              … is a natural product of the relationship which develops 
                          between  people and the state in a  democracy.   The state  
                          needs    loyalty;  voters  want –  and  need - benefits   and  
                          services. Loyalties have to be won; authority has to secure 
                          legitimation   and  respect.  There  has  to be a partnership  
                          between  state  and  people  because  „if  the   state  is  not  
                          interested   in   them ,  why  should  they   be   interest   in 
             the  state.  (29) 
 
            In effect, the middle way ideology believes that capitalism can be more efficient in 
gaining more economic ends and in  “generating economic growth” than any other system; 
but the capitalist mode of production and the free market may not always protect all of the 
people all of the time. The government has the resources and power to intervene to adjust or 
make up for market deficiencies. In this sense, the state has an important role to play in 
formulating and implementing social policy.  Marshall‟s contribution reflects the conservative 
“middle way” ideology of social policy. His argument that social welfare includes three major 
human rights is of immense importance. As stated previously, these rights are the following: 
civil rights (the individual‟s right for freedom of speech, thought, and faith; to own property 
and to receive justice; political rights; and social rights. According to him, the key aim of 
social policy is to achieve equality and abolish poverty. This comprises: 
                                 
                                   the  whole  range  from the right to a  modicum of 
            economic  welfare and security to the right to share 
            to  the full  in the social heritage and to live the life 
                                   of  a   civilized   being   according to the standards 
                                   prevailing society.  (30) 
 
        Marshall‟s view is that “welfare is a compound of material means and immaterial ends”. 
Yet crucially he maintained that, 
… collectivist social services contribute to  
the maintenance and enhancement of social 
welfare so long as such interventions do not 
                                         subvert   the    operation   of   the system of  
                                         competitive markets.  (31)  
 
             Marshall supports what is essentially a mixed economy, in accordance with the middle 
way perspective. For him, both private and public sectors are required to deliver social 
provisions. For an advocate of the “middle way”, the state is required to provide health, 
education, and social security for those citizens who unable to pay; the private sector cares for 
those who can afford to pay. Britain is currently the example of a “middle way” welfare state. 
A system of means testing underlies many social security benefits; private health care is 
available while a national health service (with restricted resources) is available on a universal 
basis. Education is equally provided by both public and private sectors. Like health, it too is 
universally available, although choice in services is frequently restricted to the private sector. 
           The middle way approach includes the vital limitation that society is divided between 
those who can afford services and those who cannot. The state may even run the risk of 
widening the social gaps between income groups if its social policies are insufficiently 
sensitive or nuanced. For feminists, this approach divides women by class and social status, 
further disempowering them. The still limited role of the state allows entrenched social and 
cultural impediments to their attainment of those civil, political, and social rights to persist. 
 
Democratic Socialism: The Role of the State is a Key 
          The democratic socialist approach to social welfare argues that the state has a 
fundamental role to play in offering universal social welfare provision. Advocates of this 
approach contend that the market cannot and should not meet the needs of all the citizens. 
Everyone should have these needs met, with the state taking the role in redistributing 
resources in order to facilitate this. Only the state can ensure equality of access to essential 
services, and a “fair” and equitable distribution of financial resources to protect citizens from 
poverty. Education plays a particular role in facilitating social mobility and ensuring equal 
opportunities. The aim of social welfare policy is to reduce the distortions of the free market 
manipulation. The social policy key goal is not a total abolition of poverty in the immediate 
term, but the maximum prosperity for all.  Titmuss contends that : 
  The  challenge  that  faces  us is not the choice between  
  universalist and  selective  services. The  real  challenge 
              resides   in  the  question  what  particular infrastructure  
       of universalistic services is needed in order to provide a 
              frame-work  of   values  and   opportunity  bases  within  
  and     around  which    can    be   developed   acceptable    
  selective  services  provided, as social  rights, on  criteria 
  of    the    needs   of   specific   categories,   groups   and    
  territorial areas and not dependent on tests of means?  (32)  
 
              Democratic socialism argues that market socialism is the appropriate means by which 
the aims of social policy may be met. The market socialism appears to be favored among the 
two others. “Its central claim is that the economic system of democratic socialism is plural in 
nature: some enterprises should be owned by the state, others privately, others cooperatively, 
others jointly between capital and labor but the emphasis should be on worker‟s co-operatives 
and worker‟s participation”;  (33) but, the worker remains the focus of welfare provision.  
Ironically, this approach emerged out of two contradictory experiences; the centralization of 
social welfare provisions as was witnessed in the Eastern European countries after World War 
II, and the recognition in some parts of Western Europe that an unfettered capitalist system 
can be de-humanizing and can fail to provide adequate social welfare to its citizens.  In both 
cases, the role of the state in social welfare provisions became central, with the Scandinavian 
countries becoming the most notable examples of this form of welfare state in Western 
Europe. 
           Democratic socialist welfare states have much to offer women, not least because social 
welfare provision is universal, not gender-based. For example, the notion that men and 
women have equal rights as workers has been translated into significant day-care provision 
for children,  encouraging women to enter the labor force and to subsequently receive the 
rights that accrue from employment (such as pensions, health insurance, etc). While such 
states have been described as promoting state feminism in so far as the state is able to over-
ride embedded social conventions of discrimination, they have also been criticized for 
creating a dependence of women on the state for their protection and a subordination of 
women to the state itself. 
 
Marxism  and Greenism: 
        These ideological perspectives perhaps have less to offer us in terms of practical 
implications for the welfare state since neither has played a particularly significant role in 
determining the modern welfare state. Marxist social policy is very much related to the 
disappearance of capitalism and seems barely relevant to those welfare states that do exist. In 
theory, Marxism considers the welfare state, in so far as it has developed in the capitalist 
industrialized West, to be a means of socially controlling human beings and in particular, the 
working class. The state itself is a tool of the dominant political class (or indeed becomes a 
class in and of itself), the purpose of which is to preserve the prevailing exploitative economic 
relations which enable it to prosper at the expense of the workers.  (34) Social policy is, 
therefore, seen one of the political mechanisms whereby class divisions are sustained. The 
 Green approach, on the other hand, and according to George and Wilding, (35) contends that 
the welfare of the human being is dependent upon a clean and sustainable environment, rather 
than upon economic growth alone. When economic growth is harmful to the environment, it 
becomes undesirable, with the search for alternative “green” means of protecting social 
welfare becoming the priority.  
 
 1.4.   The Feminist Response & Critiques to the Welfare State 
              Since the subject of this thesis is welfare provisions for women, it is appropriate here 
to refer to feminist understandings of the phenomenon. The liberal feminist approach to the 
welfare state is largely positive: it stems from the belief that “the welfare state is an approach 
to organizing economic and social relations which can be and has been used by women to 
reduce inequalities and contribute to the development of a more sympathetic public 
opinion.”(36) Liberal feminist ideology sees that the welfare state, with its policies of equal 
pay and legislation prohibiting discrimination based upon gender, uses social security systems 
as a way of indicating that the political system seeks to combat gender inequalities. In effect, 
liberal feminists argue that the welfare state gives opportunities to women to use their 
“economic and social rights” to address their own requirements. (37)  
          This view is disputed by radical and socialist feminists. They argue that the state, as a 
male-dominated structure, is not in a position to empower or improve the welfare of women. 
Rather it reinforces the traditional division of labor in the family and institutionalizes it in the 
public sector in regard to employment and opportunities. More importantly, the male is 
formalized as the head of the family and the principal breadwinner. From this perspective, the 
welfare state exaggerates the polarization of society between men and women, with 
undesirable social consequences. It actively undermines efforts to develop a society that 
promotes gender equality. Contrary to that, the state is in control of the basic resources. The 
government has the tools and equipments to fulfill its social responsibilities. Social provisions 
of citizens involve “the   state responsibilities for securing some basic modicum of welfare for 
its citizens'' (38) In this regard, citizens can use the constitutional means to demand for equal 
opportunities of employment and equal treatment of social benefits as well as improvement, 
modification and changes to the unjust provisions. In this context, the state in the liberal 
feminist view is of importance to the welfare provisions of women. In sum, social provisions 
must not be left to the church, or the only the NGOs with their limited sources and means.  
           Sainsbury‟s (39) perspective reflects her own position regarding the welfare state‟s key 
focus, which is the “economic development, stratification and the state institutions” with 
 regard to gender relations. Sainsbury argues that women‟s relation to the welfare state is one 
of being dependent and socially controlled. Her key concern and the question she poses is 
what the state welfare provision means for women? Is the state‟s aim to empower women or 
the contrary? She questions whether, if women receive benefits, are this in their interests and 
does it empower them, or does it keep them dependent and subordinate, albeit to the state 
instead of to male relatives? 
           The liberal feminist endorsement of mainstream notions of the welfare state can be 
further challenged in so far as it fails to deal with societies which have different historical, 
political, and cultural experiences and contexts from those experienced in the industrialized 
West.  
           Feminism has brought the consideration of gender into discussions over the role and 
nature of the welfare state.  In a sense, however, George and Wilding argue that feminist 
analysis has not been so much concerned with the welfare state as with the role of the state in 
general in addressing gender-based differentials. (40)  Feminism seeks an improvement in 
women‟s lives and status in both the public and private spheres and it has had to respond to 
both capitalist and socialist environments, as well as diverging cultural and ethnic/racial 
societies. As such, it has developed a number of “strands” or ideological paths, although its 
practical concerns have generally remained the same: social welfare provisions for women 
such as day care, pay for domestic work, equal opportunities, equal access to services, welfare 
payments and equal social security, and so on.     
            Four main feminist approaches regarding the role of the state and the functions of the 
welfare state are elaborated here. They are as follows: socialist feminism, radical feminism, 
black feminism, and liberal feminism.  While each is elaborated upon briefly below, it is 
worth stating at the beginning that they generally all include an element of contradiction. (41)  
On one hand, the welfare state is viewed positively as encouraging women to enter into public 
life while; on the other, it is constantly criticized for weaknesses in regard to  its “service 
provision”. Feminists accept the welfare state as a means for improving women‟s lives, but 
criticize it for a continued failure to match the standard of provisions for women with those 
for men, thus maintaining the differing statuses of men and women in public life. In this 
regard, the feminist account of the state is that it is either intentionally maintaining male 
domination or inadvertently keeping women in an inferior position.  The different ideological 
trends explain this outcome in different ways. 
 
 Socialist Feminists argue that the role of the state in the welfare system regarding women is a 
form of “patriarchal capitalism”. The capitalist economic system benefits hugely from 
women‟s unwaged labor at home. Furthermore, where women are in paid employment, it is 
clear that this subordinate position is maintained in the public sphere. Women are positioned 
in the low paid manufacturing and service jobs. The capitalist economic system, it is argued, 
assumes that women are not the primary wage-earners and the male, as the family 
“breadwinner”, is therefore the focus of their social policies and social welfare provision. 
Women have a primarily domestic function and, without comparable income or public status, 
are reduced to dependence upon and supervision by their male partners. Radical feminists go 
further, suggesting that the state––dominated by men for men––is antagonistic to women in 
general. For them, women require social welfare provision which is determined and run by 
women, for women. Society becomes polarized, and with it the role and functions of the state. 
Arguably, radical feminists are guilty of the same approach for which they criticize men: a 
biological determinism which can be viewed as narrow and short-sighted. The social welfare 
needs of women need to be addressed as a priority within a context that reduces rather than 
exacerbates gender differentials and antagonisms. The black feminists see “the state as part of 
the social and gender control apparatus of a male, racist state”. (42) The black feminist 
struggle is on two fronts: first, it is against the “white” state and second, against male 
domination of the state and its apparatuses, both of which reflect broader social divisions. 
Historically, they view the welfare state as having developed under the influence of “white” 
racial domination, which has its own impact upon black women, let alone the dominance of 
male interests.  
 
The Liberal Feminist position suggests that the state is a “neutral, disinterested arbiter open 
to the influence of sweet reason and political pressures”. (43) For the liberal feminist, the state 
can, therefore, be influenced to negate or overcome the discrimination against women and 
their interests which is generated from within society as a whole. The liberal feminist requires 
that the state pay attention to inequalities in the public sphere, in the belief that––when these 
are eradicated through policies promoting equal opportunities and equal access to income––
women will be empowered to assert their own equality in the private realm. As such, the 
welfare state is the means by which the state can redress social imbalances. This requires 
identifying women‟s specific needs and requirements and their particular vulnerabilities, and 
then devising social policies accordingly. The main limitation of liberal feminism may be said 
to be its focus on the improvement of women‟s position in the public rather than the private 
 sphere.  Neither the mainstream nor the feminist definitions of the welfare state came out of 
nowhere. One can argued that, without an improvement in women‟s domestic life and 
position, they will be unable to fully realize the opportunities presented by equality in the 
public sphere. However, identifying welfare regimes helps to further our understanding of the 
importance of the role of the state that versus other social actors such as the family and the 
church.             .   
 
1.5.   Types of Welfare Regimes: Titmuss’s Type of Welfare Regimes  
           The literature on welfare regimes offers further clues on how to approach the research 
question. Most importantly, it indicates that the state is one of a number of key social actors in 
providing social welfare, which also include the family, the market, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and so on.  To understand the role of the state, one has to compare its 
role to the other social actors. Secondly, social regime provides information about the extent 
of the state‟s coverage (that is, whether it is universal or limited). This helps to understand 
what the role of the state and its responsibilities regarding social welfare provision. Watson 
writes that Titmuss (44) suggests three types of welfare regimes based on his reading of the 
social illnesses of a respective society and the role of the state to abrogate them. 
 
 The Residual 
         Here the key social provider is the market.  Social provision is dependent on market 
performance with the state taking only a very limited role. It provides short-term social 
welfare provision in times of acute crises, focusing mainly on the poor and the very poor. It is 
a sort of remedial method for ameliorating crisis, Sainsbury argues. (45) The family and the 
market are considered to be the “natural” providers of welfare, and reliance on the state‟s 
provision should be short-term only. 
The Industrial Achievement Performance Model 
        This model speaks for itself. It provides a minimum of social security. Public provision 
is considered as complementary to the market economy, Sainsbury writes. (46) It suggests 
that the citizen‟s welfare provisions depend on his or her performance in the labour market: 
the better an individual performs, the better provisions and social security he or she receives.    
The Institutional Redistributive Model 
         This model concentrates on allocating limited resources and spending them on the most 
urgent cases using means-treated models. Titmuss names it, Watson writes the “command 
over resources through time”, (47) suggesting that this method would achieve equality. 
 Titmuss‟ basic concern is poverty, Watson states. Watson explains what Titmuss means 
regarding the above mentioned model that he sees that the advancement of industrial society 
produces undesirable social changes, with the most vulnerable segment of the society paying 
the greater cost. Rather than viewing the market as a social welfare provider, he sees it as 
creating inequalities and stigma. Social policy must address the undesirable conditions 
created. In short, he argues that social policy must adapt to this and other social changes. In 
particular, he identifies the impact of social change on the family structure as materially 
evident, with welfare regimes consequently having to target its defense of the family. Watson 
identifies this aspect of Titmuss‟ work as a strength, offering the most “fascinating account of 
the relationship between social policy and social life”. (48) Watson states that, 
       … to  understand  policy … we  have   to  see   it  
                                        in the context of a particular set  of  circumstances, 
                                        a given society and culture, and a   more   or    less 
           specified period of historical time. In  other  words, 
                                        social policy cannot be discussed in a social vacuum. (49) 
 
            Brain. Abel-Smith and Kay Titmuss (50) similarly praise Titmuss for seeing the depth 
of the impact of social programs inequalities and causalities on society. They contend that the 
social regime should “ be defended in terms of the principles of societal responsibility and the 
responsibilities of building a more caring society; it should be changed to be more useful, less 
bureaucratic, more effective, more egalitarian. They see that Titmuss called us to a grand 
vision of what a society could and of the contributions that social policy could make towards 
the realization of that vision”.(51)        
           Societal responsibility, or solidarity, is also key to Titmuss‟ vision of a welfare regime. 
He expressed a concern for developing countries that, as they witnessed the growth of the 
market as the key social welfare provider, so they would lose the social solidarity that offered 
most people basic social support. Jane Lewis (52) suggests this may be a weakness in 
Titmuss‟ analysis:  his vision of the market and the state as the two poles of provision ignores 
other vital social welfare providers in industrial societies. The family and the voluntary sector 
are ignored in his studies.  Lewis also points out that Titmuss‟ perspective on gender is 
limited.  He treated women from the rather limited point of view that they are mostly 
employed by the state institutions, but receive little attention to their social needs by the state. 
Contrary to the reality of his time perhaps, he assumed that the male was the major 
breadwinner in the family. His concern thus focused on issues such as support for working 
and, particularly, single mothers.  
           More importantly, Titmuss‟s type of welfare regime is limited to the historical Western 
social welfare experience, with no reference made to alternative cultural environments. Iman 
Babers, (53) an Egyptian sociologist and feminist, conveys her perspective from a Third 
World and a developing country‟s welfare experience such as Egypt that the Egyptian welfare 
regime and women‟s position are a reflection of how Third World countries deal with women 
regarding social provisions. Her critique of Titmuss‟s model mentioned earlier, stems from 
the idea that his analysis of welfare regimes ignores the fact that they all, in effect, make 
women more dependent on men‟s income. Titmuss himself sees no other provider than a male 
provider.  Her answer to this narrowness of Titmuss‟s analysis is that women do not have the 
same rights of access to the labour market as men. As a result, their work is basically part-
time, and the disadvantage of this is that it lessens their opportunity to social insurance.  
Therefore, women are often confined by circumstance to the informal sector. They do not 
enjoy the right to maternity leave, pension rights, or other social rights as full citizens as 
Titmuss assumes. She demonstrates that, 
                          Such inequalities are more pronounced in the Third World 
       countries   as   more  women are employed in the informal  
  sector   which  is,   by   definition,   excluded  from  social  
  insurance programmes. (54) 
 
         Nonetheless, Titmuss at least puts forward the notion that social policy is adaptive to 
changing circumstances and that there are a range of possible welfare regimes, an idea 
advanced by the work of Andersen. 
 
Gosta Esping-Andersen’s Typology 
             Andersen is a controversial social scientist, well-known for his writings on the 
welfare state and welfare regimes. Through a series of publications, he has developed a 
typology of welfare regimes which is ultimately inclusive of the experiences of non-Western 
states and which accounts to some extent for gendered questions to be discussed. This makes 
it an essential attribution to both the question and the answer of the study on which the role of 
the state is by large a key importance for provisions of women‟s social needs.  
         His first attempt in 1990, The Three Worlds of Capitalism, suggested three major types 
or clusters of welfare regimes, as evidenced across 18 welfare states in the industrialized 
advanced countries.  Anderson argued that, during the first two-thirds of the twentieth 
century, the market has become the focus for the development of different regimes of social 
protection. Within this context, the market was considered the fundamental protector of the 
 individual from risks such as “unemployment, sickness and old age”. The state and the family 
were considered secondary providers, as Ellison points out. (55) Andersen distinguished three 
key clusters of social welfare regimes which reflected the subsequent “institutional 
arrangements, the associated political infrastructures and the patterns of stratification 
associated with the distinct forms of social governance”. (56) Political arrangements are 
fundamental to Andersen‟s analysis.  
                                As  we survey international variations in social rights 
                   and    welfare    state    stratification,   we  will   find  
                                qualitatively    different  arrangements  between   the  
                                state,   market  and  the   family.  The  welfare - state  
                                variations    we    find    are   therefore   not    linearly  
                                distributed, but clustered by regime-type. (57) 
 
           Daly and Rake contend that Andersen‟s model of clustering illustrates that the 
formation of social policies and the strategies are not only diverse, but crucially adapted to 
interests of significant political actors. (58) Borchorst (59) states that Andersen‟s work is a 
rejection of the “functional theory view” that the welfare state is a product of industrialization 
processes. Rather, it is a power-resource model pinpointing effectively the interests of a 
particular political group. As Andersen concludes: politics matters and that “the history of 
political coalitions is the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations”. (60) Andersen 
broadly clusters the welfare regimes of the 18 welfare states into three key regimes regarding 
the extent of the state role in its welfare provisions for its citizens men and women. These are 
“the liberal, the conservative or a corporatist, and the social democrat”.  
 
1.  Liberal Welfare Capitalism 
          Examples of this regime are the Anglo-Saxon countries: the United States of America, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Australia. Where a liberal 
regime exists, the state encourages the market on two fronts. On the one hand, it actively 
subsidizes private welfare schemes: more passively, it offers only very limited social welfare 
schemes, one which is targeted at the most needed members of society and on a means-tested 
basis.  Social rights are limited with “little distribution of incomes”.  It is, in effect, 
“characterized by a low level of decommodification”. (61)  “De-commodification” is 
understood to mean that the outstanding criteria for social rights must be the degree to which 
they permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces.  W. Arts 
and J. Gilissen argue that this type of regime encourages the polarization of the society (62) 
with two distinctive groups emerging; a state dependent minority and a majority that is 
 privately insured.  Women receive little attention from the liberal welfare regime. Their status 
is defined by the traditional family-based sexual division of labour. When women work 
outside the home, they are encouraged to work in the service and lower-paid sectors, as Arts 
and Gelissen point out. The outcome is that women receive less income, fewer social security 
benefits, and lower social insurance. More importantly, they become heavily dependent on 
their male family members to support them.  Moreover, with no institutional measures in 
place to assist women in countering traditional social prejudices and obstacles to formal 
employment, there is always the danger that women‟s employment will be concentrated in the 
informal sector, which lacks all social protection and social insurance.   
           Andersen argues that the liberal welfare regime is basically “a residual one”. He 
contends that the (social welfare) benefits of the regime are related the “risks” posed by 
individuals: social assistance is given solely to the very needy, high-risk, individuals.  For the 
most part, however, the market assesses and provides for the individual‟s needs. He therefore 
contends that “the residual approach cultivates dualism: the good risks are self-reliant in the 
market; and the bad become „welfare dependents‟”. (63)  Ellison argues that the terms 
“welfare” and “state” do not sit together comfortably with liberal regimes. (64) In a sense that 
“these regimes have relatively ungenerous, means-tested benefit systems or social insurance 
programmes and high level of inequality. Moreover, social goods and services are delivered 
by voluntary or private agencies at once remove from the state”. (65)   
 
2.  Conservative or Corporatist Welfare Regimes 
           Examples of this type of regime can be found in Northern and Western Europe:  in 
Austria, France, Belgium, and Germany. Its basic characteristic is “moderate 
decommodification”. In elaborating, such regimes are shaped by two historical legacies:  
Catholic social policy and corporatism, or “étatism”.  The Catholic heritage embodies a desire 
to protect traditional family structures, while the corporatist legacy means that income 
maintenance benefits are delivered directly by the state and are directly related to 
occupational status.  Solidarity is narrow and corporatist, with the state only interfering if the 
family‟s capacity is exhausted.  Employees enjoy compulsory insurances, with the regime 
favoring a “new, post-industrial class structure”. The state reinforces status differences, rather 
than redistributing benefits and wealth.  Andersen states that: “The étatist legacy remains 
strong in the privileged treatment of public civil services, especially in Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Italy. The civil service benefits not only from having its own scheme 
but, also from vastly more luxurious eligibility and benefits rule”. (66) Sainsbury contends 
 that “benefits are designed to maintain the status quo with respect to income distribution, class 
structure, and societal institutions, the state, the church and the family”. (67) 
           Conservative or corporatist regimes are strongly familial. They are “a composite of the 
male breadwinner bias of social protection and the centrality of the family as care-giver and 
ultimately responsible for its family member‟s welfare (the subsidiary principle)”. (68)  
Andersen therefore classified Japan as exhibiting a corporatist welfare regime, holding that 
the familarist. Confucianism is a functional equivalent of Catholic familialism in shaping its 
social policy.  
          Andersen argues that the more familial a welfare regime is, the less generous are the 
state‟s contributions to family benefits. (69)  Women play a key role as social careers of the 
family, and are sustained by voluntary and private service providers. To protect these family 
structures, married women are discouraged from joining the labour market. (70) Family 
benefits encourage motherhood; however, “non-working wives” are excluded from social 
insurance. In sum, states reinforce the traditional gendered division of labour, while the 
regime places the burden of caring on women, while offering them little or no protection 
outside the family itself. 
 
3. The Social Democratic/Universalistic Welfare Regime 
           Examples of this type of regime include the Nordic countries: Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, and Denmark. This regime‟s principal characteristics are as follows: universal 
provision of social welfare benefits, full employment, and a central role in social welfare 
provisions for the state. Women within this regime are encouraged to join the labour market 
provided with free day-care to help women to go to work. The state provides a range of high 
social services and these are not dependent on an individual‟s contribution. (71) Andersen 
states these features of the social democratic regime as follows: Service‟s and benefits are 
upgraded to levels commensurate with even the most discriminating tastes of the new middle 
class; equality is furnished by guaranteeing workers full participation in the quality of rights 
enjoyed by the better-off. Andersen further explains that this regime recognizes broadly 
similar social rights for diverse groups, including workers and civil servants. More 
specifically, they are all covered by one, universal, social-insurance regime. Political 
opposition in these countries is against the extended role of the state, arguing for a mixed 
economy and a greater role for the private sector. Yet, in spite of the welfare crisis from the 
mid-seventies and the drop in employment rates that has characterized them, these regimes 
are thus far still keeping to their high standards of equality. In sum, Andersen states that this 
 regime is a reflection of the following relationship between the state, the market, and the 
family: 
 This   model  crowds  out  the  market,  and consequently  
 constructs   essentially   universal   solidarity in favor of 
                         the   welfare   state.   All   benefit: all are dependent; and  
                         all    will    presumably    feel    obliged   to   pay ….  The  
                         result   is   a welfare   state  that   grants transfers directly 
 to   children,   and  takes   direct  responsibility for caring 
                         for    children,     the  aged,    and   the   helpless.     It   is  
                         accordingly,     committed    to  a    heavy    social-service  
                         burden,   not   only   to   service    family  needs  but  also 
                         to   allow    women    to   chose   work   rather   than  the  
                         household. (72) 
 
     Andersen‟s initial study therefore argued ultimately that: 
 
                            Notwithstanding   the   lack   of   purity, if our essential 
                            criteria   for   defining   welfare   states have to do with 
                            the   quality   of    social    rights,  social  stratification, 
                            and   the   relationship   between the state, market, and  
                            the    family,    the    world    is    obviously  composed 
                            of distinct regime-clusters. (73) 
      
           The following table summarizes the specific characteristics of Andersen‟s model of 
three welfare regime types. The picture reflects clearly the extent of the role of the state in 
each welfare regime. 
 
                                 Liberal                  Social Democrat                 Conservative 
 
Role of:  
Family                       Marginal              Marginal                                 Central 
Market                      Central                 Marginal                                 Marginal 
State                          Marginal              Central                                   Subsidiary   
Welfare State: 
Dominant mode         Individual            Universal                                     Kinship 
Of Solidarity                                                                                           Corporatist 
                                                                                                                  Etatist 
  
Dominant Locus 
Of Solidarity                    Market                   State                                      Family 
 
Degree of  
Decommodification         Minimal                 Maximum         High (for Bread-Winner) 
 
Model Examples               USA                       Sweden                       Germany- Italy. (74) 
           
            In his second key publication in 1999, (75) Anderson apologizes for having neglected 
the issue of the role of the family and his attempt to underlie the relationship between the 
 state, market and the family. (76)  He now argued that social welfare provision in the 
developed economies is shaped by the three providers, with the particular combination of 
welfare provisions being related to the form of the political order. Each of these 
institutionalized arrangements for social welfare provision produces both desirable and 
undesirable social results.  He contends that the labor market is not a simple social acquisition 
that is broadly spoken about. The labour market functions according to a range of factors, 
including the “nature of work”, the gender composition of the workforce, the structure of 
industrial relations, and so forth. (77) These are not easily designed according to the 
objectives of a welfare state––even if the political will exists, the immediate needs of labour 
supply and profit maximization may overrule the more long-term desire for equality and 
social justice.  Within this context, greater inequality based on gender will be visible: the state 
will rush to aid the market and, in doing so, may inadvertently exacerbate gender differentials 
and discrimination. The family is regarded as a key social provider and social player. Women 
play a particular role, as caretakers, caregivers, and more importantly, as mothers of future 
generations. The majority of women who are in this position find that their “family” labour is 
unpaid and no formal social welfare protection accrues from it. The state has meanwhile been 
the key social welfare provider, especially during the post World War II period. It has 
generally guaranteed a high level quality of social, political, and economic stability, far more, 
according to Ellison, than have the private or voluntary sector. The state in developed 
economies has removed the burden of these provisions from the private employer and 
“subsided welfare capitalism by providing educational and training support, health care and 
other benefits”. (78) Andersen sums up by saying that, during the previous three decades, 
every welfare regime had demonstrated its own combination of the three key actors in 
provision of social welfare. (79) 
 
A Feminist Assessment of Andersen’s Typology of Welfare Regime Types 
           Both feminists and non-feminists put Andersen‟s clustering theory (80) under the 
microscope. The mainstream critique often focuses on the notion of “de-commodification”, 
which, it is argued, in some ways represents a fourth “type”, an ideal type of welfare regime 
according to Andersen. While he concluded that “Scandinavian countries have the highest 
levels of de-commodification”, this remains a relative concept in the absence of a real ideal-
type. It signifies that there is not a real perfect type of a welfare state even amongst the 
Scandinavians welfare states. (This is clearly a crucial point, since “de-commodification” 
affects the power relations between social classes to the benefit of the working class).  
             Andersen admits that there are no pure types of welfare regimes against which others 
may be measured, but he remains confident that the three types of welfare regimes are the 
product of their historical forces, are “qualitatively developed” and are therefore relevant. 
There is no pure example of a welfare regime, since every economy is a “mixed economy” to 
some degree. (81) Arts and Gelissen (82) prescribe not only a fourth, but also a fifth welfare 
“type” of welfare regime to be included to Andersen‟s model. They redefine Andersen‟s 
categories within the European continent as follows: the Scandinavian welfare states, the 
Bismark countries, and the Anglo-Saxon countries. They then identify a Latin Rim cluster, 
distinguished by the lack of a system of minimum social rights. However, they point out that a 
fifth welfare regime can be included if the stratification criterion is being used as a 
measurement of typology. These are as follows: “conservative”, “liberal”, “social 
democratic”, “radical”, and a “hybrid European cluster”. (83) 
          For Arts and Gelissen, Andersen‟s typology suffers on two principal accounts: first is 
the neglect of the family‟s place in social welfare provisions (although this is acknowledged 
by Andersen in his later works as has already been pointed out) and second is his 
“all-or-nothing” approach to women‟s inclusion in welfare provisions. They argue that: 
                         Instead    of    employing    the    all - or- nothing   words  
   „inclusion    and   exclusion‟   to    gender       differences, 
             it   seems  sensible   to   stress   the  importance of partial 
             citizenship.    Women   obtained   full   civil and political 
              rights   a   considerable   time   ago,  but  with  regard   to  
                         social   rights,   women    are  still discriminated   against,  
                         sometimes   formally,  and    nearly    always    informally 
                         of   different   labor   market positions, linked to different 
                         gender roles. (84) 
 
           Borchurst provides a feminist account to Andersen‟s to his early typology of welfare 
regime. (85) Borchorst claims that Andersen‟s analysis of the social equations between the 
state, market, and the family has not been adequately analyzed or investigated in depth. The 
family role was pivotal, as was evident when Andersen addressed the incorporated continental 
social welfare regimes and how the family addresses its members‟ social problems. However, 
the sexual division of labour within and between the family and within and between the state 
and the market was not effectively addressed. Secondly, Borchurst argues that the crucial 
difference between making the individual or the family the basic unit of investigation did not 
receive significant attention. Thirdly, she suggests that Andersen‟s analysis totally ignored 
gender in discussing “income transfers” for such things as pensions, unemployment benefits, 
and sickness benefits. She claims that Andersen paid insufficient attention to the service 
 sector, concentrating only on the public-private mix, rather than the nature of the economic 
activity itself. If Andersen had included an analysis of the relationship between the private 
sector and the family, he would have discovered how crucial the social services are to 
women‟s welfare, she argues. (At the same time, she herself declines to suggest that services 
must be included because they are not easily “measured and operationalised”. (85) Borchorst 
states that the “de-commodifcation” process is not only different between the regimes, it is 
also different between for men and women within and between regimes. For example, she 
writes that, 
Marriage     tends    for    instance   to   have   the   opposite  
effect    for    men    than   for women.  Married  men  often 
           have   more   permanent   connection  to  the   labor  market 
          than   unmarried,   whereas   married   women often   adapt 
          their   labor   market   participation  to   their   responsibility 
           in   the  family,   especially,  the  care  of  children. Policies 
             may   work   in   the  direction of supporting or altering this 
                        pattern. (86) 
             
         Borchorst suggests that women must have the knowledge prior to receiving the benefits, 
whether or not they receive it as individuals or as families. This reflects the importance of the 
“public care” regarding the position of women in general, she argues. On a more positive 
note, she praises Andersen‟s analysis for rejecting the “functional theory” that the welfare 
state is a product of the industrial revolution. In assessing welfare regimes as the product of a 
political classes and variations in regimes as reflecting their varying interests and power-
sharing, he has offered a departure point for analyzing the particular situation of women 
within European countries.  
            Andersen replies (87)   that he regrets his neglect of the issue of gender which is 
conceived in the relationship between the market, the state, and the family. He suggests that: 
“the typology, regardless of political origins, becomes static in the sense that it reflects the 
socio-economic conditions that prevailed, then namely an economy dominates by industrial 
mass production; a class structure in which the male, manual worker constituted the 
prototypical citizen; and a society in which the prototypical household was of the stable, one-
earner kind”. (88) He therefore argues that the key casualty of today is “women‟s role in the 
society”.  A key implication of this change is the extension of the service economy, accounts 
for the “disappearance of housewifery”. Therefore, “women occupy centre-stage in the post-
industrial society”, in his view. (89) He elaborated by saying that the male security of the 
post-war decades stemmed from the notion that man is the only breadwinner and his security 
 encompasses all forms of security. This assumption no longer prevails. The change is owed to 
the fact that “women began to join the labour market as a result of the spread of capitalism 
and globalization. Man used to be the nexus between the economy and the family: but now 
women emerge to become the lynchpins of any balance between the economy and the 
households”.  Andersen writes that: 
                        The   move  of  women   into  paid employment implies a    
                     double      job       multiplier,     visible    on     both     the  
                        consumption    and    production   side   of   the   national  
     accounts   ledger.    Their    earnings   add   to households 
                        purchasing    power;      their      employment       reduces  
                        households     available    time    to    service    their  own  
                        needs. (90)  
 
            He therefore addresses the issue of gender by exploring the question of equality 
between the sexes: whether or not it should be equality or equity. The two terms are, in effect, 
interwoven. A “women-friendly” policy is most likely to be the solution to such a complicated 
issue, although he concludes that: “the egalitarian challenge is unlikely to find resolution 
unless, simultaneously, the male life course becomes more feminine”. In other words, “if we 
want more gender equality our policies may have to concentrate on men‟s behavior”. (91) 
           In sum, Andersen‟s analysis of three models of welfare regimes is a useful starting 
point for this thesis. It opens up the boundaries of welfare-regime typologies, and thus enables 
us to measure the provision of social welfare in one country against that provided elsewhere. 
Welfare regime typologies allow us to identify the role of the state in terms of welfare 
provisions and the extent of both its direct and indirect involvement in the well-being of its 
citizens. It also allows us to identify other relevant social welfare providers, notably the 
market, the family, the church and voluntary or civil society organizations and associations, 
and to categorize their contribution relative to the state. 
            It offers less in terms of social welfare provisions where women are specifically 
concerned, although some insight is given as to the importance of women‟s role in the family, 
and the impact on women of state
 
market-family relations. By leaving behind the functional 
approach, which sees social policy as determined by the processes of industrialization, we are 
able to accommodate the impact of political structures (liberal, corporatist or social 
democratic) on social policy, but “easy” typologies do not help us to understand the relative 
impact of these on women‟s welfare as opposed to social welfare provision as a whole. The 
role and status of women within the political (public) sphere become crucial in determining 
how political structures affect social policy regimes. Equally, one cannot look at the economy 
 as a unitary entity with a single impact. The place of women in the economy, their 
engagement with paid employment in formal and informal sectors, and their domestic 
economic status, all have to be considered as playing a role in determining social welfare 
policy and provision. Finally, the fact that Andersen‟s analysis is confined to the welfare 
regimes of Europe imposes clear limitations on its relevance.  To assume, for example, that 
Confucianism can fit a Catholic template is simplistic, while the historical and political 
experiences of non-European states must––according to Andersen‟s own logic––have played 
a part in determining very different welfare regimes. By reviewing the main works on social 
welfare regimes outside Europe, an understanding can be reached as to how we may approach 
the social-welfare regime of Jordan.                                                                     
                                                    
1.6.   Welfare Regimes and Women’s Social Welfare Needs in the Third World 
             While, as has already been seen, the major research on this subject has been focused 
on the developed industrial world, Jordan‟s historical experience as a less developed or Third 
World state must be considered. In such countries, the role of the state is different, with 
welfare provision playing a smaller part in its activities. Key social players other than the state 
influence the formation of social policy in these societies, filling in the “gaps” where the 
state‟s role is limited or unable to offer social welfare provision. Political parties (for example 
in Latin America), the family (in South East Asia), religious institutions (for example 
churches and mosques), and civil society organizations all play an immensely important role 
in supplementing the limited role of the state.  
            The states of the developing world cannot be directly compared with advanced 
industrial or post-industrial states. A few characteristics might be superficially similar, but the 
substance is evidently different. A number of factors underlie the sharp difference between 
the former and the latter, including historical background, economic status, and social, 
political and cultural formations. The differences are sharpened when it comes to concepts of 
welfare. Welfare regimes in the developing and less developed countries have different 
meanings and fulfill different functions to those of the advanced industrialized nations. The 
concept of welfare state in the latter is closely linked to ideas of citizenship and the 
entitlements to which a citizen is due.  A citizen has an institutionally recognized status which 
enables him or her to access prescribed economic, social, civil and political rights. The 
enforcement of these is guaranteed within a context of laws and regulations, which are upheld 
and enforced by the state. The role of the family and the church has been, in recent times, 
diminished in industrialised and post-industrial societies, while the role of the state has been 
 enhanced. The state has an institutional strength which enables it to regulate the relationship 
between the market and itself and between the market and the family. As Al-Khouri states, in 
the developed world it is therefore the case that: 
   
          Social  services,  taxes,  and  citizenship  are   therefore 
          essential and inter - related  components of the welfare 
         state. In addition, the idea of  employment  as  a  right 
                   still underlies some of the thinking of  the welfare state. (92) 
 
         Or, as Rose and Shiratori emphasis when discussing the case of Europe: 
        
 The state is regarded as having a major responsibility 
                                  to provide welfare for all its citizens  through  public 
  education, a national health service, and the generous 
                                  provision   of   pension   and   income   maintenance 
                                  payments to the unemployed. (93) 
 
           In contrast, the state in less developed countries seems to play a more minor role. The 
literature suggests that social policies are more directly economically and politically 
motivated and are more closely associated to economic and political change. Consistency in 
social policy is undermined by political fluctuations and, with the state often being more 
institutionally weak and less well-resourced, the role of the state is more minimal: it only 
interferes to provide for the poor and often only in acute cases. Above all, as the state in these 
societies is increasingly oriented towards the market economy, the state‟s priorities become 
combating “poverty and the unemployment” (94) rather than welfare provisions for all. 
          Ian Gough (95) has written extensively about both the North-East and South-East Asian 
social welfare regimes, as well Latin America‟s social policies and welfare regimes. His 
writings are focused on the economic and social problems of these continents, especially in 
relation to the experiences of the Western industrialized countries, and the impact of 
globalization on the indigenous political and economic structures. More specifically, they 
focus on how social policies have adapted to change. His findings are that family and religion 
are key providers for the poor and unemployed family members. More importantly, social 
policy is constructed around the family and religious beliefs rather than around concepts of 
individuality, citizens rights, and capitalist economic growth. Gough‟s work underlines above 
all how the “goals, targets and provisions” of welfare regimes in these regions differ from 
those in the advanced Western societies. He demonstrates that the role of the state in these 
societies is also different, as are the expectations in regard to social welfare provisions.  While 
the state plays a minimal role, the family remains the central provider of social welfare.  
           Gough highlights the institutional weakness of the state in the East and South East 
Asian societies:, he states that they are  “less embedded, lacking democratic practices, have 
lower state infrastructural capacities and less autonomous state institutions”. (96)  Moreover, 
regarding political mobilization, he writes that there exists “a different distribution of power 
resources: weaker class organization of politics and more particularistic, regional, patrimonial 
and clientelistic forms, resulting in the „adverse incorporation‟ of weaker groups”. (97) In 
other words, the inclusiveness of social policies is variable and dependent on informal access 
to political power or patronage. In the absence of a strong state infrastructure, secure from 
partisan or short-term political manipulation, social welfare becomes the domain of groups 
other than the state, ranging from “religious or enterprise-based organizations, NGOs, foreign 
aid organizations, local/communal associations, clans and households”.(98) There is also 
some provisions made within other aspects of state economic activity which are not directly to 
be considered as social policy, such as “consumption subsidies, agricultural support, work 
programmes, and micro-credit schemes”. Within the context of welfare outcomes, they 
represent a “lower level of welfare outcomes, except among the rich. “De-commodification” 
is irrelevant in this context”. (99) 
           Gough contends that in the countries he studied, key government expenditures went 
mainly to “civil servants, the military and the police and teachers” so as to promote a high 
level of education. “State expenditure and revenues was below one fifth of GDP and public 
social expenditures are very low except education”. Health expenditure was low, except in the 
cases of some public health insurance schemes. Social protection, including pensions, was 
also remarkably low. Public programmes providing formal safety nets were minimal. Labor 
legislation provided little or no protection against redundancy, or compensation for it or for 
outright dismissal. Moreover, the health and safety of the workplace was poor, and poorly 
regulated. This background means that both North- and South-East Asian societies depend 
enormously on civil society organizations (NGOs and International NGOs) and on the family 
in terms of meeting social-welfare needs. Given the lack of investment by the state with 
regard to social provisions, vital sectors such as health and education fall into the hands of the 
private market. Not surprisingly then, despite all efforts spent to improve the development of 
these societies, they still suffer to a great extent from poverty and inequality. (100) 
         In effect, Gough applies Andersen‟s model of welfare regimes to the North and South 
East Asian welfare regimes and presents them as a fourth type of welfare regime. For Gough, 
globalization has had an enormous impact on the social policies of Asian states. Economic 
and social difficulties become exacerbated, with relief being increasingly dependent on 
 provisions by international and local NGOs. These serve the function of assisting, or lessening 
the impact of, the economic adjustments of the Asian economies so as to enable them to meet 
international economic requirements. Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines, for example, developed their current social policies as a response to the economic 
crises that took place between 1997 and 1999.  The external actors are thus significant for 
social-welfares in developing and less developed countries, far more than they are for 
Western or developed economies. Gough suggests that this fourth welfare regime may be 
termed productivist welfare capitalism. He describes it as follows: 
         Social policy is subordinated to economic policy and the   
      imperatives      of      growth.     Social        expenditures 
                          were     small   but    relatively   well   targeted  on basic  
                          education    and     health    as    part    of    strategy    of  
                          nation-building,      legitimation      and       productive  
  investment.   The    growth     of   welfare   over the last  
  three   decades  has  relied  on  the  expansion of formal  
  employment    within   the    orbit  of   strong    families,  
  plus   growing   payment   for   services.  Overseas   aid 
                          was   diminishing   but  the   social  actors were open to 
                          foreign  commercial  penetration. (101) 
  
                     Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are referred to as being more advanced with their welfare 
regimes than other East Asian states,  and as being more likely to imitate the West‟s social 
regimes. It should be noted, however, that Catherine Jones (102) has argued that 
Confucianism plays a major role in the design and implementation of social-welfare policies 
in Japan, irrespective of this state‟s level of development or its “westernized” models of 
growth. Confusionism provides a dominant cultural context in which the family bonds are 
stressed, as are education, social harmony, and the notion of the father as the head of the 
family. (103) 
          Goodman and Peng also argue that Japan‟s social welfare regime is family oriented and 
“negates much of the need for state welfare”. Moreover it is a “status-segregated with residual 
social insurance base system”. Finally “core workers” insurances are left to corporate 
occupational plans. Confucian and indigenous traditions are vital in the formation of the 
social-welfare policies and the state reaffirms the role of the family and private transfers in 
social welfare. (104) 
         The literature on North- and South-East Asian states that economic growth does not 
necessarily lead to Western-style social-welfare regimes. In those countries that have  been 
studied, social-welfare regimes have emerged in accordance with indigenous value systems 
which recognize the role of family-based support and community-based mutual aid.  It should 
 be noted, however, that social policies have been developed in a largely reactive manner, 
responding to economic crises or the demands of external actors, rather than as the result of 
political ideology or long-term planning. (105) 
 
Social Welfare Regimes in Latin America 
         The literature on social-welfare regimes in Latin America offers us some different 
insights. Here social-welfare regimes appear to be more of a reflection of the struggle between 
political power and religious affiliation. 
         Borzutzky (106) has argued that the Church becomes a major social-welfare provider 
because of the nature of the political context in these countries.  Political parties often draw 
their strength from their support for the social-welfare needs of elite groups, the military and 
the higher ranks of the civil service, offering them higher pensions and greater welfare 
protection. Political elites establish social policies and targets according to their own political 
ambitions, targeting the needs of powerful political patrons, rather than the population as a 
whole. The social welfare needs of the poor, or of disadvantaged groups like women, who 
have little political clout, are left to the care of religious institutions, NGOs and INGOs.  
         Carmelo Mesa-Lego (107) argues that economic liberalization has exacerbated the 
problem for the lower layers of Latin American society. Liberalization has strengthened the 
power of the elite, and increased the inequality and impoverishment of the majority. While 
some piece-meal reforms of the health and pensions sectors have been implemented, larger-
scale structural reform has not been seriously considered. There is little political interest in 
initiating reforms to alleviate inequality and poverty. Mesa-Lego‟s findings are supported by 
Evelyne Huber‟s (108) study of welfare insurance and social security in four key Latin-
American countries: Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica. In particular she argued that 
unemployment insurance regimes were “underdeveloped” and that social insurance was 
largely associated only with paid work. According to Mesa-Lego, the two key problems in 
regard to Latin American social-insurance regimes are the limited coverage provided (not 
least in excluding the large informal sector) and the fragmentation of, and inequalities in, 
entitlements. Since social insurance is associated with formal paid work, a large proportion of 
the rural and urban poor are excluded. Attempts to decrease the level of inequality and 
fragmentation have been faced with resistance by privileged groups. 
         Latin American social welfare regimes are different from each other, taking into account 
their different historical political and economic development.While Chile demonstrates a 
residual type of regime, Brazil is moving towards more universal provisions in health care and 
 pensions. Like most states in the region, both were hit badly by the economic crisis of the 
1980s. The subsequent economic restructuring offered the opportunity for large-scale reforms 
of social policy and social-welfare provisions. However, not all states were willing or able to 
engage in this task. Much depended on the ability (or inability) of the state to meet its 
financial obligations, especially as poverty had become and has become an increasingly grave 
issue. A key problem in implementing change has been the “inadequate extractive capacity of 
the state and the inability of the political system to pass reforms that would reduce social 
spending for privileged groups”. (109) In other words, governments must be autonomous of 
the vested interests of privileged groups and able to implement effective and redistributive 
taxation policies. Both have proved difficult in Latin America, especially as larger economic 
restructuring has become a priority.    
         Chile pursued a path of privatization and export-orientation, at the expense of destroying 
much of its domestic industry. To do this, it implemented vigorous anti-labour policies, while 
supporting the interests of those with capital. As a result, it developed a two-tier welfare 
regime in which private social welfare schemes were promoted for those who could afford it, 
while the state provided a minimum of support for those on low incomes. This privatization of 
social welfare was one of President Pinochet‟s major goals, which, according to his critics, 
was as follows: “it did so with a complete disregard for any opposition from popular and even 
middle class groups, as well as for the distributional consequences of the government policies 
for the poorer sectors. The only exceptions were a few special programmes targeting the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups. Under the two democratic governments in Chile, the new 
power distribution has heavily favored capital. The process of economic concentration and the 
dependence on foreign capital, combined with the emasculation of union strength through 
physical repression and the drastic shrinking of traditional bases of union organization, have 
produced a situation where pressures from capital against significant labour and social policy 
reforms easily outweigh pressures in support of such reforms from labor and other popular 
groups”. (110)  Successive governments have maintained this strategy. 
         In contrast, Brazil has maintained a strong non-contributory welfare regime, along with 
its anti-labour and pro-capital economic policy. Its social-welfare regime is an attempt to 
build political support among the rural population via officially-administrated syndicates in 
order to achieve mass coverage. The members of the scheme benefit from pensions, minimum 
wages, and health care. Regardless of the latter, Brazil has not been exempted from the 
problems besetting other social-welfare regimes in the region. Provision, albeit non-
contributory, is on a fragmented and politically motivated basis. Weak political parties and 
 clientalism abound, while painful policies of economic reform are pursued (in the interests of 
capitalist elites and the global economy) at the expense of the impoverished masses, who can 
do little about this phenomenon, given the fragility of democratic political mechanisms.  
          Costa Rica has pursued yet another route. While still emphasizing growth based on 
(non-traditional) agricultural and manufacturing exports, and providing tax incentives and 
subsidies to businesses to engage in those activities, it implemented policies of severe 
austerity in other areas of government expenditure in order to underpin a universalist welfare 
regime. Employers were required to maintain their contribution to social security, and the 
self-employed were offered a voluntary contributive scheme. Health care was then publicly 
provided and minimum of social insurance was offered.  
          Nonetheless, as is typical in most of states in the region, its social-welfare regime is 
relatively underdeveloped. Even the more advanced welfare regimes of the region have fallen 
far short of their goals. As Huber explains, the key problem in these countries is that the state 
still plays a minor role in welfare and social provisions. Social policy is specifically used as a 
political means to “promote the ideological visions of a desirable social order and to build, or 
destroy, support bases”. (111) 
         Where the state does get involved, it is often in terms of specific and limited 
programmes, rather than in the formulation of long-term policies and strategies. For example, 
nutritional programmes, which subsidize basic food stuffs, can be targeted at the poorest 
women and children. These types of subsidies are effectively much cheaper than the means-
tested systems which are used in liberal and conservative welfare regimes in advanced 
industrialized countries. Alternatively, states may engage in a “social funds approach”. 
Targeted emergency programmes are partly financed by international financial institutions as 
they support broader economic reforms, thus having some impact in the fight against poverty. 
This type of programme can be helpful if the goal of a permanent universalistic of social 
insurance and institutions keeps progressing, but offers only temporary and unsustainable 
relief if a broader development of social welfare is not undertaken.  In general, however, the 
role of the state in Latin America in providing social welfare is minor, inefficient, and 
insufficient. The state‟s role in effect responds only to the elite‟s basic interests. If the elites 
(the military force and top civil servants, for example) feel that the ruling party is not 
responding to their needs, they have the power to change the political regime. The experience 
of Latin America suggests that weak state structures, which are vulnerable to the interests of 
the political or economic elites, inhibit the development of social policy, and only on a 
fragmentary and short-term basis.  Democratic elections or political systems are not in 
 themselves a guarantee of good social policy if the state remains vulnerable to such vested 
political interests. 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
          The approach taken by this study thus far has aimed foremost to provide a series of 
clues as to the nature of the welfare state and the consequence implications for women‟s 
social welfare provisions. It has raised the importance of the historical and political 
experience of state development in the formulation of social policy and the role allocated to 
the state in the provision of social welfare. In the case of industrialized Western European 
countries, the experiences of industrialization and political enfranchisement were key 
contributors to the development of social policy. The impact of capitalist (or non-capitalist) 
economic activity has to be considered, as does the degree to which the economic resources of 
a country can be directed by the state towards social-welfare provisions. Whether the state has 
the institutional means to do this is also a key consideration. This means we have to examine 
the degree to which the state has the political capacity and the will to engage in social-welfare 
policy. The nature of the political system therefore matters. The experience of Latin America 
suggests that democratic political structures are not sufficient in themselves in terms of 
provisions, if they have been hijacked by the interests of the elite. The relationship between 
the citizen and the state is important, not least in determining the degree to which the state can 
or is expected to engage in something more than just mediating the relationship between the 
market and the citizen. Political systems also reflect society understands of whether the state 
is expected to provide social goods, such as equality, political or human rights, and protection 
from unforeseeable harm. The discussions on the welfare state also raised the issue of the role 
of non-state actors. In particular, the market and the family play significant roles in providing 
for social welfare. The balance of responsibility may be a result of the impact of political 
ideologies on social policy (as was evident from the typologies of social policy) or from 
engrained indigenous cultures and traditions (as was evident from discussions of East-Asian 
and Latin American social welfare regimes).  
         This chapter has also led to the study pursuing a liberal feminist approach to the study. 
The evidence presented so far suggests that the state can play a positive role in alleviating the 
disadvantages suffered by women in the arena of social welfare. However, it has also 
suggested that local historical, cultural and social specificities can shape or indeed inhibit the 
state‟s effectiveness in providing for women‟s social welfare. (Indeed, an initial assertion of 
the power of influential patriarchal, conservative and religious elements in Jordanian society, 
 suggests that the Jordanian state cannot be understood without reference to such specificities). 
The study is feminist furthermore in its belief that social  stability stems from executing a 
social policy that brings equality to the citizens men and women without discrimination based 
on sexual division of labour and with the force of law without permitting those influential 
social elements to override the constitutional  rights. However, to properly assess the role 
played by the state in doing this, the relationship between the state and women as citizens will 
need to be deconstructed.  This means looking at their political rights in Jordan, as well as 
how the state serves to either reinforce the traditional role and status of women or to challenge 
it in their interests and against vested male interests. The degree to which women may 
participate in politics and in making the state represent their voices and interests is important, 
since this will dictate to some degree the extent to which social policy will be directed 
towards meeting their particular needs. 
          As the studies of East Asia and Latin America show, indigenous cultural and value 
systems are also important and may prevail in social policy. Thus a liberal feminist analysis 
needs to ascertain the role and status of women in Jordan‟s cultural framework, and to assess 
the degree to which this is reflected in the social policy of the state and non-state providers. 
The economic position of women in Jordan is also an important consideration. Again non 
western European experiences show that global economic impositions can impact negatively 
against women, in particular economic liberalization programmes, which include austerity 
measures in terms of government expenditure, unfriendly labour laws, and the increased 
commodification of labour. Thus the impact on women of Jordan‟s current economic strategy 
(and its international sponsors) must also be considered. Finally, an analysis will be provided 
that reflects what women in Jordan have said as to what they consider to be their social-
welfare needs, and whether those needs are being met and by whom.  Only thus can it be 
ascertained the role and extent that the Jordanian state plays in meeting the social welfare 
needs of its female citizens.   
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                                        CHAPTER TWO 
                           
 The Political and Economic History of Jordan & Social Welfare Provisions for Women  
 
2.1.   Introduction 
          This chapter functions firstly to provide an understanding of the political and economic 
development of the state of Jordan. Secondly, and relatedly, it will assess how these been 
reflected in the particular orientations of the state‟s social welfare policy and in particular, with 
regard to women‟s social needs. This follows from the assertions made in the previous chapter 
that the type of political system determines the economic orientation of a state and ultimately the 
type of social welfare regime.  
          The chapter will explain how, as a result of its particular political history, the Jordan state‟s 
key preoccupations today are firstly security and secondly the development of the economy, in 
particular through enhancement of the private. Social policy and budget allocations reflect these 
priorities. Thus the social welfare needs of Jordanian women are largely left to other key social 
actors such as the family and the civil society organizations (NGOs), rather than the state.  
           To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the 
state of Jordan and women. In terms of citizenship rights, and according to the constitution, 
women maintain equal political and economic rights, on paper at least. In reality, however, it will 
be shown that the Jordanian state is itself of a patriarchal nature. Its political security depends on 
the support of tribal, family, religious and other conservative elements. Moreover, because of 
Jordan‟s scarcity of resources, combined with its vulnerable strategic position – located between 
Palestine and Israel - it relies extensively on external aid. Social policy development and 
priorities stem therefore from this dependence as much as from the regime‟s political concerns. 
Women‟s social welfare needs have a consequently low level of priority, a situation which is 
exacerbated by women‟s lower social position. Social policy is directly influenced by 
conservative tribal and family values, and the role of the state (which is also basically a 
conservative one) is minimal. Women‟s political and economic positions are therefore 
undermined by the patriarchal and conservative nature of the state as much as they are assured.  
           The Palestinian issue adds a further dimension to this. The existence of a (majority) 
proportion of citizens and refugees alike within Jordan of Palestinian origin has had enormous 
political and economic implications for the social development of Jordanian society as a whole 
and especially the identification and advancement of women‟ social needs. Palestinian political 
 activism has done much to define political and social rights within the country and have offered a 
route for women‟s mobilisation and political participation. The Palestinians also play a key role 
in the economy of public and the private sectors. At the same time, however, the public sector is 
controlled and staffed largely by Transjordanians (East Bankers) while the private sector is more 
substantially dominated by Palestinian Jordanians. The details of this historical issue and all its 
implications are not included in the study, for their complexity and multi-dimensionalism might 
confuse rather than illuminate and would certainly lead to excessive thesis length. However they 
should be borne in mind as the following discussion is read. 
          The chapter includes three sections. The first narrates the historical development of the 
political system in Jordan. This includes the political history and introduces the reader to the 
political structures, the constitution, and the social and legal orders of the state, the democratic 
process, political parties and elections, citizenship rights and women‟s political rights and 
mobilisation. The second section elaborates on the economic development of the state of Jordan. 
This includes women‟s economic status, their rights and needs, their participation in public and 
private sectors, and in formal and informal sectors. The final section offers an assessment of the 
Jordanian state‟s role regarding women‟s political and economic empowerment and more 
importantly its provision of women‟s basic social needs pertaining to education, health, 
employment, housing and social security benefits.  
 
2.2.    Political Development, the State and Social Welfare for Women 
2.2.1. General History and overview: 
         Jordan‟s political history should be understood in the context of it being a geographically 
small entity which lies at the heart of the Arab World. Its strategic location - at the Eastern end of 
the Mediterranean between Israel and the Arab world - has meant that Jordan has been vulnerable 
to a series of regional conflicts and crises. With few natural resources, (1) its survival has been 
dependent on an ability to adapt to local, regional and global developments.  For example, Laurie 
A. Brand (2) has argued that the permanent threat of war with Israel has been an underlying cause 
for the periodic opening up of the political system, followed by renewed repression. As a result of 
unrelenting internal and external threats, Jordan is forced to constitute its power relations based 
on first a unique security apparatus that it is based on family, clan, tribal ties” and second, on 
close and strong ties with the West, in particular with the United States.  
          Jordan‟s political history can be traced to the establishment of the state of Transjordan in 
the wake of the World War I, in 1921. The British replaced Ottoman rule with rule by a new 
 Emir, Abdullah, from the Hejaz. The British and the Emir set up a new “governmental structure, 
an army, a police force, and a bureaucracy”. (3) Transjordan‟s first constitution was set up in 
1928 as an “organic law”, “concomitant with many other laws (Ottoman, French and British 
laws) governing every aspect of life in the new state”. (4)  In 1923, Britain formally recognised 
Transjordan as an independent state, but that independence was not quite complete.  The 
Jordanian army and economic development remained under the British command and supported 
by British subsidies, although a still greater degree of independence was conferred in a 1928 
agreement. Following the Second World War, in 1946 the emir was proclaimed King, with the 
introduction of a new constitution, and with the country‟s name being changed to Jordan in 1949. 
British formal influence was progressively reduced to the military arena only, and in 1951 
Abdullah was assassinated by domestic political opponents. His eldest son, Talal succeeded to the 
throne but abdicated in favour of his son, Hussein, just a year later. Further, unsuccessful, 
assassination attempts were made on the new King, Hussein, in 1960, 1961 and 1963. However, 
Hussein was to rule until his death in 1999, when he was succeeded by his son, Abdullah. 
           Jordan is therefore a Kingdom with a constitutional monarchy at its head. The constitution 
dates back to 1950, when Jordan annexed the West Bank, but has been significantly amended 
over time to set out the political structures of the Kingdom. Nominally, Jordan has a 
parliamentary system of government but precise political structures have been subject to changes 
determined by external events. In 1967, for example, elections took place to a 60-seat House of 
Representatives (30 from the West Bank and 30 from the East Bank). With East Bank 
representatives coming largely from pro-Monarchy tribal groups, and West Bank representatives 
operating against the King for a more bellicose policy towards Israel, (5) the House was unable to 
function effectively. The situation was exacerbated when Israel occupied the West Bank in June 
1967, with many representatives now unable to take up their seats. Following the outbreak of 
civil war in September 1970, and an attempted military coup in 1972, the National Assembly was 
dissolved by the King in 1974. The Jordanian National Union was established under his aegis as 
the sole political party in 1971, renamed the Arab National Union in 1972. The King became 
president of the organisation and appointed the 36-member Supreme Executive Committee. The 
1975 elections were postponed and the National Assembly was briefly reconvened in 1976 only 
to enact a constitutional amendment which suspended elections indefinitely. During the 
subsequent period, legislative functions reverted back to the executive. A National Consultative 
Council was appointed to advise and support the executive, serving till 1984, when the 
government announced a return to parliamentary governance. 
             The 1980s brought a more open political climate in Jordan, in part as a result of the need 
to respond to Israeli settlement of the West Bank and later as a response to growing economic 
crisis. In 1984 the King dissolved the NCC and reconvened the National Assembly in order to re-
establish the separate political life of West Bankers in the face of rapidly expanding Israeli 
settlements there. Political parties remained banned although there was some tolerance towards 
“unofficial groupings”. 
            Meanwhile, like much of Latin America and South East Asia “Jordan faced severe 
balance of payments crisis as well as deep-rooted macroeconomic and related structural 
problems. The state had virtually run out of international reserves and was on the verge of 
defaulting on its external debt payment obligation. It faced a massive external public debt, and 
large deficiencies in the external current account and government budget.” (6) 
            The IMF forced Jordan to exercise austerity measures to rescue its deteriorating economy, 
leading to riots in the south (which had historically been the bedrock of support for the 
monarchy). In the face of such widespread discontent at the economic measures taken by King, 
he attempted to appease the populace by announcing free elections and the liberalisation of the 
press in the 1989. This was also a response to his renunciation of Jordanian claims to sovereignty 
over the West Bank in 1988, which made the old National Assembly redundant.  In 1989 new 
electoral laws made a new 80-seat House of Representatives possible and new elections finally 
took place, although political parties remained banned. (The Muslim Brotherhood was able to 
field candidates due to its status as a charity rather than a party). Women were allowed to vote in 
these elections for the first time. 
            In 1991, a new National Charter was endorsed by the King, which legalised political 
parties in return for their allegiance to the monarchy and in 1993 the country‟s first multi-party 
elections were held. As a consequence, political parties were formed around a range of groupings 
which could be identified as follows: the Islamist Sunni Muslim Brotherhood who worked within 
the framework of the government; the Centrists (based on traditional tribal structures) who are 
the back-bone of support of the King. The centrists‟ aspirations are for an “independent and 
unified Arab state based upon ancient traditions and Islamic principles”. (7) They may be 
considered as essentially loyalists, comprising largely former ministers, regional governors, high 
ranking civil servants, and tribal leaders. The Leftists and the pan-Arabists form the opposition to 
the government and find themselves in conflict with the Islamists. (8) 
           The political parties law, No. 32 of 1992, governs political parties. The law pertains to the 
manner in which political parties are to conduct themselves and includes stipulations for party 
formation and party activities. In order to receive a licence from the ministry of Interior, parties 
 must comply with certain regulations, such as having a minimum of 50 members, respect for the 
constitution and the ideals of political pluralism. Since the promulgation of the 1992 law, there 
has been an explosion of party formation. In some cases, smaller parties have since banded 
together in working coalitions to contest elections. (9) 
           The commitment to multi-partyism was short-lived. In 1997 a new electoral law which re-
ordered constituencies to favour traditional allies of the monarchy led the Islamic Action Front to 
boycott the elections. In the face of increasing unrest in response to the Palestinian intifada over 
the border, as well as regional instabilities caused by the war against Iraq, the elections scheduled 
for 2001 were put on hold and from 2001-2003 the King again ruled by decree without the 
assistance of the parliament. This was accompanied by a wide ranging set of emergency laws, a 
harsher penal code and a significant closure in the realms of media expression. Given the biases 
in the election law, when elections were finally held in 2003, the traditional allies of the King 
returned to power, at the expense of the Islamist opposition. 
            In sum, for most of the first fifty years of statehood, the parliamentary system was 
unrepresentative, inoperable, and subject to the almost absolute decree of the King himself. In the 
absence of political parties, interests were based on either tribal affiliation, proximity to the 
palace, or Palestinian/Jordanian identities. More recently, a period of political reform appears to 
have prevailed, with the (re)introduction of apparently democratic political structures. 
            In practice, the democratic process appears to carry the mark of political liberalization, 
rather than democracy. Democracy requires a strong civil society including trade unions and 
worker‟s organizations, properly organised, free and institutionalised political expression, and a 
“multiparty electoral competitions and open oppositional presence in the political field”. (10) It is 
therefore argued that, 
The reforms that have occurred scarcely warrant 
 the label democratic, in the sense of allowing for 
popular or majority rule. „Democratization‟ and 
                „liberalization‟  tend  to  be used interchangeably, 
                                         but   they   refer  to    two    distinct,  if   related, 
                                         processes.   Democracy   denotes  a  mode    of 
                                         governance in which decision-making power is 
                 shared by „the people‟ rather than concentrated 
                                         in the hands of a clique. (11) 
 
             In fact, the power of the King remains enormous. The King is the head of the state and 
the head of government; he appoints both the prime minister and the cabinet. The King also has 
extensive lawmaking powers that include the appointment of senators (members of the Majlis Al-
Ayan), ratification of laws, abolition of the parliament, and postponement of House elections. In 
 cases where the parliament is not sitting or is dissolved, the Council of Ministers, with the 
approval of the King, has the power to issue provisional laws, which have the force of law.  
           There does exist a limited system of checks and balances. Legislative power resides in the 
National Assembly consisting of the Senate (Majlis al-Ayan) and the House of Representatives 
(Majlis al-Umma).
 
(12) The House of Representatives has the right to cast a vote of no 
confidence in the cabinet. The National Assembly has the power to override the monarch‟s veto 
by a two-thirds majority in both houses. The legislative branch has also engaged in investigating 
corruption charges of several prominent members of the political elite in recent years. The High 
Tribunal, composed of Senate members and senior judges, has the right to question and try 
ministers. Similarly, legislative acts may undergo judicial review by the highest civil court judges 
and administrative officials but no constitutional amendments may be made affecting the rights of 
the king. Amendments to the constitution have to be passed by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of each house and ratified by the King. (13) 
          Similarly, the court established law of 1951 and the constitution of Jordan, promulgated in 
1952 and amended in 1974, 1976, and 1984, provide for a theoretically independent judiciary.  
An independent judiciary is the bedrock of a society functioning according to the rule of law, and 
it can ensure that other institutions of government and individual leaders are held accountable for 
their actions. (14)  The legal systems of the Arab World, in general, derive from multiple sources 
of the law, such as Islamic and “Shari‟a” legal traditions, French civil law, English common law, 
Egyptian law, and Ottoman law. The legal system in Jordan is based on a combination of civil 
law traditions and Islamic legal principles.  Civil law derives from both Islamic and the Egyptian 
civil codes; family law obtains entirely from Islamic law. The Jordanian court system is 
structured into three broad categories of courts: (1) religious; (2) civil; and (3) special courts. The 
religious courts are further subdivided into “Shari‟a” courts and tribunals for non-Muslim 
religious communities. The “Shari‟a” courts have jurisdiction over all matters relating to the 
personal status of Muslims and in instances when one party is non-Muslim but agrees to 
adjudication by the “Shari‟a” courts. A special court appointed by the court of cassation 
adjudicates disputes between two religious courts and between one religious and one civil court. 
          A number of special courts have specialised jurisdictions. The state security court, 
composed of both military and civilian judges, has jurisdiction over offences against the state and 
drug-related crimes. The High Tribunal may interpret the constitution at the request of the prime 
minister or leader of either legislative chamber. The supreme council or the special council 
interprets laws at the request of the prime minister and is empowered to try members of 
parliament accused of penal code violations. The supreme council is composed of the president of 
 the senate, three senate members who are elected by the parliamentary body and five judges who 
are selected from amongst the highest courts in order of seniority. The High Court of Justice 
hears private challenges to governmental acts. (15) 
           In reality, however, the power of the King is barely diminished by these checks. Yet he is 
not entirely autonomous. He himself relies in turn for support from the major tribes of the East 
Bank. The tribal confederations provide much of the senior ranks of the Jordanian government 
and the best part of the Jordanian army. Their loyalty to the Monarchy is deeply rooted and 
traditional. The support is mutual: in 1971, a tribal council was established to be responsible for 
tribal and Bedouin affairs. (16)The influential tribes such as the “Al-Majali”, receive significant 
financial support through their support for the Monarchy, for example in the form of targeted 
infrastructural development (roads, clinics and schools etc).  In return, the monarchy receives 
support and stability.  
          The elite group surrounding the King is largely drawn from these tribal groups, what Shirin 
Fathi calls the “traditional elite rooted in a tribal socio-economic context.” (17) Together with the 
King, they represent the real decision-makers or inner executive group. The group consists of the 
prime-minister‟s office, the cabinet, the “Diwan”, and the foreign ministry. As Fathi says: “The 
ruling elite is composed of the King‟s most trusted aides in positions of power and influence in 
the cabinet, the “Diwan”, the foreign ministry and the army (the formal). And lastly, the 
peripheral, non-executive, political elite refer to members of the parliament and senate, as well as 
religious, social and tribal leaders (the Informal). Their main function is to reflect public feeling 
and opinion with no actual powers of implementation”. (18) 
         Naseer Aruri describes Jordan as a “patriarchal oligarchy”. (19) The real authority and 
absolute power of decision-making are in the hands of the King who holds the legislative and 
executive powers as well as the small oligarchy of “tribal chiefs and landowners”. A minority of 
immigrant Palestinians are allowed to join this alliance (20) but their integration has been 
variable (particularly poorly for refugees) and they have no gained full representation through 
this system. Jordan today is little different from the Jordan Fathi described in 1958: 
                      This  is   a  very  special   case – a desert sheikhdom 
           of  Bedouin   tribesmen,  under  British  domination, 
          newly  overrun  in   1950   by a horde of Palestinian 
                                          refugees    twice     as     numerous   and  much more 
            modernized than themselves. The plain consequence, 
          of course, is that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
           constitutes  not a nation  in  any  recognizable sense, 
           but  a  nominal  state  with two substantial bodies of 
                                          population. (21) 
 
              In sum, the historical development of Jordan‟s political structures have been determined 
to a large extent by external political forces (Britain, the conflict with Israel, the influx of 
Palestinian refugees), by a consequently bifurcated population (East Bank tribes versus West 
Bank Palestinians) and by the Monarchy‟s need to build tribal alliances to underpin its own 
extensive political domination. Equally, its political cultural basis includes a variety of 
influences, including traditional (tribal), religious (Islam and “Shari‟a” Law) and foreign (British, 
Hejazi, Palestinian). This is clearly a vastly different process of political development from that 
experienced in either the West or other less developed countries such as those in Latin America. 
Despite recent political reforms, Jordan does not possess a functioning democracy comparable to 
those in Europe or other countries which have most frequently been used for comparative studies 
of social welfare systems. Rather it is a combination of (imported) political structures which offer 
a formal framework of representative democracy under a constitutional monarchy and an 
indigenously-derived although nonetheless relatively recently constructed informal framework of 
tribal alliances and monarchical patronage. Holding this miss-match together is the need to 
constantly ward against instability and threats to the regime. In 2002 the government, led by the 
King, launched the “Jordan First” campaign which was aimed at precisely this, the maintenance 
of internal stability through “ a form of national hegemony that stresses East Bank traditional 
identities over Palestinian identities” and which places national unity over divisive multiple 
identities or needs. (22) 
 
2.2.2.   Citizenship in Jordan 
           The significance of this combination of very different formal and informal structures of 
power becomes evident when we attempt to identify the nature of the relationship between the 
state and individuals that is of citizenship in Jordan. Definitions of citizenship in democratic 
systems suggest that citizens (regardless of sex, religion and ethnic origin) are equal and enjoy 
full political, civil and economic rights. (23) As was shown by Marshall in Chapter One, the 
concept of rights is crucial to the notion of citizenship, as it is applied in most welfare states in 
the industrialised western countries. In the case of the state of Jordan, two definitions of 
citizenship are effectively in use; what we may term the classic (Western, modern) understanding 
which forms the basis of  the Jordanian constitution; and secondly the culturally-based 
traditionalist (conservative) understanding which is demonstrated  in the political reality.  
             In the classic understanding citizenship is “an abstract personhood - the citizen as an 
“individual” with undifferentiated, uniform, and universal properties, entitlements and duties”. 
(24) Citizenship entails “juridical processes by which legal subjects of a state are constituted. 
 Juridical processes define the criteria for citizenship in a state and the rights and obligations of 
citizens in relation to the state”. (25) In addition, citizenship may be considered as a set of 
practices – juridical, political, economic, and cultural. (26) Gerard Delanty writes that citizenship 
here means that the citizens of a “legally constituted political community have rights, duties, 
participation and identity”. (27) For him, citizenship is partly a state project and partly a project 
emanating from civil society. More importantly, “citizenship occupies both a political and an 
economic space in which personal autonomy is guaranteed by the law.” (28)  In this 
understanding, citizens are all equal and citizenship has both formal and informal dimensions. 
            Suad Joseph, however, has argued that, while that citizenship rights are written “in terms 
of abstract citizens and appear equitable” the “scrutiny of legal texts and empirical investigation 
of citizenship practices has exposed systematic means by which citizenship, in most countries, 
has been a highly gendered enterprise- juridically, politically, economically, and culturally”. (29) 
In Jordan, the constitution and the formal political structures suggest the classic and modern 
understanding of citizenship. Yet there exists simultaneously a traditionalist understanding which 
is reflected in the informal structures of power and the political reality and which offers women 
only a second-class version of citizenship. 
            How does the Jordanian constitution reflect the modern classic understanding of 
citizenship? According to Article Six, Jordanian citizens are equal before the law. Amawi 
illustrates that equality in rights and duties, in opportunities, employment, education, training, 
employment and safe working environment regardless of gender are guaranteed firstly, in the 
Jordanian Constitution and, later in the National Charter. (30) Since Jordanian citizenship law 
guarantees equality it is therefore genderless.  
           The traditionalist understanding, however, which is reflected in the political reality (the 
power of the Monarchy, its dependence on the political support of the influential East Bank 
tribes, the role played by “Shari‟a” law, the lack of genuinely democratic political structures) sees 
citizenship as equality within cultural boundaries that apply biological determination and assert 
fundamental differences between men and women. Jordanian women are full citizens in terms of 
their formal constitutional rights but only second - class citizens when it comes to the application 
of traditionalist understandings of citizenship.  
        This is clearly reflected in the relationship that exists between the state and civil society 
organizations (CSOs). The state and its elites emphasise the preservation of traditional and 
cultural values while civil society organizations (in particular non-governmental organizations - 
NGOs) press for women‟s empowerment and full rights of citizenship as part of the broader 
struggle to strengthen democracy. Women‟s political activities are caught within this sharp 
 dichotomy. As a consequence of the influence of the traditionalist understanding of citizenship, 
and as this thesis will demonstrate, social security laws and labour laws are gendered, creating a 
gendered social welfare system and serving to constantly reinforce the weaker bargaining 
position of women As a result, women‟s political rights are further undermined in Jordan. The 
following illustrates this complex relation in a more elaborate way. 
 
2.2.3.   Women’s Political Participation in Jordan 
           Women‟s political position in Jordan reflects the volatile Jordanian history as a whole. 
Although women have made modest attempts at self-empowerment, supported by mounting 
pressure from a range of internal and external sources, the reality is that independent women‟s 
movements in Jordan do not exist as do those in the West. Women are considered to be first and 
foremost members of a family or a clan. They are governed by traditional, patriarchal and 
religious rules. Jordanian women‟s activities, as Laurie A. Brand explains, (31) are kept within 
the framework of religious and cultural borders and therefore they are not free and independent.  
                              Women‟s     groups   in    Jordan   have  been   just   as  
                              constrained      by     pre - existing     practices       and  
                              social    structures   as   are   men‟s, and that women‟s 
                              groups     express     no      particular     inclination   or  
                              ability     to     spearhead   civility  of  practice. In fact, 
                              women‟s     activist    agenda   has  been  monopolized  
                              by   agencies   close  to  the  ruling powers that choose 
                              to    keep    changes    for     women   within   society‟s  
                              religious     and     cultural    traditions     in   order    to  
                              appeal    not    only    to    religious    conservatives but 
                              also   to   its   more   secular  camps. (32) 
  
           Women‟s role in politics can be traced to the early nineteen forties. Brand (33) states that 
the political role of Jordanian women was heavily influenced by the arrival of Palestinian 
refugees in the Kingdom after 1948.  Until then, what activities did exist “were limited, generally 
involving meetings and seminars aimed at raising awareness of child health and welfare issues. 
Thus, women‟s activities were aimed at making women better mothers and at rearing the next 
generation, not at substantially changing or improving women‟s socio-economic status of legal 
position.” (34) Brand argues that in this early period women were organized in response to the 
Palestinian catastrophe of 1948 and their work was devoted to “providing assistance to alleviate 
poverty or support orphanages and similar institutes”. (35) Most organisations were of a 
charitable nature and were headed by elite‟s groups of women.  
           The first such established organisation was led by Princess Misbah, mother of Crown 
Prince Talal (father of King Hussain) in 1944. From 1951 and 1979, 340 charitable societies were 
 established.  Only 32 were directed towards women‟s activities. The Arab Women‟s Federation 
(AWF); Ittihad al-Mar‟ah- „Arabiyyah), founded in 1954, marked a qualitative change in the 
history of Jordanian‟s women activities.  The AWF „s goals were “fighting illiteracy; raising 
women‟s socio-economic levels; preparing women to exercise their full rights as citizen‟s; and 
developing bonds of friendship between Arab women and women around the world to improve 
the situation at home and to strength peace”. (36) 
           Brand argues that the AWF asserted that national issues such as an “equal rights and 
responsibilities, and full Arab Unity” were key concerns of women. Furthermore, the AWF made 
demands for changes pertaining to women‟s personal status laws, labour laws and electoral laws. 
In 1954, a demand was made by the AWF to let women vote in municipal and parliamentary 
elections. Their demands were supported by political parties and other associations and 
eventually the right to vote was given, although only to educated women. (It should be noted, 
however, that there was no requirement for literacy in the male entitlement to vote).  
           The AWF‟s activities expanded to include demands for equality in all fields of political, 
economic and social life. They also dealt with the very sensitive area of personal status law, 
demanding changes in the laws regarding divorce and polygamy. (37) Thus the activity of the 
AWF continued to elevate public awareness of these issues, as well as their engaging in more 
broad-based national activities such as demonstrations against Zionism and Baghdad pact. Their 
activities were abruptly constrained, however, when a coup was attempted and the subsequent 
clamp-down of political activists in 1957 included the AWF.  
           During the 1960s and 1970s women‟s organisations continued to be active but largely 
maintained a low profile. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 encouraged women to 
become further involved in Palestinian resistance, especially through political organisations 
which attracted the young, although Brand has pointed out that “aside from the fact that the 
women were working in the framework of a political organization, the activities were largely 
traditional”. (38) As the Palestinian resistance became more threatening to the Jordanian state in 
the late 1960s, and into the 1970s, (including a bloody conflict and expulsion of the PLO 
(Palestinian Liberation Organization) from Jordan in 1970, the state began to more openly ally 
itself with those conservative groups which regarded women‟s involvement in politics as being 
harmful to the honour of the family. This represented a set-back for the women‟s efforts to 
improve their public status. As had been the case elsewhere in the world, women were used as 
instruments of nation-building but their mobilization was confined to serving this function and 
not to their relative empowerment. Suad Joseph argues that “women had become a subject of 
 mobilization, targets of political action programs, a mass to be welded into citizens or political 
followers”. (39) 
           In 1974, the King nonetheless granted women the right to vote in accordance with the 
terms of the UN Decade for Women and, as a result, a Society for Women‟s Federation‟s in 
Jordan (WFJ) was licensed.  The goal was to establish a new era for women in Jordan, including 
progress in all aspects of society. The King appointed women to his National Consultative 
Council and in 1979 the first woman was appointed to the cabinet. She occupied the role of 
Minister of Social Development. This apparent progress concealed the fact that women‟s 
organizations and political mobilisation remained essentially controlled by the state. Shortly after 
her appointment, the new minister established a women‟s union under the umbrella of the state, 
signifying the end of any independence role for the WFJ. (40) 
             A second innovation occurred when Queen Noor became the patron of a new national 
voluntary organization in 1976, the Business and Professional Women‟s Club (BPWC).  Its goals 
were announced as firstly being to provide women with legal advice regarding their own small-
businesses and secondly to motivate women to vote in the election. Since this time, it has become 
evident that organizations run by the royal members of the family have more access and 
resources than others. Until the elections of 1989 and the possibilities represented by the new era 
of liberalization, such organisations dominated the field of women‟s activism. Since 1989, 
however, and despite that resourcing bias, women‟s involvement in local and national politics has 
increased with and without royal patronage.  
            The goals of women‟s organizations in this new era of liberalization have become more 
explicit and demanding, including controversial demands for changes to the civil status law, 
personal status laws, and labour laws. Women received full voting and other political rights in 
advance of the 1989 election, and were able to stand as candidates for election to the National 
Assembly for the first time. In fact, only twelve women stood for election and none were 
successful. The amendment of the election law in 1993 diminished their chances by promoting 
conservative traditional tribal interests over others.  Only three women stood for election in that 
year, with one being successful (Mrs. Tujan El Feisal, in the Circassian and Chechen, based Third 
Constituency of Amman). It was notable that she benefited from the minorities quota system. 
           In the 1997 elections, which were boycotted by many parties, women made a more 
prominent showing, with seventeen women standing for election. Women‟s civil society 
organisations were more proactive in supporting women candidates, and yet in the end no women 
were elected and Mrs Feisal lost her seat. 
            During the 1990s, and especially after the ratification of the National Charter in 1991, it 
did appear that women were to be given more room to run their organizations and pursue their 
goals (albeit still within limitations). For example, the WFJ, which had been dissolved in 1981, 
was restored to legitimate status, becoming the Jordanian Women‟s Union. Although the Union 
comprises more than 70 voluntary organisations, it is still officially forbidden from engaging in 
political activities. By contrast, in 1992 the National Committee for Women‟s Affairs was 
established and chaired by HRH Princess Basma Bint Talal and is a forum for addressing 
political issues relating to women directly. Clearly, the political liberalisation does not extend to 
reducing the patronage powers of the royal family in co-ordinating socio-political initiatives. In 
1995 HRH Princess Basma Bint Talal was the founding president of the Jordanian National Rally 
of Women‟s Affairs Committees, which aims to mobilise, organise and direct Jordanian women, 
to improve their living conditions and activate their political role. In the 1997 election run-up, the 
National Rally was active in support of women candidates, which nominated a number of its own 
members to run for election.  
            Mobilisation of women would appear to still be the domain of the ruling elite. This has 
been evident in the royal initiative to establish a quota of women in the National Assembly which 
has since been launched. In 1996 a draft election law was leaked to the press suggesting a quota 
of around 17 women in an enlarged House of Representatives (from 80 to 100 members). A 
Women‟s Alliance was established of civil society organisations in support of the idea, 
demanding an allotment of 20% of seats to women. The Alliance ultimately fell apart over 
disputes about government infiltration and intervention in its agenda, but HRH Princess Basma 
Bint Talal  had already achieved a notable success when she convinced local authorities to 
appoint 99 women to municipal committees which were set up to prepare for municipal elections 
in 1995. Twenty women ran for election to the municipal councils, with ten winning seats and 
one actually becoming a mayor. In the 1999 municipal elections, 43 women candidates produced 
eight elected members.  
         The notion of a quota for women in the National Assembly gained credence and support as 
it became clear that women faced particular obstacles in translating their willingness to 
participate into actual representation. When Abdullah became King, he advanced the agenda by 
finally establishing a quota of six women in the by-now 110-member House of Representatives 
and by appointing seven women to the House of Senators (out of 55 members). (41) 
 
 
 
 2.2.4. Limitations to Women’s Political Development 
          Despite Royal support for political mobilisation and participation by women, it is clear that 
there remain a number of key factors which limit women‟s political participation in Jordan 
          First, most women‟s organizations are established primarily for charitable reasons. Since 
their activities are not political, the state and the ruling class who dominate politics are not 
directly threatened by them. The majority of these organizations are dominated, as Brand points 
out, by women from “prominent families and few have had experience in serious work on 
women‟s issues”. (42) They do not represent, therefore, a political lobby on behalf of women. 
          Secondly, women‟s role in political parties is minimal. A report by the Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 
Research Centre in 1993 showed that women played a negligible role in the formation, leadership 
or programme development of the newly-established political parties. 
 
The survey also showed that ten parties did not mention in their programs or basic orientations 
any clauses or provisions particularly related to women, while eight parties have had one general 
paragraph about either the necessity of giving women equal rights with men, or defending 
women‟s social rights and relieving them of injustices, or the removal of obstacles facing them so 
that they may perform their task in family-raising, society building, work, wages and promotion. 
Only two parties had a special paragraph about women‟s causes in their programs, stating their 
belief in the necessity of changing women‟s actual conditions and linking that to social and 
economic change throughout the country. (43) 
            
         The report similarly found that the ratio of women in the founding bodies of the political 
parties averaged less than 5% and that thirteen parties had no women in their leadership at all, 
three parties had just one woman and one party had two women in their leadership bodies.  With 
19 parties registered for the 1997 elections, four years after the initial survey had been made; no 
growth was shown in these numbers for women‟s representation. The 1993 survey also showed 
that women‟s participation in political parties was low, ranging between 5% and 8.5%. The 
survey concluded that political parties in Jordan take a basically instrumentalist approach towards 
women‟s political participation: it is good when it serves their electoral interests but has little or 
no intrinsic value. This reflects the prevailing social attitude towards women in politics.  
 
A 1994 study about the political participation of Jordanian women conducted by the University of 
Jordan Strategic Studies Centre revealed that men and women in Jordan still look at women‟s 
role through the expectations of traditional gender roles. Many of them believe that women‟s 
capacities are inferior to those of men, especially in the field of political work and making 
important decisions; they also believe that men are more rational than women. Of course, there is 
a significant percentage believe that women are capable of political work, but there is also an 
element to be reckoned with that finds the new roles of women to be in conflict with their 
 traditional gender role of taking care of the children and the husband and running the affairs of 
the house. (44) 
 
          Where women are politically active, it is more socially acceptable that this should be in an 
ancillary role – fund-raising, donating, voting and assisting with other candidates‟ election 
campaigns.  
          Shteiwi and Al-Daghastani (45) have argued that women‟s participation should not be 
counted therefore as real participation. Women have little influence within parties and fill 
virtually no high-level positions. Moreover, political parties do not consider women‟s issues as 
significant. Gender issues were not part of their political path or part of the national agenda. (46) 
Leila Sharaf, a former Minister of Information, identified the key societal impediment against 
women‟s political participation thus: 
                            Jordan    is    very   conservative   society. It is a society 
                            of  men.  Usually   men  never  give  their  places easily 
                            for  women  if  we  don‟t  push  for  it. (47) 
 
           In the absence of political parties which push forwards the women‟s agenda, it has been 
the Monarchy which has taken on the task and it has been free to shape that task as it chooses. As 
Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group Research Institute in Amman has pointed out, 
Jordanian society is fundamentally conservative and traditional. Women find it very difficult to 
run for election and even if they do their chances of winning are not great. For women to vote and 
to be elected is not the rule, it is an exception. It may therefore be fruitful for the King to appoint 
women to public office in order to set an example or establish a model. The reality, however, is 
that change has not caught on at the grass roots level despite the interventions of the King and his 
family. (48) Moreover, critics still doubt the radical moves of the King to increase women‟s 
political participation and representation from the top-down. They argue that the concentration of 
power remains centred in the hands of the King, indeed it increases his ability to push for more or 
other changes in different aspects of political life. In other words, the King‟s patronage of women 
is still an instrumentalist mode of mobilisation and does little to alter the objective status of 
women‟s political participation or representations. Moreover, as long as his ability to exercise 
power depends on support from a traditional tribal base, his willingness to promote the interests 
of women against a traditional cultural environment will be limited. 
 
2.2.5.   Summing Up: Politics, Citizenship and the Status of Women 
          In sum, the reality of the volatile establishment of the state of Jordan and its subsequent 
political fragility, and the duality of citizenship rights – the formal modern and the informal 
 traditional – have had serious implications for women‟s political role, recognition and 
participation. The fact is that women in Jordan have a limited role in political life and virtually no 
impact on political decision-making. This means that there is no dynamic to ensure that their 
social needs are effectively met. They have no autonomy to act outside or, or against, the state or 
conservative traditional social norms and structures. They therefore lack political resources to act 
to alter discriminatory laws in the field of social welfare, health, education, their civil and 
personal status. (49) Furthermore, and as a consequence of this, the state is under little pressure to 
either improve its commitment to the social welfare of women, or indeed to implement even its 
commitments thus far. The state is beholden to conservative constituencies and is unlikely to risk 
the instabilities which might arise from alienating these groups by challenging their traditional, 
conservative social values. 
 
 2.3.    Economic Development, the State and Social Welfare for Women 
           Jordanian women‟s economic reality is no different from their political reality. The 
structure and policy priorities of the Kingdom‟s economy are not oriented towards improving 
women‟s lives and indeed, in many ways, make them harder. 
         According to the World Bank‟s classification of economies, Jordan is classified as “a 
medium sized lower-middle-income developing country”. (50) Jordan covers an area of 92,544 sq 
km of predominantly desert and semi-arid terrain, situated to the east of the Jordan River. Less 
than 50mm of rain annually is received by two-thirds of the total area, and 200mm of rain goes to 
9 percent of this area which is considered to be the productive agricultural land. Jordan is 
therefore a small country with inadequate supplies of water and other natural resources such as 
oil.  
          Laurie Brand argued that Jordan‟s survival has consequently been based on attracting 
external revenue. She argues that Jordan‟s strategic position, sharing a border with Israel, has 
made it a vital ally of, and thus recipient of aid from, foreign powers (British and America). The 
indigenous economy is weak because agricultural land is limited, natural resources are scarce 
(mostly phosphates and potash) and human resources limited despite sky rocketing population 
growth. Fifty percent of its population is under the age of 15 (51) and is centred in the cities. The 
domestic market is limited and, given the reliance on imports and aid, the economy is profoundly 
vulnerable to regional and international changes. (52) The key casualty is human resources. 
Labour migration fluctuates wildly, according to events such as Israel‟s wars against its Arab 
neighbours, the two Gulf wars in 1980 and 1991, and the occupation of Iraq by the USA in 2003. 
These events have seen huge flows of Palestinians as well as Iraqis into Jordan. Arab and foreign 
 workers with little or no education have been welcomed in Jordan to replace the shortage in 
labour force in low job categories.   
           However, with a small productive base, few natural resource exports to generate foreign 
currency, and demographic growth rates which outpace economic growth, Jordan faces on-going 
fundamental problems including substantial government debt, poverty, unemployment and an 
inflated public sector. (53) In this environment, the government‟s economic priorities have 
become the development of a competitive service sector, the promotion of the private sector (in 
order to generate employment opportunities), and privatisation of the public sector (to reduce 
government expenditures). The consequences of these policies are arguably felt most severely by 
women. 
           The dependence on external revenues can be traced back to British support of Abdullah, 
when subsidies of the young state were never less than £2 million per year. (54) Kingston noted 
that political elites were content to rely on these revenues and initially neglected more sustainable 
forms of development. (55)  Although King Hussein proved a more enlightened monarch, the 
dependence remained, transferring instead to US patronage in the 1960s. The incorporation of the 
fertile West Bank into the Transjordanian economy after 1948 did however allow for a significant 
increase in agricultural output in the meantime but the incorporation of Palestinians after 1948 
and again after 1967 (when the West Bank was lost to Israel) combined with a developing 
demographic bulge, eroded many of the benefits of economic growth. Loss of the maritime 
access via the Mediterranean forced the country to develop its internal transport routes and its 
port at Aqaba, whilst the provision of health and educational services saw the economy slowly 
moving from an agricultural base to one primarily based on services and – increasingly – on 
migrant remittances as labour moved to lucrative employment in the increasingly affluent Gulf 
Arab states. By 1978, services contributed around 63% of GDP, almost double the contribution of 
agriculture, construction and industrial production combined. (56) Almost surprisingly, economic 
growth averaged around 8% a year in real terms in the period 1954-67, a figure which dipped 
significantly after the 1967 war and the loss of the West Bank. Growth recovered after the 1973 
war, fuelled by a rapidly developing if still largely SME-based private manufacturing sector, the 
development of mining and mineral production, the international rise in phosphate prices and – 
most importantly – the growth in both economic aid (resulting from Jordan‟s key role in 
preserving stability in the region) and labour remittances (benefitting from oil price rises and 
growing demand for labour from the Gulf). Foreign aid income accounted for between 25 and 
60% of import earnings between 1972 and 1980, clearly indicating its significance for the 
survival of the monarchy.  
            Although efforts had begun to introduce public sector planning in the 1960s, (57) it was 
only in 1972 that the state began serious efforts to engage in social welfare provision for its 
rapidly growing, modernising and urbanising population. The state was both the recipient of, and 
responsible for, the distribution of the foreign economic aid revenues, making it consistent with 
what has been classed as a rentier economy. (58) Such “rents” could be deployed through 
provision of education, health services, housing, and direct welfare payments for the poor, 
bolstering the political legitimacy of the regime. Not surprisingly, this entailed a rapid expansion 
of the public sector, many of the jobs in which were filled at the clerical levels, or in the 
“nurturing” professions like nursing and teaching, by women reaping the benefits of their new 
educational provision. Philip Robins has described the era thus: 
 
If the generation and maintenance of external strategic rents had been key to the establishment 
and consolidation of the Jordanian state, the role of externally generated funds would be crucial 
in the decade-long surge in economic development and prosperity that would characterise Jordan 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.......The increase in capital accruing to the public sector during 
this period stimulated an extraordinary expansion in the size and profile of the state. (59) 
 
           Robins identifies a number of key consequences. Firstly, the state became the chief 
employer, with the number of civil servants growing from 27,000 in 1970 to over 74,000 in 1985 
and with Transjordanians accounting for the bulk of the increase. Secondly, the state increased 
the areas of its intervention in the economy, regulating prices, introducing subsidies and 
developing what Robins describes as a “cosy” relationship with large trading companies and their 
owners. Finally, the state embarked on numerous large infrastructure projects of its own. 
            The era of rapid growth culminated in 1980/81 when Jordan capitalised on its border 
location with Iraq to serve as principal supply line to that country when it embarked on its war 
with Iran. International sanctions soon cut in, however, and – with oil prices lowering, full-scale 
war on its doorstep, declining remittances, falling phosphate prices and a general Arab failure to 
make good on promises of economic assistance, growth plummeted. The Jordanian government 
resorted to international borrowing to fund its trade deficit, and by 1989 the cost of its debt 
servicing alone had risen to $900 million (60) per annum. Inflation was rising, the Dinar was 
depreciating and foreign currency reserves were dangerously low. Finally, the outbreak of 
another war in the Gulf resulted in the sudden loss of trade with Iraq as well as a new wave of 
incoming refugees in need of support and a decline in tourist revenues. In the face of crisis, 
austerity measures were soon followed by an IMF loan agreement which introduced the era of 
economic liberalisation to the Kingdom. The removal of subsidies, the erosion of government 
 spending in the public sector, and the eventual privatisation of components of it, all contributed to 
declining living standards, felt most intensely by the new middle classes and the urban poor.  
           These hardships, combined with growing evidence of elite corruption and opportunism, 
led to an unstable political period in the early 1990s, one which Adiba Mango says represented a 
crisis that was “shaking the regime to its core”. (61) Once again, the precarious stability of 
Jordan‟s economy meant that the regime was forced to place security above its constitutional 
commitments to its citizens. Protests and demonstrations were met by both harsh crackdowns and 
limited political reforms aimed at passifying the disgruntled population. By the late 1990s, 
however, the economic reforms had largely restored the country‟s financial stability, although the 
country was now obligated to its international creditors in new, similarly politically sensitive 
ways. A brief suspension of economic assistance from both the Gulf Arab countries and its US 
sponsor had reinforced for the monarchy the crucial role played by that income in its own 
survival, but Jordan‟s strategic value had allowed them to play a careful game of only gradual 
withdrawal of the wider welfare provisions that had previously been so heavily subsidised. As 
Robins says: 
 
Careful, incremental change also typified reform in areas with a strong impact on social policy, 
mindful of the fact that perhaps as much as 40% of the kingdom‟s population now exist below the 
poverty line. Thus, subsidies were phased out in some areas like fuel, but kerosene and unleaded 
petrol were exempt, in order not to hit the least well off. The general subsidy on bread was also 
removed, but targeted assistance was maintained for the very poor. ....The plight of the poor was 
also partly assuaged by the introduction of the beginnings of a social safety net, notably through 
the establishment of the Social Productivity Programme, which includes new public sector 
agencies like the National Aid Fund (NAF), Community Infrastructure Programme and the Small 
and Micro-enterprises Development Progamme; and the Family Income Supplement (FIS). 
Though vulnerable to accusations of being little more than a band-aid, the NAF helps 22,000 of 
the kingdom‟s most destitute families each year, while the FIS is aimed at lifting families above 
the poverty line. (62) 
 
           When King Abdullah came to power, the economy had largely been stabilised thanks to 
the programme of economic reforms and privatisations implemented under the previous King, 
and with substantial international economic assistance once more coming as a result of progress 
in making peace with Israel. There remained, nonetheless, a foreign debt of around $7,315 
million (99% of GDP), a growth rate of just 1-2% per annum (population growth being around 
3.5% p.a.) and unemployment rate of between 15% (the official rate) and 30% (the more extreme 
unofficial rates). (63) Moreover, the state remained the major employer, accounting for almost 
37% of total employment by the late 1990s. (64) As the peace process collapsed and Iraq 
imploded into civil war following the American-led invasion, trade and remittances from its 
 neighbour fell. The country was already suffering a stagnation caused by declining labour 
remittances from the Gulf since the mid-1990s, and the new situation threatened the fragile 
economic stability won by the King‟s father. 
            King Abdullah has consequently continued with the policy of economic liberalisation and 
privatisation. The public sector which had grown rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, had acted as a 
means of generating domestic security as it provided employment opportunities which depended 
on the security and functioning of the state itself. This remained the case during the 1970s and 
early 1980s which were relatively prosperous years, but when external assistance diminished in 
the mid-1980s the government had been forced to consider reforming and reducing the public 
sector in order to reduce expenditure and streamline the economy. The implications of this were 
complex. Private and public sectors in Jordan are intertwined, rather than entirely distinct.  Since 
the 1970s, and the loss of the West Bank to Israel, the Jordanian public sector has been basically 
controlled by Transjordanians while the private has been concentrated in the hands of 
Palestinians. It is not publicly acknowledged that the Palestinians monopolise the private sector 
and the Transjordanians the public sector, but privately it is a common wisdom. The Jordanians 
are exceptionally sensitive to this issue. Privately the researcher was told by Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin (during the three field visits to the area) that the latter is a significant issue for 
many people. Economic policies are in effect influenced by this division and it plays a part in the 
considerations of the elite over the impact and implications of privatisation strategies. 
           Furthermore, Brand argues that the extent of relative contributions of the private and the 
public sectors to the economy is a complicated matter. Some companies are privately owned but 
receive heavy subsidisation from the public sector.  The private sector is not totally free but 
depends on government contracts. (65) On the other hand, she contends that the chambers of 
commerce and industry are closely identified with key parts of the private sector. Some ministers 
are even considered to be pioneers of the private sector.  This close connection between the 
public and private sectors – has led to charges that the private sector is “parasitic” in being 
heavily dependent on the state and commissioned projects. (66) Equally, the commitment to 
privatisation is suspect. Privatization is not considered as an economic ideology as it is in the 
developing countries, Alquaryoty writes. (67)There is not a real political commitment to 
privatisation within the elite (who benefit from the close ties between the two sectors) but rather 
privatisation is an economic policy which stems from economic necessities of the moment. 
Similarly, Bank and Schlumberger (68) write that the reluctance of the state to embark on 
comprehensive privatization is due to “a desire to control strategic parts of the economy in order 
to avoid the emergence of alternative power bases, and from fear of unemployment and its social 
 and possible political consequences”. (69) A dismissal of public sector employees, who are 
considered to be the backbone of government political stability, can pose a threat to the state‟s 
security. The result, conclude Bank and Schlumberger, is that, economic policies like 
privatisation are implemented only so far as is possible without the state losing its upper hand. 
(70) 
            In sum, “the Jordanian economy is a mixed economy where public and private sectors are 
equally important in the ownership, organization of production, and resources allocation. Public 
and private sectors‟ roles overlap in almost all fields of economic and social activities, and there 
have been no doors closed in the face of private entrepreneurs in Jordan. In effect, the state‟s role 
in the economy can be described as that of a catalyst, stabilizer, supporter, and a promoter of an 
effective role for the private sector”. (71) Where state budgets are concerned, the priority is to 
preserve national security and support economic development to that ends first and foremost. 
           In 2005, for example, about $757.5 million was spent on development and maintenance of 
the armed forces, including security and intelligence services, or approximately 8.6% percent of 
the GDP. (72)  
          A key element to preserving this security is to reduce the social discontent that arises from 
unemployment, which is – as shown above – a significant problem in Jordan, especially for those 
aged between 16 and 24. Thus any reductions in employment in the public sector have to be 
compensated for with increased employment in the private sector. Jordan has focused in recent 
years on developing its service sector, based on trade, highly-skilled labour, and light industries 
such as textiles and pharmaceuticals. Jordan secured membership of the World Trade 
Organization WTO in 2000, a free trade accord with the United States and an association 
agreement with the EU in 2001. Information technology and tourism have also been prioritised, 
the aim is being to create a modern, competitive, open economy able to offset the vulnerabilities 
previously created by dependence on aid and migrant remittances (both of which are susceptible 
to external shocks).  
          Overcoming unemployment and poverty is a key concern of the Jordanian government and 
civil organizations. Jordanian women‟s participation in the public and private sectors as well as 
their formal and informal employment is the function of this.  They are disproportionately 
employed in the public sector and therefore vulnerable to changes in its staffing and deployment. 
          Eighty six percent of employed women work in the civil service and wider public service, 
including the vast majority of women graduates.(73)  This is not least because the civil service 
offers significant social provisions for women which are not available in the private sector, such 
as maternity leave and child care. It is also a result of a cultural preference for women to work in 
 nurturing professions such as health care and education. Nonetheless, as 49% of the public sector 
labour force, women‟s participation here falls below other lower-middle income countries 
(although on a par with MENA regional averages).
 (74)  Women‟s wages in the public sector are 
discriminatory, both directly and in terms of benefits such as pensions, where men are favoured. 
Despite this, women prefer to join the public to the private sector. It offers them not just greater 
opportunities, but also security, social status, higher salaries than available in the private sector, 
shorter and more predictable working hours, access to non-wage benefits and advancement 
opportunities.  
            By contrast, the private sector offers women fewer opportunities for either non-wage 
benefits or career advancement. Only approximately 7% of Jordanian women are employed in the 
private sector, (75) which sees the statutory obligations regarding maternity leave and child care 
provision as economic burdens. The majority of women who work in the private sector receive 
lower wages than men in comparable jobs, work longer hours and have difficulty in gaining the 
same leave periods. The researcher was told by a number of non-working women during her 
fieldwork visits that they would rather stay at home than work in the private sector because 
conditions were considered to be so bad. A large number of less educated women conveyed to the 
researcher that they would rather be poor than work in what they considered to be a humiliating 
environment. 
           Table 1. below shows the main  differences experienced by women working in the private 
and  public sectors. 
 
Labor requirement Public Sector Private Sector 
Minimum Wage per Month 120JD 85JD 
Working Hours 7 hours 8 hours 
Tenure Security of Tenure Contractual 
Paid Maternity Leave 90 Days 70 Days 
Costa Covered By Government Private Sector Employer 
Location Leave 1 hour per day Non prescribed 
Nursery Care Non Prescribed Fully Funded on-site once 20 
married women employed 
Source: “Comparison of Public and Private Sector Conditions of Employment for Women”. (76)  
 
          Given this situation, the implications of government efforts to reduce the size of the public 
sector and increase the contribution of the private sector are clear for women. Women are losing 
 their job security and being forced to seek work in a less protected and supportive environment. 
Moreover, the government has focused its efforts on developing the Qualifying Industrial Zones, 
or QIZs, which favour foreign, male labour over local female labour. These zones involve 
travelling further from home on poor transport infrastructure, which is considered both physically 
and culturally insecure for women. The government has tried to develop specific projects to 
support youth and women moving into the labour market, and particularly to enable rural women 
to work in the QIZs, but a growing tendency has instead been for women to be employed outside 
of the formal labour market. 
           There are formal government statistics for the informal labour market, which includes 
mostly low or unpaid rural workers and petty traders. The World Bank (77) estimates that 
women‟s participation in the informal sector accounts for 19.4% of women‟s employment, while 
officials from the Department of Social Development suggested they amounted to 40% of 
working women. Women are believed to account for the majority of workers in the informal 
sector, and they are the most insecure and exploited among labourers. 
            This brief survey of women‟s role in the economic development of Jordan suggests a 
number of things. Firstly, economic strategy and policy do little to meet women‟s key economic 
and social needs. Principally, they do not provide women with economic security. Indeed, the 
lack of employment opportunities which meet the needs of women results in a preference often 
stated to the researcher, not to work at all. Those who had finished their studies and been unable 
to find suitable employment instead were forced to stay at home and wait for a husband to take 
care of their needs. Such women were reluctant to work in the private sector but were unable to 
find work in the public sector. Where women did work, and of whatever social or economic class 
they came from, they would invariably emphasise to the researcher during her field work in 2005 
that the possibility of a better future and economic security are missing and that what exists does 
not meet their aspirations for a better future. 
           It is important to stress that the same women expressed their desire and willingness to 
work. Women in Jordan need a job so as to earn respect from family members and from society 
at large. More importantly, they want to be financially independent from their families. The 
importance of gaining experience and knowledge were also emphasised. Unemployment for a 
woman means that she remains dependent on her family and may be forced to marry as soon as 
there is a suitable candidate. In this context, the UNIFEM report of 2004 writes that “economic 
security does not mean only material aspects of human life but rather it includes nonmaterial 
aspects. Economic security, besides meeting basic needs, is about personal autonomy, human 
dignity, and effective participation in community life”. (78) The report states that, 
    Human security should include the ability of individuals 
   to participate and  decide on matters and issues related to 
                                  factors that  could  affect  the  pursuit  of their own  lives. 
                                  In this respect, economic security   should   entail   that 
                                  individuals,   both   men   and   women,   have   access  to 
                                  changing markets,   resources,  and credit.  It also should 
    include the equal ability to take advantage of opportunities 
                                 as  well  as  to  protect  themselves  from  risk of economic 
                                 changes resulting from globalization.
  
 (79) 
 
 
2.4.   Assessment and Conclusion 
              The state in Jordan has developed both political and economic frameworks which do not 
favour women or the satisfaction of their needs. The Kingdom‟s political development has been 
characterised by a constant fragility resulting from its regional location and its dependence on 
external political and economic support. The fluctuations of population have led the monarchy to 
rely on close alliances with traditional Transjordanian tribal groups, with a resulting impact on 
the degree to which progressive elements of the constitution can actually be pursued. Similarly 
economic development has been dependent on the maintenance of external revenues and 
remittances, leading to vulnerability and inconsistency in growth patterns. The state has 
developed an economic role which revolves around distributing those revenues in ways which 
can support its political legitimacy (again with the traditional tribal groups often in mind), which 
can stave off the greatest degree of poverty through generating employment, and as far as 
possible supporting an indulged private sector in its own efforts to do this. Neither the democratic 
components of the constitution nor any ideologically-driven vision for development have 
therefore ultimately shaped social welfare policy and women‟s particular needs have played little 
part in its evolution. Indeed, despite a constitutional framework favouring equality of citizenship 
rights for women, there exists a less formal power-structure which is based on traditional and 
cultural values and which determines that women have a second-class status in reality.  
         This is evident in the position of the monarchs themselves, despite their patronage of 
women‟s political participation. Abla Amawi writes that in King Hussain‟s speech from the 
throne at the opening of the thirteenth Parliament‟s first ordinary session‟, (80) he stated that, 
          The   family   or   the tribe in our country...is one of the   
         cells   of   society,   which   make   up the entire people.  
     It   maintains   society‟s  lofty  ideals, protects its noble  
     values,    and    moves    its    beautiful   traditions   and   
     generous    customs    forward.    The    family-like   the   
     tribe  -   has   always   been a source of honor and pride.  
     It  has   never   been … a burden or a source of blemish,  
      nor  has  it  been  a  shortcoming  or  a  censure. (81) 
 
           In this respect, Amawi argues that the King affirmed the family as the determinate force, 
the cement, of Jordan society and that “Jordan is built on the concept of “alusra al-wahida,” the 
single or united family, and by extension, the tribal families”.  His speech demonstrates, 
according to Amawi, two dimensions of Jordanian politics. One is that society should be viewed 
as a collective family with the King at its head. From this notion “emanates all other notions of 
national cohesion, the articulation of the rights and obligations of members of the family within 
the context of a society as a whole, the interrelatedness between the patriarchal family and the 
patriarchal state, and the promotion of all allegiance around these symbols of family and tribe 
solidarity in support of the state.” (82) Secondly, the state of Jordan attempts to accommodate 
two contradictory determinate factors but with great difficulty. On the one hand, the state tries to 
accommodate demands for rapid liberalization and modernisation. On the other hand, it tries to 
accommodate the desire to preserve traditions and maintain the status quo of the social order and, 
by extension, the basis of state cohesion. (83)  
             Women are caught within this contradiction. Social policies are devised largely by men 
and are based on traditionalist views.  This results in disadvantages for women in achieving an 
equal political and economic role to that of men. Women‟s work, for example, does not count as 
socially significant, even if it is economically desirable. The traditionalists‟ view is that women‟s 
work is less valuable than that of men. The natural role of women is the domestic terrain as a 
mother and a wife of a male breadwinner. When women apply for a job, the employer tells them 
“why should I employ you while there many males have no jobs. Besides, you will marry and 
your husband will take care of you”.  
               To conclude, the continuing and prevailing influence of informal, patriarchal cultural 
influences over the Jordanian state, which derive from its constant need to bolster regime stability 
in the face of political and economic insecurity, means that women‟s social welfare needs do not 
have a significant place within the hierarchy of social welfare considerations and are rather 
undermined despite the constitutional obligations of the state to its female citizens. 
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                                                        CHAPTER THREE  
           
        The Embeddeness of Patriarchal Influences in Social Welfare Provisions of Women 
 
3.1.   Introduction 
          The previous chapter had pointed to the prevalence of a traditional, patriarchal culture 
within the state‟s attitude towards social welfare provision for women. The function of this 
chapter is to shed light on the patriarchal culture of Jordanian society, to examine its gendered 
vision of social relations, and to illustrate in more detail how it is reflected in women‟s social 
welfare provisions.  
         The chapter will examine further how the boundaries between the private (family) and 
public spheres are blurred in patriarchal societies in which specific and differentiated roles are 
assigned to men and women. Mainstream patriarchal structures are found within the family 
from an infant age. The relations between members of the family (regardless of social class) 
are strictly gendered. Sex and age are indicatives of how gender relations are constructed 
inside the family or private sphere. Males are first on the ladder, followed by older women 
and with young and single women in effect having little or no status whatsoever. In the public 
sphere the state holds the greatest political power and, embodying this patriarchy within its 
own self as it does, it applies the same hierarchy to all public social and economic relations. 
Men dominate all of the key political, economic and legal state institutions. They are therefore 
in effect the decision makers and women subject to their decisions. Despite their formal 
citizenship rights, they are conceived in this public sphere as defined principally by their 
biology, for example being constructed as mothers of the nation. Moral obligations are placed 
on women‟s personal and public conduct. Personal status laws are predominantly patriarchal 
rules and traditions rather than the rights of supposedly democratic citizenship, with fathers, 
husbands and close male relatives being given a superior status in determining the actual 
rights of women. Social restrictions against the movement of women which start at home have 
undermined their political, economic progressive roles in the public sphere.  
 
           As Suad Joseph has argued more generally, “when women and motherhood are used as 
icons of the nation, they too frequently become captive to the structures and ideologies of 
patriarchy, particularly when men and fatherhood are associated with the state”.(1)  Patriarchy 
has enforced the “production of gendered hierarchy and facilitated the institutionalization of 
gendered citizenship in state building projects”. (2) 
           The parallel and inter-connected patriarchal biases within both the state and the society 
against the development of women‟s political and economic roles has led to two structural 
strategies. First, a policy of physical segregation has been manifested in sectors like education 
and health. Second, discrimination against women is applied within the social and labor laws.  
The combined result, as Brand points out, is that “existing national legalization and societal 
practices continue to reinforce women‟s exclusion from certain spheres, thus underpinning a 
general condition of second class citizenship”. (3) 
          The chapter is structured to include three sections. Firstly, the definition of patriarchy is 
explored and its particular Jordanian manifestation is presented. It is argued that Jordan today 
demonstrates the peculiar challenges of reconciling patriarchal social organization and 
traditions with the requirements of modernity, democracy and development. The second 
section examines the formal status of women in Jordan – how it is depicted in law, in their 
constitutional rights and specifically in their educational, employment, in their status as 
citizens, and in their rights to social security provisions. In these areas an initial appearance of 
gender equality nonetheless masks an embedded social patriarchy. 
         The third section explains the status of women within the framework of the personal 
status laws which are based on “Shari‟a law”. Here again patriarchy is evident, although in a 
more explicit form. Women are categorically considered as being of lesser status than men 
within the context of the laws of marriage, divorce, custody of children and, inheritance. Here 
traditional culture overlaps with heavily with particularist interpretations of Islam. The 
various sects within Jordan are divided by a number of “Madahabs” (a theologian 
interpretation of the Qur‟an). Women‟s personal status, in this regard, is decided by each 
“Madahab.” All “Madahabs” are interpreted by men and all carry a traditionalist patriarchal 
vision regarding gender relation within the family and society.    
         In sum, the chapter demonstrates that Jordanian women‟s social provisions with regard 
to equal citizenship and equal personal status law are effectively undermined by the sharp 
contrast between the written constitution and the traditional patriarchal culture and “urf”, 
religious laws (Islamic “Shari‟a” law with regard to personal status law), which extend 
patriarchal private or family relations into the public sphere. It concludes that the state and the 
form of a patriarchal family are so intertwined as to disadvantage women‟s social provisions 
despite their equal status as citizens.  
 
 
 
  
3. 2.   Defining Patriarchy and the Challenges of Modernity 
            Historically there has been no single society that has been exempted from gender 
inequality at some point in time. Where these were largely overcome in the industrialized 
West after the Second World War, this was through the introduction of a range of measures, 
enacted and enforced through the law, designed to minimize gender inequality in the 
provisions of education, health, labor market and social security rights. Doing this required 
introducing and applying equal citizenship rights to both men and women. The constitutions 
of such political societies manifested these fundamental rights. They were achieved after 
decades of historic struggle by both men and women. Patriarchal forms have subsequently 
been diminished and women have become more independent. In this narrative, the 
introduction of equality in the public sphere progressively eroded social inequality in the 
private sphere. Although civil society organizations in welfare societies, especially those 
formed by and for women, were active forces in demanding that laws be reformed to favor 
women‟s equality, and then implemented, women‟s movements would not have succeeded if 
the state had not been sufficiently secure, stable and ultimately willing to comply and to 
advance its own activities into the private sphere by redefining the role and status of women. 
           In contrast, Karam argues that the Arab world has been an exception to a general trend 
in which the, “boundaries between the personal and the public spaces have often diminished 
in many parts of the world”. (4) In Jordan, the public realm belongs to the state but the private 
sphere still belongs to the family. Attempts to appropriate responsibility for personal laws are 
doomed in the face of social resistance from powerful forced. A civil marriage is hardly 
accepted in most of the Arab world. A religious marriage is always a pre-requisite for a civil 
one. A marriage contract is a family affair and not the business of the state. A woman of a 
different religion from that of the man has to covert to the man‟s religion to be able to marry 
him. The state has thus made few inroads in the patriarchal structures and values of society. 
          Patriarchy is used in a casual way and interchangeably as follows: “there is one sex 
which dominates, another which is subjected”. (5) A more advanced definition of patriarchy is 
that it describes “the political and the social control of women by men”. (6) In this regard, and 
according to Coward, (7) patriarchy as a concept offers two sets of explanations. Firstly it 
“delivers the history of the relations between the sexes; and second it explains the form and 
function of male domination”. Explanations for patriarchy range from Marxism, which 
associates it with a materialist concern with relations of private property ownership, (8) to 
psychoanalysis which views “the history of the patriarchal family as the crucial condition in 
 imposing reproductive sexual identity”. (9) Either way, “patriarchal relations describe the 
oppression of women by all men. Patriarchal signifies sexism as a particular kind of kinship 
structure or a residual ideology of male dominance”. (10) 
            In Jordan, as in most of the Arab world, biological determinism frames the patriarchal 
social policies towards women, and justifies the sexual division of labor and entitlements in 
the household and social attitudes towards women in public. Yet biological determinism is in 
sharp contrast to the constitutional commitments to equal rights for men and women in the 
public sphere. Jordan is caught between the cultures and traditions of the past and the 
conditions and requirements of modernity and development. As Moghadam argues from a 
sociological perspective, “the salience of structural determinants other than religion reflects 
the major social change in the region that has an impact on shaping women‟s lives”. These 
determinates are of “economic development, the state, class location and the world system”. 
(11) Moghadam is referring to the “contradictions and challenges that patriarchy and the 
family have encountered and thus a collision between tradition and modernity “which, in her 
view, are sharply affecting women‟s private and public roles”. She argues that the family is 
considered to be perhaps the only natural and essential unit of the society. The relationship 
between the “biological basis of kinship and women‟s reproductive capacities” has 
historically and generally impacted on their status within the family resulting in different 
status expectations for males and females. The husband functions as an “instrumental of 
earning the family‟s keep and maintaining discipline”. In short, he is the only or main bread 
winner. The wife‟s function is “to socialize children into society‟s normative system of values 
and inculcate appropriate status expectations, and to provide a stable emotional environment 
that will cushion the (male) worker from the psychological damage of the alienating 
occupational world”. (12) In short, a woman‟s function is reduced to that of an “affective, 
expressive role of nurturance and support”. Moghadam draws on the work of others to suggest 
that a distinction can be made between the “private patriarchy of the pre-modern family and 
social order and the public patriarchy of the state and labor market”. (13) In doing so, she 
recognizes that patriarchal forms of social organization and tradition can be transplanted into 
the public sphere and specifically upheld and sustained by the state itself, something which 
has become a common feature of the Arab world. 
           The Jordanian family is certainly no different and is indeed held to be the “the 
fundamental unit of society [which] stresses the mother‟s role in the socialization of children 
particularly in raising “committed Muslims” and transmitting cultural values”. (14) 
Moghadam points out with reference to such Arab forms of patriarchy, that during changeable 
 conditions, such socio-economic difficulty, political uncertainty, and social rapid change, the 
role of the family and specifically that of the women within it, becomes the focal point of 
debates about how to respond. Preserving the status-quo becomes a key strategy of social 
preservation especially for the conservative and traditionalist‟s keepers of social order.  This 
can have multiple and even contradictory repercussions, not least of which is a transference of 
the patriarchal behavior from the family to the state. For example, it may be argued that – 
given an underlying base of male unemployment, women may be discouraged by the state 
from entering the labor market and competing for what jobs there are. Instead women are 
encouraged to stay at home and minimize their public roles, with moral virtue becoming the 
guise of economic necessity. On the other hand, when there is a shortage of male labor, either 
because of war or labor immigration, the state encourages women to enter the labor market. In 
a sense, women are considered to have the role of a reserve army, their rights are contingent 
on the preferential satisfaction of men‟s needs, demonstrating that women are not considered 
to be fundamentally equal to men or to have social welfare needs of equal status. In effect, the 
state applies patriarchal norms to its consideration of women‟s role in society.  
          Suad Joseph argues further that there are numerous uses of the term patriarchy, 
commonalities in Arab usages of patriarchy are as follows: 
Arab patriarchy consists of the privileging of male and                
elder rights. In Arab societies patriarchy mobilizes kinship 
structures, morality and idiom to justify male and elder 
privileges. (15)  Saud further writes that: 
 
Arab patriarchy has been forceful, in part , because of its rooting 
in kinship, unlike Western patriarchy.  The impact of patriarchy 
for the gendering social laws, citizenship has been profound 
because kinship permeates all domains,all spheres of life: 
private/public, state/civil society/kinship, governmental/ 
domestic. Boundaries between family and state, public and 
private, civil society and state are fluid; indeed made of 
integrally connective social tissue. (16) 
       
         An illustration of this overspill of private patriarchal structures into the realm of state 
provision can be found in the acute shortage of women nurses in Jordan. Kawar explains how 
young women are denied access to employment by their fathers after completing their studies 
or training. He recounts the particular details of a nurse who was not allowed to work after 
she completed her studies because her father did not want her to be in contact with her “male 
patients or co-workers”. (17)  Nursing in general is looked down on as a profession by 
society, which sees it as a menial form of employment, and women are thus often not willing 
 to enroll in nursing college courses to start with. (18) As a result, the Jordanian Nursing 
Council prompted a campaign on April 2007 to high-light the issue of female nurse shortages 
and to pursue efforts to counter it. (19)  It highlighted as part of the campaign the advantages 
of work as a nurse in an attempt to raise its social status. However, the combination of 
patriarchal attitudes towards women working in the field and its low social status has 
effectively kept women largely out of the nursing labor force. Women‟s access to this 
particular labor market is limited because a father or husband can exercise his control against 
his own females‟ family members in determining whether they should work outside the home 
and, if so, in what professions. Thus, for all the efforts of the state to reduce the shortage of 
female nurses, the private patriarchal realm extends its reach into the public sphere. This 
should not surprise us: as the Arab Human development Report of 2005 says, “The prevailing 
masculine culture and values see women as dependents of men. As a result men take priority 
both in access to work and the enjoyment of its returns”. (20) 
         This feature is not thus exclusive to Jordan. The Arab Human Development Report of 
2005, entitled Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World(21) set out very clearly the 
social and cultural roots of Arab patriarchy and its inter-connectedness with current Arab 
regimes and states. The relationship between tribal communalism, Islamic collectivism and 
modern authoritarian state forms have led to the erosion of any gains made in women‟s status 
in the early post-colonial period. 
Initially, the all-encompassing Arab state contributed to a 
greater participation by women in the public sphere, 
professional fields and social services, as well as to the relative 
protection of motherhood and childhood. But in the end, 
bureaucratic rigidity, the expropriation of different social and 
civic initiatives and the system of local dignitary (a man, of 
course) as the sole intermediary between authority and society, 
held women‟s rights hostage to the nature and vicissitudes of 
power. The symbiotic relationship between the state authority 
and patriarchy saw to it that these early achievements soon 
became opportunities for personal (male) gain….The position of 
women thus continued to deteriorate with the retreat of 
citizenship rights and the return of organic patriarchal rights as 
the final means of self-defense of a society forbidden to engage 
in the various forms of civic activity. (22) 
          
        The report concludes that “sex, good repute and honor” continue to define the boundaries 
of women‟s status in society, regardless of the major structural transformations which have 
taken place to politics and the economy in the last century. Woman moves only within a space 
whose boundaries are guarded by laws and prohibitions which are established by society, not 
 the state, and which are tacitly endorsed by the state even when they are at odds with its own 
stated objectives. 
 
3.3.    Formal Patriarchy (Official State Institutions)  
          This section explores the state‟s application of international conventions with regard to 
women‟s equal rights for education, health, labor, and social security. It assesses the gendered 
nature of citizenship rights in Jordan and their implications for women‟s social welfare 
provisions. It demonstrates the ultimate failure of the state to ensure equal citizenship rights 
for women, which in turn leaves a vacuum in their provisions that must be filled by the family 
and non-governmental civil society agencies. (The two final chapters will discuss these realms 
of provision in detail and bring to light the resultant ultimate deficiencies on the overall social 
welfare provisions for women). 
          The Jordanian constitution of 1951 states in Chapter Two, sub-headed “Rights and 
Duties of Jordanians”, in Article 6 that: 
 (i) Jordanians shall be equal before the law. These shall be no discrimination between 
them as regards to their rights and duties on grounds of race, language or religion; 
 (ii) The Government shall ensure work and education within the limits of its 
possibilities, and it shall ensure a state of tranquility and equal opportunities to all 
Jordanians‟.  
 Further articles state: 
 Article 7:  Personal Freedom shall be guaranteed. 
 Article 20: Elementary education shall be compulsory for Jordanians and free of 
charge in Government schools 
 Article 22:  
 (i) Every Jordanian shall be entitled to be appointed to public offices under such 
conditions as are prescribed by law or regulations. 
 (ii) Appointment to any government office or to any establishment attached to the 
Government, or to any municipal office, whether such appointment is permanent or 
temporary, shall be made on the basis of merit and qualifications. 
 Article 23: 
 (i) Work is the right of every citizen, and the state shall provide opportunities for work 
to all citizens by directing the national and raising its standards. 
 (ii) The state shall protect labor and enact legislation therefore based on the following 
principles: 
  (a) Every worker shall receive wages commensurate with the quantity and quality of 
his work. 
 (d) Special conditions shall be made for the employment of women and Juveniles. (23) 
      The language of the constitution reflects a modern, international usage of terms and norms 
and in this Jordan is little different to many other Third World countries who similarly may be 
said to fail the test of their actual application. In fact, as will now be shown, social provision 
by the state – far from respecting the quality of all citizens - is highly gendered. 
        The areas where social provisions are gendered can be identified as follows: 
a. the right for education  
b. The right to employment  
c. the right to Jordanian nationality  
c. The right to social security. 
 
a.) Educational Provision 
              The Arab Human Development report of 2005 (24) write that “despite the 
tremendous spread of girls' education in Arab Countries, women continue to suffer more than 
men do from a lack of opportunities to acquire knowledge. In terms of basic indicators, the 
Arab region has one of the highest rates of female illiteracy (as much as a one half, compared 
to only one third among males). It also displays one of the lowest rates of enrollment at the 
various levels of education. This is in spite of the success of some Arab states, most notably 
those in the Gulf, in increasing the percentage of girl's enrollment and narrowing the gap 
between the sexes at the three levels of education”. (25) However, it (26) stated that, whilst 
pre-school in Jordan is not compulsory, education is free for all primary and secondary school 
students, and compulsory for all Jordanian children through the age of fifteen. It is estimated 
that Jordan has achieved over 95 percent enrollment for its school age children, as compared 
to only 47 percent in 1960.   In general, Jordan has made significant advances in fulfilling its 
obligations to provide education to all its citizens.  
Thus, in 1960, Jordan‟s adult population had an average of only 
2.33 year of schooling, which is lower than the level in every 
East Asian and Latin American country [on our list] except 
Indonesia. By 2000, Jordan‟s population had higher average 
education levels (6.91 years) than Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, China and Brazil – most of which had started in 1960 
with higher levels of education than Jordan. (27) 
 
            The World Bank Report highlights multiple problems with this education – the quality 
of schooling provided, the over-concentration in some fields of study by higher education 
students, and the miss-match between educational attainments and the needs of the 
employment market, so one must qualify suggestions that – overall – the right to education 
has been satisfied by the state. In sum, the report indicates that the state provision of 
education has not matched the need for critical thinking and innovation which would not only 
lead to a proper economic return for educational investment but, more importantly for this 
study, promote significant change in social attitudes towards and of women in ways which 
would allow them to capitalize fully on educational opportunities. There is evidence, 
however, that this may change as Jordan has become a regional leader in the recent past in 
pedagogical and curricula reforms which aim to enhance student-led and inquiry-based 
learning.  
          The Report argues that over time, significant steps have been made by most MENA 
countries to reducing gender gaps in education – parity indexes suggest they are now not 
significantly different from those found in Latin America and East Asia. In Jordan the Gross 
Enrollment Rate of female to male students at primary level moved from 0.82 in 1970 to 1.01 
in 2003, suggesting there are now more females starting school than males, a situation which 
only improved through secondary and higher education levels. (28) In fact, the Report states 
that “Jordan and Syria have the most equal educational distribution in the region, with 
education Gini coefficients of around 0.45”. (29) 
          However, one area of persistent gender differentiation highlighted by the report is that 
found in continuing high levels of adult illiteracy. In Jordan, total adult illiteracy has been 
reduced from 30.8 of the population in 1980 to just 9.7% in 2003. However, whilst male adult 
illiteracy has been reduced in this period from 17.8% of all males to just 4.9%, female 
illiteracy has been reduced from 44.6% of women to 15.3%. (30) 
          This suggests that the actual attendance during these school years is less than their 
compulsory nature suggests, or that the importance attached to educational achievement in 
school for girls is still not recognized within family or society. A report by the Jordanian 
National Commission for Women pointed out that the highest illiteracy rates are found in the 
southern governorates of Jordan, Maan and Tafileh (26%), closely followed by Ajloun in the 
north (24%). The northern areas of Balqa and Jerash also share high rates (23) %, while 
Amman (capital) and Karak (south) have the lowest rates at 13%. The report states that 
children are subjected to gender stereotypes at an early age (pre-school) and that these feed 
through as children progress into earlier drop-out rates or lower imperatives for achievement 
 for girls than for boys. This seems particularly true of rural and poorer areas. For example, in 
1999 a survey of primary school textbooks (31) found that 96% of all references to men 
placed them in public life whilst 66% of references to women found them in a family setting. 
Men were portrayed as strong, brave, wise, independent leaders, whilst women were 
portrayed as kind, sensitive and caring home-makers. An Mendani Hendessi says: 
Gender stereotyping affects social attitudes about women‟s 
potentials and influence women‟s self-confidence and esteem. 
The effects of this are not always felt directly; indirectly and 
over time it becomes embedded in social attitudes and practices. 
It is hardly therefore surprising that a large number of girls in 
Jordan refrain from advanced academic, technical and 
vocational education. (32) 
 
         Though, the UNDP, AHDR 2005 indicates in their survey that 95% percent of Jordanian 
believe that “girls should have the same right to all levels of education, including university, 
as boys”; and 82% believe that girls should have the right to choose their field of 
specialization at university”. (33) Irrespective of the result of this survey , the prevailing 
social attitude is demonstrated by Jordanians graduate  young females during a random of  
interviews with a number of female students  in the final year of their studies at the University 
of Jordan in 2005. . Nonetheless, the majority of them suggested that as soon as they finish 
their studies, they would like to marry and have children if getting a job is a problematic. 
They expressed an opinion that “this is what women are for”. Clearly the impressive 
enrollment figures for secondary and further education disguise high drop-out rates for girls – 
in a survey conducted by the International Labor Organisation in 2002 (34) it was found that 
marriage was quoted by young women as the prime reason for quitting their education. (35) 
More than this, a JNCW/ German Technical Co-operation report (36) surveyed young women 
in 2004 and found that a half of them believed that priority in education should be given to 
men, demonstrating how the prevalent attitude among Jordanian families that marriage is a 
high priority for young women and education for young men, continues to be internalized by 
many of the women in question.  
         When it comes to obtaining a state scholarship for further study, whether inside Jordan 
or abroad, women are clearly disadvantaged, with only 19% of studentships for study in 
Jordan and 7% for study abroad being allocated to female students.  
         Social restrictions appeared to be the factor underlying this limitation.  In short, women 
are entirely equal to enroll in schools and peruse their studies but the quality proved to be 
short of its promises. The promise of eliminating segregation between males and females at 
 many schools, excluding women from decision maker‟s positions, discrimination between 
boys and girls in the educational sector has still fallen short of the aspirations and language 
found in the constitution and indeed the attempts of the state to improve educational 
entitlement. 
 
b.) On Employment Provision 
The second major field of provision of women is the employment or work. Sonbol 
writes that, “given the patriarchal order under which women in Jordan continue to live, it is a 
wonder that life for Jordanian women, though filled with frustrations and problems, is still 
comfortable in comparison to Jordan's neighbors and other Muslim countries”. (37) Jordan 
signed the United Nation Convention on the Elimination and discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) since 1980 and ratified it in 1992, albeit with reserving the right to limit 
compliance of Articles 9, 15 and 16 referring to nationality rights, equity in legal and civic 
matters, and marriage and family relations.  Nonetheless, Sonbol argues that discrepancies 
between what is signed and how the “laws and the execution of these rights” still persist. (38) 
         To illustrate, despite efforts of the state of Jordan to involve women in the labor market 
and enhance female participation in the economic sector, “Jordanian women‟s participation in 
the labor force is still “far from needed level.” (39) The report on the Status of Jordanian 
Women (40) writes (Source: Department of Statistics, “Employment Survey: Annual Report 
2002,” Amman) to the  that the “proportion of economically active males is much higher than 
that of females(39.7% for males and 7.7% for females).(41) The figure has improved 
according to the World Bank, to 25.5% by 2003 and 26.1% in 2004, but significantly this still 
lags well behind other Arab countries like Egypt (31.4%), Tunisia (32.7%) or Lebanon 
(30.2%) and is not much above Saudi Arabia (20.2%) or Kuwait (23.9%) suggesting Jordan 
remains one of the more conservative Arab countries in this area. (42)  Moreover it is well 
behind the average for East Asia (41.8%) or Latin America (35.3%). Al-Qudsi (43) argues 
that ''Arab women labor force participation is considered the lowest among the six developing 
regions of the World” and, above all 89 % of women are concentrated in services especially in 
the social and personal services. The World Bank Report of 2008 suggests that, unlike other 
developing regions of the world, it is better education women who are disproportionately 
represented in the work force, suggesting that women who are less educated and/or poorer are 
more likely to remain so in Jordan. This is at odds with Qudsi‟s assessment: he writes that 
“occupational segregation is quite extreme, with females comprising only a small minority in 
most occupations”. Most women, especially those with low educational attainment levels, do 
 low grade “white collar” work such as being a typist or clerk. Few are skilled or semi-skilled 
blue-collar workers and they are similarly under-represented in professional or managerial 
positions.  
           Moreover, women are usually allocated to jobs where “traditional female skills” are 
required, such as a degree of patience or precision, often seen as specific qualities of 
women.(44)  For example, 45% of female employees work in the public sector (54,000 
employees in 2005). The highest numbers work in the Ministries of Education, Health, 
Planning, Social Development and Post and Communication whilst the lowest numbers work 
in the Ministries of Finance, Awqaf, Tourism and Antiquities, Energy and Mining, Water and 
Transport. (45) The same pattern is true in women-owned private enterprises, three-quarters 
of which are home-based and the majority of which utilize traditional female skills such as 
sewing, embroidery, provision of beauty services or production of garments. Overall, only 4% 
of women‟s enterprises operate within the formal sector, one of the lowest ratios in the world 
(average 25-30%). As Mendana Hendessi says: 
Private enterprise in Jordan is male-dominated and women‟s 
entrepreneurship is markedly under-developed, marginalized 
and under-valued, as it mainly operates along traditional gender 
roles. (46) 
 
          Not surprisingly then, most studies focus on  formal female labor and ignore the 
informal sector, and more importantly the women who are engaged in home production such 
as sewing traditional handicrafts. (47) What is known is that women face greater 
discrimination in gaining access to credit and financing for their own businesses. They are 
usually required to have male relatives stand as guarantors for business loans and find it 
harder to access business networks and other resources than men. With regard to employed 
women, there is a difference between the rural and the urban, age and educational, as Flynn 
finds out from a survey executed by „WIDTECH‟ project with the CSS (Centre for Strategic 
Studies at the University of Jordan) (48). She writes that the only sector in which a gender gap 
in terms of the participation of females is not found is within agriculture. Women in the 
agricultural sector are significantly more likely to work than women in urban regions. (49) 
         The WIDTECH (50) report writes that “the rate of women currently working in rural 
regions at 18.4% is significantly higher than the rate for urban regions, at 11.4 %. Agricultural 
activities account for a significant proportion of women‟s labor, and women in rural 
agricultural regions are significantly more likely to work than are women in urban 
regions”.(51) Agricultural income is more likely to be informal, seasonal and unprotected, 
 (52) meaning that this employment pattern leaves Jordanian women particularly vulnerable. 
With regard to age, Flynne finds that more elder married women enter the formal and 
informal sectors than do the young, and married women working show a higher activity in 
economic life than single women. (53) However, marriage is also a prime reason for quitting 
employment – jobs which are not sex-segregated are unappealing for husbands, fearful of the 
sexual harassment or temptation to which their wives may be exposed. Employers too may 
prefer unmarried women, who have fewer family and childcare responsibilities. The 
ILO/Ministry of Labor survey quoted earlier found that 68% of the employers interviewed 
(40% private and 28% public) “expressed a marked preference for unmarried female workers 
who are perceived to have fewer family and childcare responsibilities. Similarly, because of 
the need to adhere to the Labor Code requirements of maternity leave and childcare provision, 
employers [in the QIZs] said they would discourage married women from applying for 
jobs”.(54) 
          Miles similarly found (55) that Jordanian employers consider married women to be 
expensive. Although the minimum wage in the private sector (JD85 in 2007) was lower than 
in the public sector (JD120), and workers were required to work 8 rather than 7 hours a day, 
private employers are still required to offer up to 70 days paid maternity leave (90 days in the 
public sector) and to provide funded on-site childcare if they employ over twenty women. 
However, some of the perceived benefits for women, portrayed as favorable to their specific 
needs by the state, are ultimately more costly for women. For example, women pay the same 
pension contributions as men, yet are not able to pass these on to their husbands of children 
after their death as men can do to their wives and children. The earlier retirement age for 
women also means they can build up only lower pension funds, leading to greater dependence 
on relatives for support in old age. Widows and dependents of a deceased man receive their 
benefits more easily than beneficiaries of a deceased woman. State or employer-provided 
child-care assistance for women in the private and informal sectors is non-existent and private 
day-care is extremely expensive. Thus women are often dependent on grandparents‟ 
willingness to help out. With regard to other benefits, women who run their own businesses, 
or who work in the informal or agricultural sectors are unlikely to receive anything at all. 
Sonbol therefore states that a “discrimination based on benefits against women is a serious 
hindrance impacting on the employment of women in the work force”. (56)  
          Finally, there is little effective enforcement of any measures to prevent wage 
discrimination. In effect women in the private sector are paid 45% less than men and women 
in the public sector 13%. (57) 
           Sonbol explains that economic status of Jordanian women remains as controversial as 
ever. Despite the equality article in the Jordanian constitution, women‟s work is widely 
considered to be a complementary rather than essential activity. It is a continuation of her 
work as “natural” duties of house work, with the exception that the former is paid. (58) As 
Hendessi says:  
                                      Jordanians, by and large, still regard the world of work and 
business as a male domain and household and care of children as 
a female domain. This attitude prevails even more strongly 
outside the capital. Although Jordan has made important 
advances in education….it is yet to break the taboo of women 
working outside the house.(59) 
 
           The economic role of Jordanian women in the labor market and work has been the 
target for change by the government. Most recently the National Social and Economic Action 
Plan (2004-2006) attempted to increase women‟s participation in the workforce through two 
specific measures; the provision of ICT Knowledge Stations across the country which would 
assist women in upgrading their skills and accessing paid work, and an outreach programme 
to convince parents to allow girls from rural areas to travel to work in Qualifying Industrial 
Zones (QIZs) producing products such as garments and textiles for exports. As well as 
stressing the benefits of employment, the government provided free meals and travel to 
women employees such that by 2007 they made up a total 70% of QIZ employees. 
           However, women suffer from structural shortcomings especially at the official public 
level. Sonbol gives a bleak picture of this. She argues that despite efforts by the state to 
overcome the latter, women work involvement is undermined by the patriarchal nature of the 
legal system with regard to the “explanatory and executive parts of Jordan‟s laws” (60) 
pertaining to labor. To illustrate, women are allowed to work and can work but they need first 
their father‟s approval if they are single (earlier example of the nurse whom her father did not 
want her to work as a nurse) or husbands if they are married. Without the approval of male 
members of the family, women find it hard to either go to work or even continue to do so. 
Cases of divorce in Jordan reveal the factor of those women who disobey their husband‟s 
disapproval. 
           Further evidence of patriarchal influences subverting formal state commitments are 
manifested in the contradiction between state laws and “Urf”( a tribal code of morally-guided 
behavioral norms) with regard to work. Whilst “Urf” does not prohibit women from working, 
it stresses that work outside the home exposes women to immoral environments. “Shari‟a” 
Islamic law is not against women working but it also applies the issue of mixing gender and 
 morality for women joining the labor force. The latter‟s argument is compounded with 
assertions that women are physically not able to do work (the biological determination 
argument is used here) hence the lower mandatory retirement age, and that women are inferior 
to men and cannot do much of the work men do. With reference to the latter, the Labor Code 
states that women may not work night shifts or do heavy work that needs physical strength. 
This argument prevailed in the 18
th
, 19
th
, and the 1
st
 half of the 20
th
 century in the 
industrialized societies. It is still a persistent argument in Jordan especially by the 
traditionalists and Islamists and has clearly infiltrates the state through the terms of the Labor 
Code. 
           The defenders of the above conditions state that it makes women‟s work much easier 
than that of men. Women are regarded as being frail by nature, needing to be protected. 
Arguments which favor the employment and employment conditions of men are thus 
disguised as being designed to serve women‟s needs through adoption of norms and values 
which are rooted in social traditions and religion. Sonbol writes that: 
      Because of the patriarchal outlook, an outlook based on 
      acceptance of tradition as the basis for legislation, labor 
      laws actually differentiate according to gender and   on 
      the basis of the need to protect women and   allow    a 
      “moral” work environment. Morality and      a “moral” 
      sexually segregate working situation in which women 
      are protected represent the most important   issue     for 
      people who are skeptical about women‟s employment. (61) 
 
          Combined with the technical difficulties associated with employment outside the home 
(e.g. poor transport infrastructures) and the fear of sexual harassment going to, and in the 
place of work, this context of strong patriarchal practices against women who work, and the 
ambiguities of the state‟s own position in enabling them, woman‟s incentive to work is 
undoubtedly diminished. Sonbol sums up that the implication of the infiltration of patriarchal 
beliefs and practices on Jordanian labor and benefits laws as being a systematic discrimination 
and failure to meet the social needs of women.  
 
c.) On Jordanian Citizenship Rights 
 
             Formal citizenship status is perhaps the clearest indication of a state‟s commitment to 
equitable status of male and female citizens. Here we see the Jordanian state‟s failing in even 
starker relief. 
            Reading between the lines of the Jordanian Nationality Law of 1954 (amended in 
1987), it appears that the law is a mixture of the colonial, paternal British nationality law and 
 the Ottoman code. It states that “Jordanian nationality shall be defined by law”. (62) In the 
light of the former, a British mother was unable to pass her nationality to her children if she 
was married to a non-British man. The British man on the other hand was able to pass 
correspondingly, the Jordanian nationality law states that nationality is granted to (a) those 
born of a father holding Jordanian nationality, (b) those born in the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan to a mother holding Jordanian nationality and a father whose citizenship is unknown or 
who is stateless or whose paternity has not been legally established; and (c) those born in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to unknown parents. Thus, a Jordanian man can pass his 
nationality to his wife if she is non-Jordanian and of Arab origin if she lives in the country for 
3 year or to his wife if she is non-Arab after five years. However, a Jordanian woman cannot 
pass her nationality to a non-Jordanian man with few exceptions. Children from a Jordanian 
mother and a non-Jordanian man are unable to have neither their mother‟s nationality nor 
residency status in Jordan. Such children will have no access to public schools, social 
entitlements or political rights. (63) More importantly, those children are not even registered 
in the passport of their Jordanian mother, which is stamped “Children are not included due to 
the different nationality of the father”. (64)  
          Amawi argues that the nationality law and the reservations which the state of Jordan 
registered to the United Nations (UN) convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the UN General Assembly on 18 
December 1979, reveals two key factors. First, the nationality law is written with a patriarchal 
conviction that the father‟s blood ties to the child are the only ones which matter. Second, the 
nationality law is not associated with a citizen‟s relations with the land itself. A Jordanian 
man passes his nationality to his children even if they are born in another country. They also 
carry his Jordanian nationality even when he carries another nationality. In short, blood ties 
and paternal linkage are decisive for the nationality of Jordanian citizens. (65) 
          Defenders of the present nationality law in Jordan claim that it conforms to the 
requirements of Islamic “Shari‟a” law. Amawi disagrees and states that the law is not based 
on the Islamic law but rather it on “masculinity-based nationalism”. In her reading, she states 
that Islamic law did not address the issue of nationality, but that of “Nassab” which associates 
the children to their father and not the mother.  
           A second claim is that the reservations manifest a fear in the side of the officials and 
address the “higher national interest” of the country. This presupposes that expanding 
nationality entitlements to be more equitable would pose a threat in two ways. First it would 
lead to depopulation the Occupied Palestinian Territories by facilitating a huge Palestinian 
 influx into Jordan and, secondly and relatedly, it would have serious consequences on the 
meager resources of Jordan as they had to be distributed among a larger population. Amawi 
argues that these fears reflect a degradation of women‟s intellectual capacity as well as 
suspecting their loyalty for their country. She argues that if this is how women are regarded, 
then the rights of women to vote, occupy a parliamentary seat and other official posts must 
also undergo serious scrutiny. (66)  She summarises thus: 
The nationality law reflects the underpinnings of paternally 
based citizenship with its main function of reproducing the 
nation….It underlies the fact that that relationship between the 
citizen and the start is based on the type of citizen, a male, rather 
than on a citizen per se. Accordingly, that citizen is the one 
entitled to a direct relationship with the state and through him 
the relationship of the lesser citizen is mediated. (67)   
             
          The Nationality Law clearly considers women to be second class citizens despite the 
constitution claiming their equality before the law. The contradictory pattern between these 
two laws themselves and between the law and reality is reflected in other laws i.e., the social 
security laws, the personal status law, the passport law and the family registry book. 
  
d.) On Social Security Law 
An additional pattern of a patriarchal influence is evident the social security law of 
Jordan. The first effort to devise a social security law was Provisional Law number 30 of 
1978, which was amended with Law Number 19 in May 2001. Law 19 provides for a Social 
Security Corporation into which employees pay 5.5% of their monthly salaries while 
employers contribute the equivalent of 16.5% (14.5% for insurances against old age, death 
and disability and 2% for insurances against work-related injury and disability). Article 3 
states that the particular insurances include insurance against work injuries and occupational 
diseases, old age, disability and death, health insurance for the worker and beneficiaries, 
family allowances and insurance against unemployment. They cover all laborers over the age 
of 16 except those in the public sector (covered separately), those “whose relationship with 
the employer is irregular”, most agricultural workers, fishermen and sailors, and “Housemaids 
and the like”. (68) 
           It is striking that the extent of the law begins by referring to employees in both genders 
(him/her, he/she) but by Article 13 the gender bias becomes clear. Reference to a Director 
General of the Social Security Corporation is to “his”, “him” and “he” only. Thereafter, the 
 employee is also deemed to be male, except for particular instances where distinctions are 
made for females.  
          The first major distinction, is the age at which pensions may be drawn (60 for a male 
and 55 for a woman). Women may be compensated for accumulating fewer years of payments 
only if they have paid a total of 180 monthly payments (15 years) which may be difficult to 
accrue given their years spent on child rearing. Article 52 specifies that a male employee‟s 
beneficiaries include his widow, his children, any brothers and sisters whom he supports 
financially, his daughters if they are widowed or divorced, and even his parents. For women, 
the only beneficiaries named are their widowers or un-born boys. Pensions may be paid to 
mothers (Article 54), widows and daughters (Article 53) of male employees only if they do 
not remarry although they may be resumed if they later divorce). In other words, the Law 
presupposes that men are the primary breadwinners and women are primarily dependents. A 
woman‟s entitlement to receive the benefits of a dead male relative cease if another man 
assumes the role of her provider. Moreover, since the majority of women who work do so in 
the informal and agricultural sectors, there is no social security provision available to them 
through this law. It is worth noting that a man cannot receive the pension of his deceased wife 
unless he proves that he is unable to work and that a woman who resigns from her 
employment can take with her what she saved from her pension but a man cannot. Thus the 
male breadwinner status of men is not always to their advantage. 
          Sonbol thus argues that “gender considerations are central to the system, and benefits 
differ according to gender”. (69) A brief look at the statistics provided in the 2006 Social 
Security Annual Report, the latest available, support this argument. (70) 
         The report states that in 2006 only 7.5% of women were employed compared to 39.6% 
of males, and 25% of employment seeking women were unemployed compared with just 
11.9% of men. During the year, the number of active insured persons increased by 11.7%, 
74.4% of these being male and just 25.6% being female.  
          Table 1 below demonstrates the vast difference in numbers of males and females 
insured as well as indicating how women are concentrated in certain economic activities over 
others. 
Table  1: Numbers of Active Insured Jordanian Citizens by Gender and Economic Activity 
Activity    Male  Female Total 
Agriculture    7450  1200  8650 
Industry and Mining   63251  12414  75665 
Trade     38,874  6987  45861 
 Construction    13414  119811 14612 
Transport    9875  1266  11141 
Finance and Banking   13507  5,926  19433 
Tourism    13993  1584  15577 
Other services    264546 114273 378819 
Unspecified    250  95  345 
TOTAL    425,160 144,943 570,103 
Source: Table 1, SSC Annual Report 2006, Amman. P.35. 
           Table 2 below demonstrates the unevenness of women‟s coverage between urban and 
rural areas (reinforcing rural poverty for women in the longer term) as well as the regional 
variations in the proportion of insured persons who are women which depends not least on 
regional economic activities and the more conservative attitudes of rural areas being reflected 
on women‟s employment in general. 
          Table 2: Numbers of Active Insured Persons by Gender and Locality of Residence 
Location    Male  Female Total 
Amman (central)   123598 64173  187771 
Amman (north)   78539  23971  102510 
Amman (west)    98233  16314  114547 
Zarqa     16367  5814  22184 
Sahab     15465  3834  19299 
Irbid     16282  6674  22956 
Amman (east)    13480  3611  17091 
Amman (south)   23337  5190  28527 
Salt     8049  3680  11729 
Aqaba/Ma‟an    12574  1611  14185 
Karak and Tafela   8819  3196  12015 
Mafraq    2910  679  3589 
Yarmouk    3518  4759  8277 
Jerash     1758  491  2249 
Ma‟adaba    1415  590  2005 
Ajloun    816  343  1169 
Source: Table 2, SSC Annual Report 2006, Amman. P.35. 
         The report details the variations across economic activities in average wages for males 
and females. Male are on average paid more in all economic sectors except agriculture and 
 tourism, with the overall average difference being between male salaries of JD296 per month 
and average female salaries being JD253. Over the prolonged period of insurance payments, 
this means that women build up lower insurance “pots” or pensions then males, despite the 
supposed equality effected through the Social Security Law itself.  
         Finally, the report provides the accumulative number of pensions being paid out by 
gender. (See Table 3 below). This makes clear the vast disparity in the financial receipts from 
the Social Security Corporation of males and females. For a supposedly national provision, its 
performance falls woefully short and demonstrates an internalized culture of gender 
stereotyping and male preferencing. 
           Table 3: Accumulative Number of Pensions by Gender 
Type of Pension   Males  Females Total 
Old Age    55618  8073  93691 
Disability due to natural causes 14472  1675  16147 
Disability due to work injury  2492  104  2596 
Death due to natural causes  7628  521  8149 
Death due to work injury  1363  63  1426 
Source: Table 10, SSC Annual Report 2006, Amman. P.39. 
           To sum, the constitution of Jordan declares that citizens of Jordan are equal before the 
law. However, reading between the lines of the laws pertaining to education, labor, citizenship 
and social security, as well as examining how they are manifested in reality, shows that, 
whilst they are apparently modern and egalitarian and conform to the UN International 
Conventions against all types of discrimination, they serve to reinforce the patriarchy that is 
embodied in every aspect of women‟s lives.  
           Not all Jordan‟s laws even try to claim the equality of women. When it comes to their 
personal status (as opposed to their status as formal citizens), they are subject to a legal code 
which is premised on religious “Shari‟a” Islamic laws. These address areas pertaining to 
marriage, divorce, the custody of children and inheritance. These laws are often considered by 
Jordan‟s ruling elites as being in some way sacrosanct or holy, and whilst women have at time 
successfully campaigned for public laws to be made more progressive, there has been always 
a substantial resistance by the officials of the state to proposed alterations to these laws.  
           The final part of this chapter sheds light on how these more overtly patriarchal 
conventions affect the lives of women of Jordan from birth to death. 
 
 
  
3.4.    The Patriarchal Influence of the Personal Status Laws 
           The legal status of women is determined not only through their constitutional rights but 
more directly perhaps through the body of personal status laws which are derived from 
“Shari‟a” law.  
         “Shari‟a” law is the interpretation of the written words of God found in the holy book of 
the Muslims, the “Qur‟an”. Interpretations and explanations of these laws by high religious 
interpreters is allowed but fundamentally changing them is not.  “Shari‟a” law established the 
religious context what God has dictated to his followers to determine the relationship between 
men and women, what rights they have may have and how they should behave towards one 
other. Disobedience of these religious directives draws condemnation on the grounds of 
immorality.  Islamic “Shari‟a” law is used in Jordan to determine the rights of men and 
women with regard to marriage, divorce, custody of the children and inheritance. 
          Other bodies of law within Jordan are civil law, which is largely comparable with, if not 
drawn from, European (notably French) law and which is mainly relevant to business activity, 
and the traditional tribal or “Urf” law, which is mainly associated with an informally 
instituted culture of honor and shame. The latter basically addresses women‟s behavior in 
public. This Jordanian legal system is in effect part and parcel of the historical heritage of the 
Ottoman‟s empire in the 18th and 19th centuries and of French and British colonial laws. The 
colonial laws of Victorian Britain and nineteenth century France were themselves gendered 
and drew much upon interpretations of biblical laws. They have been developed and 
progressively changed in the social welfare states of France and Britain since the Second 
World War to enhance equality for women and to advocate their social rights. But the social 
and political developmental processes which accompanied this modernization have been 
missing in Jordan, and colonial law has been modified instead through the impositions of 
Islamic and “Urf” Law which counteract the commitments made to gender equality in the 
constitution. Consequently the women of Jordan are obliged to abide by Islamic laws 
regardless of what the constitution promises them in terms of equality before the law. 
    More than 95% of Jordan‟s population adheres to the “Hanafi” School of Islamic 
“Fiqh”, or law which they – in theory - consider to be holy beyond dispute. Laws of marriage, 
divorce, inheritance and custody of children are derived from this.  “Shari‟a” law in effect 
holds the “genesis of the Jordanian personal status laws”.(71) The legal status of the Jordanian 
women is enshrined within it as this it established the legal basis for the family unit of which 
she is a part. (72) Islam is declared in the Constitution to be the religion of the state, providing 
 the means whereby Islamic law gains its status, and Islamic Religious Courts serve as arbiters 
of all legal decisions in the realm of personal status for Muslims. Following the Ottoman legal 
precedent, other religious communities are subject to their own courts systems. In the first 
instance, cases go to judgment by “Qadi‟s” and subsequent appeals lie within the realm of the 
“Shari‟a” Court of Appeal in Amman and are not subjected to secular scrutiny. These courts 
were established by the Courts Establishment Law of 1951, were endorsed by the statement in 
the 1952 Constitution that “Shari‟a”s courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction shall apply the 
rulings of the “Shari‟a” law, and have subsequently been reinforced with the Law on 
“Shari‟a” Lawyers of 1952, the Law on Structure of “Shari‟a” Courts of 1972, the Law of 
Personal Status of 1976 and Civil Code of 1976. 
          Personal status was defined through a reformulation of the 1947 provision Law of 
Family Rights. A new 1951 Law of Family Rights drew from Ottoman law, as well as 
Egyptian precedents, to establish Islamic “Shari‟a” law as the basis for personal status in 
Jordan. The 1976 Law develops the 1951 law in more detail and makes specific reference to 
“Hanafi” interpretations and precedents.  It should be noted that Jordan is not unique in 
adopting this approach to personal status laws. Saud Josef writes that religion is the essence of 
Arab politics where religion is frequently accused of being responsible for gendering 
citizenship and consequently maintaining women‟s oppression. Josef writes that, “in most 
Arab states, citizenship has been constituted through membership in religious communities. 
The effect has been to institutionalize religious identity as political identity. Arab citizens 
have not been imagined as homogenized, undifferentiated, detached, separable, bounded 
individuals. The mediation of citizenship through sub-national communities appears to be an 
alternative to the Western liberal contractarian notion of a direct, unmediated relationship 
between individualized citizens and the state. The “civic myth” of primordial pre-state 
religious communities has fostered state sanctioned religious intermediaries between the 
citizen and the state.” Furthermore, the Arab state represents itself as the guardian of the 
Islamic path; it employs  membership of religious communities as a strategically tool in 
defining its relations with its citizens, for example by institutionalising the religious courts 
and thus gaining political support from religious authorities which in turn endorse and 
legitimize it. The latter has made researchers focus on the religious and ethnic communities 
rather than the role of the state, Josef writes. The intersection of Islam and politics is, 
however, strongly approved of by particular influential groups in society including 
traditionalists, some modernists and of course political Islamists. Not surprisingly then 
religious interpretations of Islamic ideas regard what constitutes appropriate forms of 
 citizenship for women are both socially and politically powerful, especially when they are 
deployed within political systems easily open to power manipulation. (73) A practical 
example might be the case of an Egyptian lady who needs to make a birth certificate for her 
both children because their father has died. The widow is caught by  surprise that “Shari‟a” 
law does not consider her automatically the guardian of her children and without a written 
will by her deceased husband confirming her guardianship to his kids she is unable to be 
recognized as such. In this case, their uncle - the brother of the father - is automatically the 
guardian or another male relative on the father‟s side. They are the only ones who can apply 
for the birth certificates for those children. In short, the power of patriarchy in executing 
personal status law around the Arab world is strongly evident in many countries. This is 
hardly surprising since – as in religions – the places, institutions and offices of Islam are 
predominantly occupied by men. They maintain their status within their own religious 
community by inserting the value of the family, and the male‟s superior role within it, into all 
other spheres of activity in which they have a voice.  Their assertion of the „kin idiom‟, of 
fundamental intertwining of patriarchal kinship structures, religion and the material world, 
sustains the status quo in their own favor. Stoweasser argues that this discriminatory attitude 
towards women in Islam stems from the “Quranic” verses that are often written in “gender 
specific language”. (74)  The “Qur‟an” mainly focuses on concepts of devotion and worship 
which are couched in a discourse of morality and immorality framed through the relationship 
between men and women. Thus it would be hard to escape a second-class status for women so 
long as Islam serves as the basis for personal status legislation in whatever country it may be 
applied. We may now turn to specific areas of personal status to see how this patriarchal 
subordination manifests itself in the law. 
         On Marriage: In Islam, as in other religions, marriage is a contract between a husband 
and wife, the purpose of which is to form families and procreate. A wife‟s duties are to look 
after the family members inside the home while the husband bears the burden of providing for 
the family. The wife is obliged to obey her husband and she must seek his permission if she 
wants to leave the marital house to socialize or shop. Despite the fact that the constitution 
writes that both men and women have the right to travel, a woman is required to obtain a 
husband‟s approval to obtain a passport as well as to actually travel. This raises a key 
contradiction between citizens who are supposedly equal before the law but at the same time 
exist in a relationship where the woman is subject to the rule of the husband. (This is one of 
the principal barriers against women who want to work. Permission of the husband or male 
 relative is essential beforehand even though the labor law allows women a supposedly equal 
right to work). (75) This guardianship role is established by personal status law. The legal age 
for marriage is 16 for males and 15 for females but women under the age of 18 are considered 
to be under the guardianship of their fathers or male relatives and cannot marry without their 
permission. Amawi argues that personal status law is also discriminatory in terms of 
“guardianship in marriage, or the need for a “Wali” to act as mediator for the woman in 
concluding her marriage”.  A woman is required to have a mediator to negotiate her marriage. 
The “Wali” is usually her father but it may be her brother or another male relative if the father 
is unavailable. A woman cannot be a “Wali”. The “Wali”   negotiates the woman‟s marriage 
and acts as a mediator. The marriage is dissolved if the “Wali” is not happy with the 
husband‟s provisions for the wife. The “Wali” role is explained as bringing respect for the 
woman‟s position in the family and increasing her prospects in the eyes of her marriage 
candidate. The discrepancy regarding marriageable age is important to note. The civil code 
states that the maturity age for a woman is eighteen whereas the personal status law places it 
at fifteen. To allow a girl to marry at fifteen years old contradicts all international conventions 
on children‟s rights.  Amawi writes that the “Wali” is in effect an agent who mediates 
between the female member of his own family and the state in matter of her private life. The 
woman in this regard has no final say or no right to ultimately object. This suggests that a 
woman is considered less in terms of emotions, intellectual and economic value than a man, 
and therefore needs protection. (76)  A woman‟s position is almost nothing. She conceals her 
wishes and passes them to her guardian. Although women over the age of 18 may in fact 
object to a “Wali”s decision, and a girl over 15 can have a judge overturn a “Wali”s rejection 
of a suitor if his grounds are improper, the traditional and informal “Urf” laws mean that a 
woman‟s honor is closely linked to her behavior, her financial dependence on the family and 
their moral support, acting as a major discouragement from disobeying the family‟s will. Her 
obedience to the family offers her beneficial social linkages. Disobedience takes all her family 
privileges that she is provided with away; more importantly she will be looked down at her by 
the whole of society. Thus the combination of the state‟s recognition of the role of 
guardianship and traditional social custom work to undermine the equality offered through the 
constitution.  Moreover, a woman is denied the right to marry a person of a different religion, 
unless the non Muslim man converts into Islam. The marriage is dissolved if the husband 
“recants his Islamic faith”. The explanation is that children carry the father‟s religion and not 
the mother‟s, further evidence of a preferencing of men over women within the law. 
          On Divorce: The personal status law gives the husband an absolute right to renounce his 
marriage and forward a divorce without the consensus of his partner: it is not surprising that 
Sonbol argues that this is contradictory and discriminatory. The “talaq” or repudiating oath is 
not valid if the man is drunk, asleep, in a faint, coerced or “overwhelmed”. Women may 
petition through the courts for divorce but only on the grounds of failure to maintain, physical 
desertion, prolonged absence (over a year), a prison sentence (of three years or more) breach 
of a binding stipulation of the marriage contract or issues relating to the physical and mental 
health of her husband. Both parties may petition on the grounds of “discord and strife”. Where 
a husband dissolves the marriage through “talaq” without good reason, the law requires him 
to pay compensation worth a year‟s maintenance as he must do for an ex-wife who is still 
breast-feeding their children and as he must do whilst she retains custody of the children (until 
they reach puberty.)  A wife who fails to provide sufficient evidence in support of her petition 
for divorce must remain married against her will. 
            These legal positions are common in many Arab states which incorporate “Shari‟a” 
law. Divorce is not favored in the word of God but it is permitted by Islam. Indeed Islam 
provides a peaceful method for dissolving an undesirable marriage. Abuelayan writes that: 
        In Islam Talaq(divorce) means to dissolve the marriage 
        contract  as  when you say, I  release   the   bonds‟  this 
        means the release of his or her marriage bond. Divorce 
        is  a hateful thing in the eyes of Islam. Marriage  is  not 
        supposed  to  be a temporary relationship because  it  is 
        considered  as  one  of  the holist of bonds. Divorce  on 
        the  other  hand  is one of the  most   undesirable things 
        that were permitted. The Prophet was reported to have 
        said „marry and do not divorce because Allah‟s shakes 
        at the mention of  the word „divorce‟.(77)  
 
 
            Divorce is clearly not approved of by God and thus Prophet Mohammed set a number 
of conditions so as to make it difficult to obtain.  Minai summarises these as follows: (1) a 
man cannot return to his divorced wife unless she first marries someone else and again 
divorced. The re-marrying and divorcing process must be actual and not fake; (2) a woman 
becomes divorced if the husband pronounces the word “I repudiate thee three times in 
succession”(3) the man must maintain his ex at least for 3 months until she proves that she is 
not pregnant. (78)    
             However, divorce in Islam may not be as gendered as is often considered according to 
a number of writers Sonbol argues that divorce has become gendered since the intentions of 
the personal status law which is derived from “Al-Shari‟a” became overshadowed with the 
 view that “natural characteristics differentiating human beings from other species form the 
bases upon which are based the legal principles regulating man‟s social existence”, the 
differentiation is made whether “the human being is male or female; a husband, widower, or 
divorced; a father, a legitimate one; or whether he is legally competent”, Sonbol says.  Thus a 
patriarchal vision of how the relationship between men and women should be has become 
embedded in the personal status law.  
                 The method used in formulating modern Shari‟a laws was talfiq 
(patching), by means of which of western laws and the 
interpretations of various madhahib (schools of law) were 
merged together to compose what became known as „personal 
status laws‟ to handle gender and family relations. Even though 
what was being set up was a new system, it was bundled into a 
“legitimate Islamic package. (79)  
 
           In this process, the biblically-influenced colonial laws were merged with the Islamic 
laws inherited from the Ottomans to establish a fundamentally patriarchal perception that 
women are “less reliable than men and are moved by emotions rather than by their minds and 
less able to remember facts, and that thus women are more liable to sin by nature and must be 
protected and watched over”, as a legal principle. (80)  
           Divorce in Jordan creates a number of particular difficulties for women. Men usually 
have work and are financially better off. If women ask for the divorce, they have to go to a 
Jordanian court. The court decides for her “nafaqa” (alimony) and arranges the visits of the 
children. The alimony can be decided by two arbitrators who are appointed by the judge from 
both families. Most alimony mounts to 50 Dinar a month. Men often manipulate the 
arbitrators and escape payment. The courts can take a long time before laying down their 
judgment and women are mostly left with no support until the decisions arrive. Recent  
changes in the law which are currently taking place in Jordan, have introduced  “khul” – the 
possibility that women may chose divorce but even here the man has to agree and can ask for 
financial compensation so as to let her free. In short, the “khul” type of divorce in Jordan does 
not mean a woman is free to ask for a divorce. This demonstrates a fundamental contradiction 
between the constitutional article that men and women of Jordan are equal before the law. 
Women of Jordan, particularly women of low social background, of poor family or who are 
unemployed, are the most affected by the discriminatory personal status law.  
 
        On Child Custody: In the first instance, custody of children is in effect decided by the 
“Shari‟a” courts. The court decides the amount of alimony and the child support which 
 divorced women receive. Whatever decision the court applies, men have to abide with the 
rules. However, custody of children is gendered.  Islamic schools are different with regard to 
the interpretation of the Words of God in the “Qura‟an”. Each school lays its understanding of 
what each religious law means for both men and women. Beck and Keddie writes that Hanafi 
law states that custody of children is with the mother until her sons reach age of nine and 
daughters reach age of eleven; in “Malki” law, mothers can have their children until the age of 
puberty for sons and daughters until they are merry. In al-“Shafi” law, children are given the 
choice with which parent they can live at age of seven. In “al-Hanbali”, sons are given the 
choice with which party of the parent they can live, but girl‟s custody goes automatically to 
the father at age of seven. A woman can lose her rights for custody if it is proved that she is 
incapable “physically or morally” and if she marries a man who is not related to the child 
within the “prohibited” degrees. (81) In Jordan, women retain custody rights till the children 
reach the age of puberty (and other custodians until boys are 9 and girls 11. However, in 
accordance with “Hanafi” law certain conditions are applied for mothers entrusted with the 
custody of their children: 1. she must be “trustworthy”; 2. dedicated to her trust; 3. must not 
have anything distracting her from her obligation; 4. she must be able to raise the children; 5. 
she mustn‟t remarry otherwise she will lose her children‟s custody. If she remarries, she will 
lose custody rights when the children reach the maturity age; 6. If she travels outside the 
country, she must get the father‟s approval. (82) Such conditions are not applied to fathers 
seeking custody of their children. “Hanafi Madhhab” sees marriage and divorce as follows: 
(83)  
             
Abu Hanifah's Rules  
So long as there are good relations between husband 
and wife, divorce is prohibited. 
 
It is forbidden to give three divorces at a time, and 
whoever does so is a sinner. 
 
The amount of dower can in no circumstances be less 
than ten dirhams. (The idea is to prevent thoughtless 
divorces, for poor people would not find it easy to pay 
such an amount.) 
 
Consummation of marriage makes payment of the full 
dower compulsory. 
 
Skin diseases (e.g., leucoderma) are no grounds of 
dissolution of marriage. 
 
If a man divorces his wife during his last illness and dies 
during the 'iddat (period of probation), the wife is entitled 
to inherit from him. 
 
A revocable divorce is no legal bar to sexual intercourse; 
for the marital connection is not broken by a minor 
 
 misunderstanding or quarrel. 
For the revocation of a divorce, an oral declaration is not 
necessary. Any act indicative of reconciliation is enough 
(the idea is to facilitate reconciliation and revocation of 
divorce). 
 
                
           The “Hanafi” School is particularly concerned with an understanding of worldly needs, 
and especially the needs of a growing society. Furthermore, “Abu Hanifha”, the founder of 
“Hanafi Madhhab”, is supportive of moderating traditions and reason. His critics argue that 
“Abu Hanifha” committed errors as any human being would, that he was “mujtahid” 
(interpreter of “Qura‟nic” verses) and not a prophet and, therefore his “Madhab” does not 
ultimately offer reasonable interpretation. However, “Abu Hanifa Madhab” is still followed 
by millions of Muslims, especially with regard to Family Law and Personal Status Law, 
including the majority of Jordanians. Thus this patriarchal approach to personal status and 
women‟s rights is accorded broad popular support when it is infused into the formal legal 
system. 
             Amawi addresses another discriminatory dimension of a woman‟s right to custody of 
her children in Jordan. Custody of children law in Jordan is associated to the civil code, which 
regulates the relationship between the citizens and the state. This is regulated through 
legislation, including the constitutional, administrative and financial laws, the penal code, and 
private and public international laws. “As stated, however, in section 2, no.2 of the civil code, 
„if the court shall find no provision in this code it shall decide by the rules of Moslem 
jurisprudence which are more adaptable to the provisions of this code, and if there is none 
then by the principles of the Moslem “Shari‟a”. And if there is none then by custom, and if 
there is none then by the rules of equity”. (84) Amawi argues that custom is an ambiguous 
word. It is confusing and can be interpreted in various ways. Custom as it is explained by the 
civil code is that of “general, ancient, stable and continuous .and shall not be in contradiction 
with „provision of the law, public order, or moral”. (85) Often this custom is left to judges of 
the town and most judges are men who base their judgments on the customary view that 
women are less than men. Thus even the Civil Code contains a default mechanism which 
acknowledges Islamic and traditional customary law, both of which are in stark contradiction 
to the gender equality promised in the Civil Code. 
 
        On Inheritance: One of the key aspects of the personal status law is the issue of 
inheritance. In Jordan, the inheritance law is an application of the Islamic law in this regard. 
Women may inherit their father, mother, husband or children under certain conditions, from 
 other family members. Women's share is still smaller than that to which men are entitled. 
Daughters inherit only half as much as son. The argument in this regard that women have no 
financial responsibility towards their husbands and children. A  daughter's share can be 
further diminished by legal transactions related to assets that fathers undertake with their sons 
while still alive. Women can also be pressured into waving their right to inheritance (86). If 
the man has only daughters, his brothers are first entitled to his wealth as they are the ones 
who will take care of their sister in law and their nieces. Thus, the Jordanian Inheritance law 
is reflecting the Islamic Inheritance law.  
 “Inheritance law is one of the obstacles undermining women‟s position in Jordan”. “When 
the man dies, it becomes a very critical period for the wife especially if she has only 
daughters. It needs to overlooked and make changes”. (87)  
          In early Islam, inheritance rights were laid down according to the concept that man is 
the sole provider of the family. Islam does not recognize “the law of primogeniture”: as 
Abuelay quotes from the “Qura‟anic” verses: 
             Those of you 
             Who die and leave widows 
              Should bequeath 
              For the widows. 
              (Qura‟an, 2.240) 
 
             From what is left by parents 
             And those nearest related 
             There is a share for men 
             And a share for women 
             (Qura‟an, 4: 7) 
 
              God (thus) directs you 
              As regards your children‟s 
              (Inheritance): to the male, 
              A portion equal to that 
              Of two females: if only 
              Daughters, two or more, 
              Their share is two or more, 
              Their share is two-thirds 
              Of the inheritance;  
              If only one, her share 
              Is a half. 
              (Qura‟an, 4: 11) (88) 
                  
           Islam explains that a woman is given half of the inheritance of a man since the man is 
responsible for taking care of his extended family, wives, daughters, mothers etc... A woman 
can spend her share the way she wants but a man cannot. If a man dies, the brother or a male 
 close relative will take care of the man‟s wife and children. In short, females will be always 
looked after by their male relatives. This is basically a tribal norm that has been embedded in 
Islamic texts.  Similarly a woman inherits only part of her husband‟s wealth when he dies 
because it assumed that her sons will provide for her during her widowhood. Daughters 
inherit half the share of their brothers because their husbands will take care of them when they 
marry and so on. (89)  
           Although offering certain clarity, Zarinebaf-Shahr argues that this form of inheritance 
law can create conflict among the family members. With regard to property, courts during the 
Ottomans at the seventh century were overwhelmed with cases (about 39%) regarding 
conflicts between the “heirs - brothers, sisters, co-wives, husbands and corrupt officials”. If a 
woman inherited a land estate or had a share in a residential unit, she often found herself 
threatened or persuaded to hand it over to a male relative or give it up all together so as to 
avoid an escalation of the conflict among her family members and to preserve the family 
unity. Conflict arose too when a woman‟s share was sold without her consent or her signature 
on it. (90) Zarinebaf-Shahr that since the law is little different today, and given women‟s still 
vulnerable social position, such things continue to occur. 
            Brand also challenges the presumption in “Shari‟a” provision” that women are always 
looked after by their male‟s relatives and therefore do not need as much inheritance as men 
do. The latter puts women in the disadvantage position and that they are not able to have an 
independent source of “saving”.(91) Cases of inheritance conflicts are common in the Islamic 
societies especially when women feel threatened by their male relative‟s intention to take it 
away from them since this is often their only source of financial security.  However, Haifaa 
Jawad (92) argues that 
                          Theoretically speaking, then, the position of Muslim women as 
far as inheritance is concerned is secure and guaranteed by the 
Islamic law. But, in practice this is not the case. Constantly, the 
Divine instructions concerning women's rights to inheritance 
are violated and overlooked by Muslim societies. Social, 
political, economic and cultural factors play a major role 
determining who does and who does not take a share. In such 
situations the weak (in this case, women) have always been 
kept at bay when it comes to their rights to inheritance. (93)  
   
            Moreover, women are pressurised to give up their inheritance by their own brothers or 
male relative if they have no brothers. Haifaa  Jawad confirms that 
                          Very often, very strong pressure is applied on women to 
renounce their shares for the benefit of the immediate male 
members of the family. This is particularly the case when 
 women are well off or married to wealthy men. Their due is 
automatically written off and transferred to their mail relatives. 
Whether they like it or not they are all too often forced to 
accept the loss of their shares. If they refuse, they are accused 
of being selfish, greedy, inconsiderate and irresponsible. Often, 
this has led to tension, friction and conflict of interests among 
the members of the family, shattering the whole concept of 
caring and sharing which lies at the heart of the Islamic faith. 
(94)  
    
            Lawyer & women‟s welfare activist Ms. Asma Khudr says: “Inheritance law is an 
obstacle against empowerment of women. It creates misery, conflict and unjust towards 
women's share of inheritance. Jordanian women rights activists are taking this issue seriously. 
We need to work harder in order to achieve a justifiable change to the laws of inheritance, 
taking into account the rapid social and economic changes in the life of Jordanian women”. 
(95)  
           Nadia Boshnaq writes that “women are still limited by the power and domination of 
their brothers not to have a free hand in using their inheritance”. (96)  
 
3. 5.    Conclusion 
         The argument of this chapter is that the social welfare rights of the women of Jordan are 
caught in a fundamental contradiction between the equality promised them by the constitution 
and a profoundly patriarchal system of laws and influences which derive from a combination 
of religious institutions and laws, and traditional social practices. The chapter has 
demonstrated how women‟s rights and entitlements in key areas including educational 
provision, employment law, and social security provisions are deeply gendered to the 
disadvantage of women, despite language and maybe intentions to the contrary. The chapter 
further demonstrated how this was an inevitable consequence of a gendered approach to the 
actual rights and enactments of citizenship itself, which contradicts the basic equality 
promised by the constitution and which the state proclaims to be its intentions. This 
discrimination is even more deeply evident in the Personal Status laws which govern 
women‟s rights in marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance and so forth. Here Islamic law 
prevails and, where it does not reach, the default lies with customary or traditional law, both 
of which embody unequal gendering. For Islam, women are subordinated to a biologically-
determined (and thus inescapable) dependence on men, which requires their obedience. For 
traditional “Urf” law, women are lesser beings whose behavior must at all times be guided by 
the honor-shame dualism. The state itself, in sum, is a patriarchal set of institutions and 
 practices which fail to deliver the social security of women. For the state, the father or the 
husband is conceived of as being the contact or intermediary between the state and women 
and thus women have less   voice, less access and finally fewer rights.  
              This form of patriarchy is not a phenomenon associated only with Arab states. All 
societies irrespective of their geographical position or political and economic developments 
remain patriarchal. What makes some more and other less is the historical development of its 
own political, economic and social forces and, more importantly, the degree to which there is 
a separation between religion and politics. This separation has not taken place in almost Arab 
states – although many retain secular constitutions, the status of religious law, particularly in 
the realm of personal status – remains almost sacrosanct. Those writers and scholars who call 
for such a separation are met with fierce opposition by the religious establishments and 
conservative elements within state‟s themselves who are keen to retain religious endorsement 
of their right to rule (in the absence of a popular mandate). In welfare state regimes (as was 
discussed in the first chapter) key women‟s social provisions - those pertaining to marriage, 
divorce, custody of children and inheritance - are all dealt with by a single body of family law 
which seeks to eradicate differences between the rights of men and those of women. There, 
the private becomes public as Karam (97) has argued. The development of individualism – 
tied to the culture associated with citizenship - and the separation of religion from the state 
enable women to fight for their equal rights. Furthermore, democratic forms of government 
which recognize the right of all women (usually at the age of 18) to vote and elect their 
political leaders on an equal basis to men, has ensured they have been able to develop a 
political role effectively. Yet in the Arab region, where there is no substantive democracy, and 
where the divide between religion and politics has failed to materialize, women have retained 
their subordinate status as much because of the state as in spite of it. Fundamentalist religious 
elements, conservatives and traditionalists in the Arab societies have sought to influence the 
State to retain their own political and social status by resisting either the fundamental social 
changes or the structural state-level changes which would enable women to break free of this 
patriarchalism. Moreover, such resistance is legitimized by concerns that Arab society must 
retain its distinctiveness, traditions and culture in the face of external efforts to colonise or 
otherwise subordinate it.  
          The state has tried to improve the status of women in ways which can enhance the 
social fabric, improve the economic potential or Jordan, and reduce poverty. However, the 
state remains heavily influenced by the traditional patriarchal conventions of its key political 
allies. Its political stability depends on the traditionalists and conservatives elements of the 
 society, particularly on the tribes. Since they form the backbone of the army, they are 
especially important given that Jordan shares a border with Israel and includes more than one 
million Palestinians within its own borders. This weakness – the lack of autonomy of the state 
from traditionalist social forces that seek to capture its modernist agendas – is one that the 
state of Jordan needs to constantly consider in any social planning for the equality of 
Jordanian citizens.  
             Finally, women in Jordan do not enjoy equal social provisions as men. Citizenship 
rights and personal status are limited and unequal. They are shaped by patriarchal social 
traditions and practices in a system that considers the male to be the dominant figure in both 
the public and private spheres. As a result, the women of Jordan are caught between two 
paradoxical realities. In the public sphere women are considered to be constitutionally equal 
to men if they are not so in the details of citizenship law; in the private sphere they are 
deprived of any equality at all. As a result, women‟s social welfare is in reality left largely to 
non-state providers to manage. The following chapters discuss how the family becomes the 
principal provider for women, and with what limitations, as well as how non-state but 
nonetheless public provision can be delivered by civil society organizations, albeit once more 
with limitations.  
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                                                              CHAPTER FOUR  
  
                    The Family, the Tribe and Women’s Welfare Social Provisions in Jordan. 
 
4.1.   Introduction 
          Both the state and women in Jordan have an interest in the provision of women‟s basic 
social welfare needs. Enhancing this provision serves the progress of the whole society at both the 
political and the economic levels. However, whilst at a superficial level it appears the state has 
made commitments to such provision, the previous chapters have demonstrated that the reality of 
women‟s social provisions is very different.  Women‟s basic social welfare needs are not provided 
for by the state. Whilst the latter undoubtedly is concerned to provide education, health, 
employment insurance, housing and other forms of  social welfare provision, it is more 
preoccupied with provision of quantity (and measurable outcomes such as numbers of female 
school enrolments) than with the quality of provision. The state‟s statics certainly demonstrate that 
there are more girls attending schools and universities as well as joining the labour force, than ever 
before. Yet our discussion so far has shown that when it comes to the legal and social rights of 
women, traditional, patriarchal norms and structures prevail. Despite the efforts of the state in 
some areas, its failings in others mean that women are still unable to own their own destiny. Since 
the state does not ultimately provide for women‟s social needs, who does? The prevailing 
influence of traditional patriarchal norms and institutions (like “Urf” law) suggest that the 
responsibility for women‟s social provisions remains primarily with the family, both in its nuclear 
and extended (tribal) forms. 
          The relationship between the state and tribal groupings tribe is a solid and historical 
one. The army is staffed by men drawn from tribes loyal to the monarchy, such that the 
security of the state is dependent on these associations. Similarly, the political elites are 
heavily weighed in favour of tribal and large family associations. The majority of members of 
the parliament are drawn from the large influential families and tribes. With such a structural 
inter-dependence between state and tribe, it is unsurprising that the traditions and norms of the 
tribe and the family have permeated the infrastructures, legal frameworks, policy orientations 
and implementations of the state. Patriarchal notions of honour and shame, embodied in the 
behaviour of women and the expectations placed upon them by men, determine how women 
actually interact with the state and the public sphere to a much greater degree than the official 
statements of the state in favour of a progressive status for women. Informally, and in some 
 cases more formally, the state endorses this influence. 
          This chapter moves our discussion on to examine these tribal and family attitudes 
towards the status of, and provision for, women. It begins with an examination of the role of 
the family in Arab culture more generally, and then assesses the particular status and provision 
accorded women within Jordanian tribal tradition and practice. The most unambiguous 
discriminatory aspect of this is the continued practice and social endorsement of so-called 
“honour killings”, the murder of women accused of bringing shame upon their family through 
illicit or immoral activities. The chapter will argue that this amounts to a denial of the most 
fundamental right of women – the right to life- as well as the right over their own bodies. 
           Drawing on interviews conducted by the researcher in Amman in 2005, the chapter will 
then discuss how, despite the socio-economic and political changes being brought within 
Jordan as a result of modernisation and globalisation, the culture and traditions of the tribes 
continue to prevail within Jordan, placing women in an increasingly untenable and harsh new 
reality. In this regard, UNDP, AHDR of 2005 (1) writes that “Arab tribal society understood 
very well the structural and functional importance of women to its existence. It viewed 
honour, respect and protection as a unity linking any one of its members with the whole and 
thus also the women with the whole. This made any interference with the status of women a 
matter touching the very heart of her kinfolk's security and standing.” (2)  Far from amending 
patriarchal culture in favour of women and the provision of their social welfare needs, the 
result is that the discrimination against and subordination of women becomes more deeply 
entrenched whilst the protection and support of the family which supposedly accompanies 
their secondary status is progressively diminished. 
           The interviews drawn upon here are of two types. The first type includes a series of 
seven group interviews, conducted in “Ajloun”, “Irbid”, “Zarqa”, “Karak” and Amman. The 
group interviews were organised on the researcher‟s behalf by Heads of local branches of the 
Jordanian Union of Women. Through a Jordanian friend, the researcher got in touch with Mr. 
Zayad  Alw‟nha (Head of The Civil Society, “Lahab”) which educates young Jordanians 
(female & male) towards keeping the environment healthy and promoting the welfare of 
human beings. Mr. Al-Aw‟nha proposed all the following names and contacts of heads of civil 
society organizations that work on the social welfare needs of women.  These were as follows: 
Mrs. Amaal Al-Qwsmha, (Head of the Jordanian Union of Women in “Ajloun”), Mrs. Fatma 
Al-Ubaydat, (Head of the Jordanian Union of Women in “Irbid”), Mrs Nadia Bushnaq, (Head 
of “Zarqa” Housewives Association),  Mrs. Nawal Al-Fa‟ouri, (an Islamist activist for the 
improvement of the Jordanian Family working at the Ministry of Social Welfare, in Amman), 
 and HRH Princess Basma Bint Talal, (Chairperson of the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for 
Human Development (JOUHD) under whom worked Mrs Nuha Muhreiz, the Programme 
Manager of Human Resources and Women‟s Empowerment at the Institute of “Zenid”.) These 
contacts then organised the group interviews. The groups ranged in size from the smaller of 
just two women, to the largest in Amman which included 26 women. They were held in the 
offices of the organisations and women were voluntary participants, invited to attend on the 
basis of their membership of the organisations in question.  
           Whilst this assistance in bringing women together for group discussions was invaluable 
in accessing women from a range of regions and backgrounds, it did have limitations. For a 
start, the participants were self-selecting and included women already engaged in activities 
dedicated to their own empowerment. On the positive side, this meant that they were to some 
degree all self-aware as women, and reflective of the need for, and impediments against, their 
own welfare improvement. 
            Being dependent on the assistance of local intermediaries meant the researcher had 
little control over either the size of the groups or the particular arrangements under which we 
met. In Amman, for example, the group of unemployed women whom I met through the 
Institute of “Zenid”, arrived at different times, and – given the group size – conversation was 
noisy, interrupted and difficult to coordinate. Some women remained silent throughout the 
meeting, whilst others were too far from the researcher for the tape recorder to catch their 
contributions. In order to develop a real engagement between the researcher and interviewees, 
it was necessary to cease efforts to tape the meeting and concentrate on listening to the 
women. The other four group meetings were easier to record and to engage all participants 
since they were smaller.  
           By going through intermediaries, and conducting the meetings on the organisations‟ 
“home grounds” it was easier to establish a relationship of trust with participants, which was 
enhanced by my ability to speak with them in Arabic and my own clear Arab origin. The 
issues we were discussing were of a socially sensitive nature, and thus it was considered more 
important to arrange interviews in conditions which led to trust, then to ensure empirical 
representativeness of samples, or more formalised and structured interview arrangements. The 
group interviews were necessarily semi-structured and managed as focus groups in which 
participant contributions were used to develop discussions more broadly. They lasted between 
two and three hours each and included women between the ages of 23 and 35. Almost all 
participants were unemployed, although a few held part-time jobs in the social service sector. 
They included both married and unmarried women, graduates and non-graduates. Whilst it is 
 acknowledged that these groups did not include older women, women with full-time 
employment, or women from all regions in Jordan, they did provide lively illustration of the 
obstacles facing women in achieving their social welfare needs. Ideally, a focus group 
interview would include between 8 and 12 participants and last between one and one and a 
half hours. The realities of fieldwork in Jordan meant that the ideal situation could not be 
achieved, however the groups did “provide a valuable insight into both social relations in 
general and the examination of processes and social dynamics in particular” (3) thane would 
hope for. 
           The second type of interview took a more formal, structured one-to-one form of 
interview. The focused interview is an “open-ended character”. (4) This type of qualitative 
interview allows the interviewer to ask the questions and the interviewee answers in the way, 
she / he likes. There is an interaction and interactive communications between the interviewee 
and the interviewer. This type of interview turns into sort of a constructive dialogue that 
builds a type of trust between the interviewer and the interviewee. It involves that the 
researcher has an aim in the mind and with the focused interview can be reached because the 
interviewee is freer to talk. It is “flexibility and the discovery of meaning, rather than 
standardization, or a concern to compare through constraining replies by a set interview 
schedule, characterize this method”. (5) The researcher interviewed a number of Jordanian 
high position civil servants work in governmental positions, academics and women activists. 
 
4.2.   The Family within the Arab Context 
            Barakat contends that the Arab family is the “basic unit of social organization in 
traditional and contemporary Arab society”; it is “a relatively cohesive social institution (6) 
and the core social institution within society. It is characterized by a sexual division of labour 
and by male domination over women. The family is key to the identity of the individual – it 
provides the means for channelling protection, security and provision for members of society 
and is the prime location of 'socioeconomic activities in the Arab society”. (7)  
           Whilst it is true to recognize that the contemporary Arab family unit has been altered 
by political and economic development, and is progressively more inclined to its nuclear form 
– at least in urban areas – the links of the extended family remain strong and important, as do 
the  a hierarchal sexual division of labour and the domination of males over females. 
Common forms of family relations and behaviour are found across the Arab world regardless 
of the type of family (nuclear or extended), the geographical area, the levels of education, or 
the urban as opposed to rural or even Bedouin lifestyle. Ehud Ein Gil and Aryeh Finkelstein 
 have referred to this Arab resistance to the modernization of the family as “stubborn 
conservatism” in the face of “Changing reality”. (8)  Three decades later, UNDP, AHDR 2005 
(9), writes that “the family continues to be the first social institution that reproduces 
patriarchal relationships, values and pressures through gender discrimination. Such pressures 
on women increase in violence at times of crisis when a woman becomes subject to 
surveillance. The man's right of disposal over her body, his watch over it, his use of it, his 
concealment, denial and punishment of it all become more blatant. This violence in turn 
comes into play to intensify the feminisation of poverty, political misery, dependency, 
domination and alienation.”(10)  
            Arab families are not, of course, all identical. There are three types of families, which 
Lutfiyya argues reflect the social contradictions in Arab modern history. The nuclear family 
consists of father, mother and offspring and often exists in urban centres. Its main purpose is 
the “fulfilment of the biological function and it is seldom economically or socially 
independent”; it is usually subordinated to a “larger and more important kinship unit.” The 
second type is the “a‟ila or  joint family” . This consists of a father, the mother, and unwed 
children as well as the wedded sons and their wives and children, unwed paternal aunts, and 
sometimes even unwed paternal uncles. This type exists mainly in the rural areas and it 
represents a bond of blood relatives governed by, or derived from, the grandfather of the 
eldest male. When the grandfather died, his land is divided among the heirs and the male 
children each become the nucleus of a new “3a‟ila”. (11) Finally, the third type is that of 
blood kinship unit, the “hamula” or clan. It consists of “all those who claim descent from the 
same paternal ancestor regardless of whether they live in the same village. Usually the village 
is composed of two “hamulas, and each hamula of several joint families”. In this regard, a 
member of the family is always identified with the other members of joint families through 
the composition of his name. In short, the Arab societies are in effect a family society. (12)  
           For a start, the heads of the tribe, and of the families within it, are male. Men are 
regarded as the primary breadwinners, and are the public face of the family. Women are 
regarded as first wives and mothers, with responsibilities for the home and for child-rearing. 
Both males and females are expected to consider the needs of the family as superior to the 
needs of the individual. Neither males nor females are free to take decisions concerning their 
daily lives or futures without consulting their family first. If a member would take his or her 
own decision without consulting his/her own family; he or she will be considered an indecent 
person and to have insulted the family honour, if not the tribe‟s name itself. Morality, and the 
concept of honour (or conversely shame) are closely intertwined with the norms of family 
 relationships and they determine the rules of behaviour within the family, and between the 
family and the rest of society. 
         The identity of individuals is closely tied to their family status and more specifically to 
the reproductive aspect of the family. When they give birth to a first child, women are 
renamed as “Umm …..” – or Mother of” whilst the father will be re-named as “Abu…”, Of 
“Father o”. Parents lose their self-identity and are treated only as parents. Family, referred to 
as “aila or usra” has another meaning which can be explained as “interdependence and 
reciprocator”; the mother is called “banna” the home maker and the father is called “Janna' 
the provider; and the children are called “iyal” (dependents) and “sanad” supporters when the 
parents reach an old age.  
          For the family “safety net” to work, it must remain the backbone of every aspect of 
their social identity and economic needs. Physically moving away from the family weakens 
the commitments to this collective security and therefore both Arab males and females are 
deterred from  leaving or breaking up with the family, except where this is necessitated by the 
promise of employment and greater economic inputs for the family which is usually a 
privilege accorded to males rather than females. To move away from the family without a 
clear necessity for doing so, is equally to bring shame upon the family. Ironically, whilst 
urbanization may fragment extended families, the experiences of urban poverty and 
separation from the extended family safety net can reinforce the bonds of the nuclear family. 
Barakat argues that such “family safety net works” are most effective in “poor, and less-
developed areas' regardless of religious or even across ethnic identity”. (13)  Barakat argues 
whatever the socio-economic status of a group, that “the Arab family remains the cornerstone 
of social behaviour, attitudes and needs for both males and females family members”. (14)  
          The Arab family is highly patriarchal. The father exercises his authority upon the 
family. He fulfils his duties towards his direct and indirect family members if he is the sole 
breadwinner of the family. The wife‟s role is to join his kinship group (patrilocal kinship). Her 
children take his surname (patrilineal descent). Furthermore, the father expects respect and 
obedience from his wife and  his children. The rule of the father is absolute. If the latter is 
challenged by his wife or his child, whether son or daughter, all members of the family as 
well as close relatives will condemn the culprit.  The father upholds authority and orders, 
while the mother carries out his teaching and instructions in the upbringing of the children 
and the management of his household.  
           The wife in the Arab society, however, keeps her family name. She is associated to her 
husband and called “aqila” (qarina (linked), and “hirma” (prohibited). In effect, the women 
 (married and older) exercise their own power within the family but instructions are received 
from the father. (15) In effect, women as mothers enforce patriarchal rule among family 
members. Barakat writes, “The heirarchal structure of the traditional family reflects the 
stratification of the Arab family that is based on sex and age. The younger is subordinated to 
the older and female to male”. (16). Suad Joseph argues that this patriarchy is “the privilege 
of males and seniors (including senior women) and the justification of male and senior 
privilege in the idioms and mortalities of kinship, sanctified by religion. (17) However, 
women are singled out for surrendering their identities to those of their families. Self-denial is 
emphasized for women. For example, they may be expected to give their inheritance rights up 
so as to keep harmony in the family. When finances are low, girls may be expected to give up 
opportunities for further education so that boys may take the privilege (the correlation being 
of course that boys are then expected to put their own education after their duty to provide for 
the whole family). Post-education, or even during their school years, girls may be expected to 
stay at home to help the mother with house duties and to look after younger brothers and 
sisters. In short, members of the family are expected to remain loyal to it. More importantly, 
they must be obedient and humble towards the first in the hierarchy of this social, the father. 
It is now wondered then that the father carries the name of “r‟aab Al-usr” (the lord of the 
family).  
           Marriage is the cornerstone of the Arab family. As Kitty Warnock says of Palestine, but 
as is equally true in Jordan: 
 Patrilineal families can only be reproduced through the 
             birth of sons of undoubted paternity, so marriage, as the 
             mechanism  for  restricting  a woman to sexual relations 
             with one man, is essential. (18) 
 
           Marriage is generally considered a family choice rather than a personal one. In 
practice, couples are often matched well in advance before the marriage contract is signed, 
perhaps even from childhood. Parents are always busy trying to find the right match for their 
son or daughter. Parental choice in finding a suitable match in the urban areas and big cities is 
admittedly less common now than it is in the rural areas or among the Bedouin, where 
children are still expected to marry at early age and where cousins are commonly found 
marrying one another, but family lineage remains an important criteria in selecting a marriage 
partner. Eligible divorcees, widows and widowers are also expected to re-marry, to be drawn 
back into the protective safety-net of the family. The birth of children strengths the bond of 
the family – it is a family affair in a broad sense. For example, an uncle is entitled by tribal 
 law to stop the marriage of his brother‟s daughter if he wishes to claim her for his own son. 
           Arab attitudes towards the family, and women‟s role within it, can be in part attributed 
to Islam. Islam as a religion, like many other religions, asserts the importance of the family in 
securing a stable and nurturing society. It obliges parents and family members equally to 
respect and look after each other‟s interests. The family is even to be regarded as holy, adding 
to the imperative that the members of the family must follow its line or expect punishment as 
a consequence of deviation. This belief has become interwoven with patriarchal Arab 
traditions such that it becomes hard to tell where one ends and the other begins.  This makes it 
difficult for the Muslim majority to separate between what belongs to tradition and what 
belongs to religion. According to Barakat, Muslim people, by and large, inherit religion from 
the family as they inherit „social class, socio political affiliations, and language. Barakat 
writes: 
                                  Persons and groups also receive their religious affiliations 
                                             and  orientations  from the family.    Religion reciprocates  
                                             this  continuity  of  support  by  stressing the holiness of a  
                                             family  and  its  ties,  as  well as the value of obedience to  
                                             parents. (19) 
 
             Barakat further reveals the association between religion and family: 
 
       There   are   striking   similarities   between  the   religious  
     concepts  of  father  and of God, indicating that God is an  
                                             extension  or  abstraction   of   the father. Rabb al-isra, the  
                                             Lord of the family, became rabb al-amal, the lord of  work  
      (a term that survives with reverence to the employer), lord 
             of  the  universe  or the existence. Similarity, the mother‟s  
      role  of  mediator  between  children  and the father in the  
       Arab  family  must  have shaped believers‟ understanding  
      of   the   role   of    Mary  in   Christianity    and of „Aisha,  
      umm al-mu‟mineen,   the  mother  of believers, or Fatima  
                                             or   Zainab   in   Islam,  who   play   the   role  of mediator 
                  (shafi) between the believers and God.(20) 
 
           As we saw in the last chapter, Islam also has much to say on the status of women 
within the family. Marriage is an especially important component of this, as is seen by the 
extensive corpus of Islamic family law which very specifically identifies rights and 
responsibilities of husbands and wives within the married state, as well as determining the 
superiority of the married condition over the un-married. The absence of civil marriage and 
divorce laws have left citizens, and particularly women, dependent on these religious 
understandings of family which determine “whom and how they marry”, Suad argues. Women 
 must change their religion to those of their husbands while men are not so obliged and 
Muslim religious clerks put more restrictions on women‟s choice of marriage than they do on 
men. However, marriage in Islam is a civil contract more rather than a “sacrament”. Each 
party has its own representatives from among the male family elders to negotiate the marriage 
contracts and the demands from both sides. The marriage contract contains some provisions 
for both parties. Those provisions must be respected if the marriage breaks down. While this 
might suggest an equitable position for women, in reality this is not the case. The preferential 
position when it comes to rights to demand a divorce, and the on-going religious endorsement 
of polygamy, leave women vulnerable once the marriage has been contracted. Arab women 
live in a constant state of fear of repudiation or of their husbands taking another wife who will 
be given a preferred status. They are in constant watch of their husbands‟ behaviour, 
especially in the company of other female relatives or friends, always left insecure by the 
religious conferment of superior male rights. 
           Traditional concepts of honour and shame play a large role too in determining 
women‟s status and rights within the family. Female family members including wives, 
daughters, and sisters are expected to respect the family honour and family instructions that 
are coming from their father, husbands and brothers. In this context, age or working position 
of men play no role in determining their power. Men are the ones in control regardless of 
economic changes such as women leaving the house for employment purposes. Women may 
exercise power but in the private or family domain, rather than the public domain. In the 
public domain, they are expected to first and foremost hide from view that which is 
considered to be the biological source of what power they might have – their sexuality. 
          Warnock continues to explain the implications of this emphasis on marriage and family 
for Arab society:  
                              There [was] great pressure on men and women to marry. 
                               the  need  for  marriage was emphasized in Islamic text 
         and commentary and in popular belief, by various moral 
          and  biological  explanations. Sexuality, while held to be 
          natural and impossible to suppress, was thought wicked 
           and dangerous if not channelled into marital relationships. 
          Women   were   thought to be weak and unable to survive  
                              with-out    protection    and    material  support  that men  
                              provided   in   exchange   for   women‟s   work  as wives.  
                              Women  who lived on their own challenged this view, so 
                              it  was   unacceptable   for  them  to do so, and the social  
                              system tried to preclude the necessity. (21) 
 
           The containment of the sexuality of the women of the family to its own domain was, 
 and remains, a fundamental component of a family‟s honour. Honour can be tied to a family‟s 
land, the number of sons, its wealth, its upholding of justice and collective morality, but most 
of all to the personal morality as evidenced in public of its women. Women whose behaviour 
is seen as immoral bring shame on the whole family and the definition of immorality is tied to 
the subordination of women to men‟s control. 
              One function of the ideology of honour was to support  
          the internal structure of the family; to  be    precise,  to 
         idealise    men‟s  control  over  women. Its most keenly  
         felt daily  requirement was   that   the   male   members 
         of  the  family  should    protect    the   female  from all  
                               dangers  but  particularly  from  sexual   impurity. (22) 
 
           Whilst men seek and defend honour, women must be passive, helpless and dependent. 
Since their status within the family and community depend on this passivity and since 
exclusion from the family removes them from the protection of the family as safety-net, they 
are bound to become complicit in their own subordination. Nawal el Sadawi goes further, 
asserting that – with the concept of honour – women‟s bodies become the property of the 
family and not of themselves. In a discussion of honour crimes in Egypt, she speaks of how 
“the honour that is considered to have been sullied is always that of the man; the woman is 
merely the object through which his honour has been blemished. The woman is not a human 
being with honour, but rather a thing that can cause dishonour and shame….Honour is the 
sole possession of the man, and this total ownership gives him the power and the right over 
the being who possesses no honour, namely the women”. (23) 
          Undoubtedly, this traditional Arab approach to the family has been challenged by 
urbanization, the increasing need for second incomes within the nuclear family, female 
education and the possibilities of family planning, yet the norms of honour and shame remain 
strong within contemporary Arab society and continue to determine the status of, and 
provision for, women. For example, male family members may still decide whether a woman 
may be educated in non-segregated environments or may work outside the home with the 
principal consideration being the extent to which her modesty or honour may be 
compromised by mixing with non-family males. As Nawal el Sadawi points out, it may still 
be considered shameful for women to work outside the house, because it implies that the men 
of the household cannot afford to defend their honour by providing sufficiently for the women 
to remain secluded and segregated in the home. “A man who can provide economically for his 
wife and so protect her from the need to work outside the home is considered to be more of a 
man than others. Women‟s work outside the home is regarded as a sort of humiliation, and 
 held in low esteem”.(24) Similarly, the notion that women should be passive and guided by 
family males is translated into women being obliged to vote as their husbands determine in 
elections, regardless of whether they agree with the choice or whether it serves their own 
interests.  
            So social, political and economic changes taking place within the Arab world which 
may on the surface appear to enhance the status of, and provisions for, women, continue to be 
negotiated in practice through a framework of tradition, customs and habits which reflect 
tribal. As long as the identity of the Arab man or woman is defined according to these 
patriarchal tribal and religious practices, the gender division of labour inside the family and 
the subordinated status of women within and outside the family, will remain. The expectation 
will be sustained that women‟s social needs are taken care of through the family, and that the 
state‟s actions should not interfere with this social hierarchy or seek to replace its system of 
provision.  
            Suad Joseph goes further, asserting that the formation of Arab states has seen the 
“family processes” being woven into the “state dynamic” itself and that this has been “a 
rather explicit political project within the state and nation building projects of the Arab 
states”. (25) For a start, Arab political leaders often employ their family members in the body-
politik, even when the formal political system requires elections and meritocratic 
advancement.  Mobilisation continues to take place through family networks and the 
terminology of the family is used to gain legitimacy and assert rights to political power. 
Family membership is a political strategy for citizens in so far as they can gain advancement 
and privileges through family connections and informal patrimonial networks which are 
validated through terminology such as “father of the nation” – an often repeated reference to 
political leaders.(26) The legitimacy of the Arab rulers stems in part from their ability to 
reflect the values and role of the family, a symbiotic relationship since home is regarded as 
the first location for political socialization. Children are expected to absorb the political 
orientations of their fathers and the political loyalties of their families. Political leaders are 
looked upon, and expected to behave, as fathers and the citizens are effectively children. In 
retrospect, “God, the father, and the ruler thus have many characteristics in common”. (27) 
The former and the latter are illustrated as follows: 
                     A  central  psychological feature of  Arab neopatriarcha 
                                society is  the   dominance of the father (patriarch), the  
                                centre   around   which  national  as  well as the natural  
                                family  are  organized.    Thus between father and child,  
                                there  exist  only  vertical relations: in both settings  the  
                                 paternal  will  is an  absolute will, mediated in  both the  
                                society  and  the family by a forced consensus based on 
                                ritual and coercion. (28) 
 
              Religion is important too in this construction. Religion-and-family work as means of 
mediation between the individual and the state. Islam in this respect is not separated from 
politics. The Prophet Mohammed held both the religious command as well as the political 
one. Religion and politics are intertwined in most Islamic societies, and in particular Arab 
society. Most Arab leaders declare their intention to carry out both political and religious 
duties even if their position is technically a secular one.  
             In societies such as Jordan, where tribal groupings retain significant political status, 
the structures, values and terminologies of the family have been imposed onto the state as 
much as they have formed the basis of it. Family is central to political identity and the state 
itself considers the family unit to be more important than the individual. It is, by and large, 
considered to be holy – endorsed by religious edict and tradition and integrated into the state‟s 
religious legitimations. Arab society consequently expects women to place “their familial 
roles above their public positions”. (29) In return, it expects the family to provide for its 
members and that this constitutes a component of the unspoken social contract between state 
and citizens. It is no coincidence then that Her Royal Highness Princes Basma Bint Talal of 
Jordan asserted the importance of the family in the life of women in a speech on Arab women 
stating that: 
          Arab   society  is  a  collective  society in which  family 
        and    clan   relationships  play a  prominent role.  This 
        collective   social   approach   has  saved Arab women 
           and  their   societies   from   much of the modern social 
          strains  that  are  common  in   other societies including 
        advanced     industrialized      countries.   There  is  less 
        hunger     and    starvation   among   the  poorest    Arab 
         societies      than      in     other    regions.  Drugs     and 
        prostitution     is     limited,    rape  almost non-existent, 
        single     parent   families  and births  outside   marriage 
        are    also   very  few.   Community   violence     Exists, 
           however   at   a  lower  level  than most  other societies; 
        and     polygamy,    although   it still  exists  among the 
         less      advantaged      groups,   is     becoming     more 
                  unusual.  This   collective   social    approach, however, 
        did   not   greatly   assists  in   spurring women to work 
        outside    the   home.   The    family,  in   most    cases, 
        provided    them   with   shelter, basic Necessities and 
        a   relatively    secure    future,    which    meant  there 
        was  little   incentive   to   look  for a job or seek other 
         re – munerative   sources   of    employment.” 
                                (International Institute for Labor Studies 1996). (30) 
 
          Arab women‟s social needs, in this regard, are caught within a paradox.  Women are not 
regarded individuals but members of a family, the structures and systems of which are defined 
by religious and traditional patriarchal social norms. For women to achieve their 
empowerment, they must struggle with the combined weight religious, political and social 
constraints which come together in the institution of the family.  By comparison, women in 
the welfare societies of the industrialized western nations enjoy a direct relationship with the 
state. Indirectness and mediated relations no longer exist in the latter. As a result, women‟s 
social needs in developed societies are dealt with directly by the state and provided for 
without reference to their status within a family.  In this regard the family role is weakened 
and undermined once the relationship between the state and the individual becomes the 
central issue of citizenship. By contrast, the lack of a direct relationship between the state and 
the individual in Arab countries continually forces women to depend on their family‟s 
provisions and support, despite its being subject to patriarchal interpretations of their needs 
and rights.  
           In sum, Suad writes that “the implications of Arab patriarchal family systems, their 
legal status in Arab states, the implications of family systems for the making citizens, and the 
critical differences between the family-based notions of citizenship and individually based 
notions in the modern history of Arab states as well as the religious interpretation of Arab 
women‟s social rights play a key role in undermining women‟s social provisions and women 
are left to the random control of the family”. (31)  
 
4.3.   The Family in Jordan 
            The Jordanian family mirrors the generalized Arab family system described above: it 
is “an extended household consisting of members related to each other by kinship, either 
through descent or marriage, and family ties extended into the structure of clans and tribes”. 
(32)  However since the early 1990s, the Jordanian family system has in many ways begun to 
evolve. A number of key changes have begun to take place affecting the gender division 
within the Jordanian family and being consequently reflected in women‟s social provisions. 
This chapter will outline some of the key political and socio-economic changes affecting 
women‟s status within the family and the subsequent provision of their welfare needs. It will 
argue that changes in education, urban migration, the labour market, sedentarisation, and 
political democratization, are impacting upon the sexual division of labour in negative ways 
 which remove the traditional protection of women afforded by family networks. As previous 
chapters have shown, however, this new vulnerability is not compensated for by state 
provision which continues to assume family provision. The critical division between the 
private (the family) and the public (the state) has become much wider and to a large extent 
has undermined women‟s efforts to bring improvements to the provision of their social 
welfare and economic needs.  
             First it has to be stated that the status and provision for Jordanian women is directly 
related to their families‟ economic and social statuses. Women in rural areas  and among the 
urban poor necessarily enjoy a greater degree of mobility in so far as they are more likely to 
be required to fulfil economic function to support the family and therefore to enjoy greater 
freedom of  movement, albeit within the limited terrain of traditions and customs. Among the 
urban traditionalist bourgeoisie, women are unlikely to have an economic function outside the 
home, something more likely to remain the preserve of men. Thus women of merchant or 
artisan families have traditionally been confined to the home. Middle class women may be 
divided into two categories. One category includes those who are being economically 
independent, have a high education and exist within more liberal family cultures. They enjoy 
a greater degree of mobility and personal freedom. The second category of women may be 
educated but conservative family cultures impose upon them a less mobile and more sheltered 
life.  
            Regardless of economic and social status, segregation of the sexes begins at the early 
age in the Jordanian family, especially in the rural areas. The Jordanian family collectively 
cares for its children until the age of five or six, although children are most likely to be cared 
for by their mothers and elder siblings.  After this age, boys start to spend more time with 
their fathers outside of the home, perhaps having responsibilities such as doing the shopping 
for their mothers or assisting their fathers in the workplace. Girls start carrying out domestic 
duties, such as looking after their younger brothers or sisters and doing the washing up and 
cleaning. (33)  A woman‟s status within the household will depend on her age, her marital 
status, whether she has borne children or not, and – in the case of multiple-wives – her status 
as favoured wife (or not). Men remain the principal decision makers, have greater autonomy 
than women, and are much freer in their public movements and personal decisions; the 
education, work and marriage of women are however family matters over which individual 
women have only limited say.  
           Thus, although equal citizenship in the Jordanian constitution suggests that Jordanian 
men and women are equal and must be treated accordingly – at least in the public sphere, in 
 practice Jordanian women are still regarded as being of second class status within the private 
sphere, less within the private sphere and treated that way. This second class status spills over 
into the public sphere in terms of the attitudes and behaviour which shape the application of 
policies and laws.  Women in the public sphere are still discriminated against according to 
sexual attitudes and traditional beliefs. As one interviewee said: 
 “women are safer to work in the public sphere than in the private, as discrimination against 
women in the private is more rigours”.(34)  
             In sum, the family in Jordan conforms to the pattern of the traditional patriarchal 
family structures commonly associated with Arab society. However, in Jordan there is a 
particularly strong, even unique, component in this construction, the continuing strength of 
the role played by tribal affiliations and cultures, the social impact of which is constantly 
reinforced by the political relationship that exists between the tribes and the monarchy itself.  
Before we can examine the socio-economic changes which are occurring within Jordan and 
impacting upon the family and its provision of women‟s welfare, we must therefore 
contextualize the family itself within the tribal system. 
 
4.4.   The Function, Status and Impact of the Tribe in Jordan 
             Fathi argues that tribalism in Jordan can be viewed as “one of the organizational 
principles in a dynamic and complex political environment and is a process, which involves, 
among other things a modern understanding of local culture” (35)    describes the nature of the 
tribe as follows: 
  The   tribe   constitutes   one   of   the  forms of    social 
    organization,   born    out    of    necessary   adaptations 
       to   the   environment.   Apart   from   a few exceptions, 
  the   tribal   structure   is   based   on   the  principle  of 
    patrilineal     descent   to   form   relatively   small-scale 
                             groupings   for  social  and  political   action. (36) 
 
             The tribe is identified with two key values: “cooperation with members of one‟s 
group, which is often situationally defined; and its autonomy”. The first of these, which 
amounts to group solidarity, defines the structure of the tribe. 
             Tribes are considered to be groups of families related to each other through a 
common descendence from a founding ancestor. Most tribes consist of smaller groupings and 
they are this considered to represent a “egmentary system” of social organisation. In general 
the tribe “resembles a pyramid composed of ascending segments, or levels, each of which is 
both a political and a social group”. (37)  During critical or dangerous times the entire 
 segments can unite in face of a common threat. Juredini and Mclaurin write that, 
    The   significance  of the pyramidal pattern is that  there 
    is an overall  vertical organization of the tribe,  not  just 
            a   series   of   horizontal   units   with  the same general 
            identity.    But   the   Jordanian  tribe  is  also  inherently 
     segmentary: each  segment  at each level has a   separate 
            identity     and  a  degree  of   power and  authority of its 
             own.    Coupling the  two concepts … indicates  that the 
      tribe   is  organized  in  an ascending series of segments, 
            each  a   political  and  social  group at some time and in 
            some   events.   Thus,  each  unit  at a structurally higher 
       level   automatically  contains all those   groups below it. 
                        Nor  does    any    real   leadership hierarchy connect the 
       groups;   instead, for  example, the  Shaykh of one of the 
      subsections is in turn the Shaykh of the section of which 
        it  is  a part; similarly, the Shaykh of one of the   sections 
                                  is Shaykh of the tribe.(38) 
 
              In this respect, Fathi writes that a tribe can form a political community, depending on 
the historical context, for the purposes of gaining power, asserting loyalty and even claiming 
it from others. This has been the case since the establishment of the Jordanian monarchy. 
Jordanian kings like the former King Hussein have conventionally placed enormous emphasis 
on their tribal identifications and the relationships of loyalty and obligation that define the 
role of the tribes in Jordanian political affairs. The relationship is not one of subordination of 
tribe to monarch but rather one of reciprocality and blood ties which respect the autonomy of 
the tribe as a unit whilst confirming its place in a network of ties and loyalties. This leads the 
Jordanian citizen to have a double-identity, as both citizen and tribal member. These loyalties 
do not always necessarily contradict one another and can be reconciled within the specific 
political and social context. The power of the informal tribal identity is substantial. As one 
interviewee said: 
 “there is a system of “El-Fu‟azeha” in the village where everybody helps everyone regarding 
celebrations; the tribal system in the village is very strong and forceful”. (39)  
            Jordanian Bedouin tribes in particular have no problem in asserting the loyalty of 
families within the tribe whilst simultaneously being loyal Jordanian citizens. The strength of 
the compatability of Bedouin customs and values of tribal loyalty on the one hand, and 
loyalty to the state on the other, is demonstrated within the framework of the relationship 
between the Jordanian state and the Army. Once the formation and consolidation of the state 
of Jordan began after 1951, the settlement of tribes began. Bedouin young men were recruited 
to join the new army of new state. Their traditions of loyalty to their superiors made them 
 suitable for the institution which defended the Monarchy itself and Bedouin men were given 
priority in recruitment policies. The tribes identify with the religious legitimacy claimed by 
consecutive kings, specifically their dependency from the prophet Mohammed, with the 
monarch‟s 'institutional legitimacy' as the heads of the state, and more importantly, as their 
status themselves as tribal leaders. The monarchs are, in effect, “a kind of super Shaykh al 
Shaykh (paramount of the tribal Shaykh)”. (40)  It is no surprise then that the late King 
Hussein said: 
                      Whatever  harms tribes is considered harmful to us, law 
        remains   closely    connected  to  norms, customs, and 
        traditions…our  traditions  should be made to  preserve  
        the  fabric  of  society.  Disintegration  of  tribes is very  
        painful,  negative   and    subversive.(41) 
 
         The relationship between the tribe and the state is, moreover, consistently reinforced and 
solidified by the provision of both tangible and intangible benefits from the government. The 
tribes receive financial bonuses, infrastructural development support (such as land, roads, 
wells, clinics, and schools), as well as arms. It was largely thanks to the tribal support that the 
Jordanian army was able to suppress the PLO in 1970s in the so-called “Black September” 
battles. The tribes receive also regular payments from the intelligence services, the interior 
ministry and even the prime-minister. The Army on the other hand provides the tribes with 
rewards: in return for the provision of “good and well mannered men” to defend the stability 
of the regime, the tribal youths are offered salaries, a means of upwards mobility and 
possibilities for social status as Jureidini and Mclaurin write.  Besides the material support, 
the government of Jordan gives constant moral support to the tribes, with political figures 
making high-profile visits to emphasise their importance, and with prestigious positions being 
offered to for tribal members in the governmental institutions. The support is thus both 
material and moral. (42) Consequently, as described by Jureidini and Mclaurin: “in the Jordan 
Arab Army, as in the society outside the army, Jordanian tribes have been a major force for 
stability in the Kingdom”. (43)  
             In general, tribalism in Jordan may then correctly be described as a “persistent social 
force bringing together people for many different purposes and doing so in the context of 
many different, competing or alternative principles of alignment”.(44)   
             In this regard, tribalism is more than a concept; it is in effect an organized set of 
structures which embody key perspectives and values of the state.  
            Moreover, the continuing existence of the tribes is in no respect accidental; rather it is 
 a result of “effective environmental conditions”. The tribes can be classified according to their 
way of living and the kind of economic activities they are engaged in. The nomadic and semi-
nomadic tribes are engaged in raising sheep and goats and rarely in agriculture. The third, 
non-nomadic or sedentarised type of tribe is principally engaged in agriculture and they are 
unlikely to move from one place to another like the other two types.(45) Whilst these lifestyle 
patterns have some impact on variations in tribal cultures, they nonetheless have much in 
common. 
 
4.5.   The Tribe and Women’s Social Welfare Provisions 
            The social structure of a tribe is based on the “ramification of patrilineal ties among 
men” within the context of endogamous marriage. For example, the marrying of cousins 
within the tribe is the norm, the assumption being that those relations who are closest to the 
father and father‟s family are likely to be the most solidaristic and therefore the best. 
Matrilinealism is also known within the structure of a tribe and the women of the tribe can 
hold some power but this remains within the household rather than outside it.  
           The women of the tribe are treated according to the norms of protection and honour. 
The first duty of the males of the tribe is to protect their own women from harm or dishonour. 
In return, women expected to remain loyal and obedient, to fulfil their domestic and economic 
obligations to the collective welfare. Nomadic women‟s duties consist of carrying out tasks 
both inside and outside of their tents. They have duties as wives and mothers as well as duties 
herding and maintaining the tribes‟ livestock, collecting fire fuel or water, (46) milking 
camels, and making butter either for domestic use or selling it in the market. 
            Women of the tribes marry at early age, sometimes even before they have reached 
puberty and, as previously stated, endogamous marriage is the norm. Nomadic women can 
remain unmarried if there is no immediate relative to the father to whom they can be married. 
Marrying a stranger is rare. Marriage is usually negotiated among tribe members and it 
usually requires consensus within the tribe. If some significant male is not happy with a 
match, it will most likely not take place. Marriage in this regard is not a family issue; rather is 
a tribal issue. If divorce takes place (which it hardly ever does) women are returned to their 
original families. Nomadic Bedouin women have no say in their marriages. It is a father‟s 
affairs. A dowry is paid directly to him in the shape of land, money or animals. Women can 
demand a divorce via the Sheik of the tribe or they may flee to their father‟s tent, but her 
children must remain with their father‟s place and there is always the possibility that a 
divorced woman will be barred from seeing her children for good. 
           Segregation between the sexes starts at early age in tribal life, as it does in the poor 
urban, conservative middle class and elite families. (Indeed, Brand argues that whilst the 
nomadic or Bedouin population is shrinking, their values remain intact within the whole 
society). Customary laws regarding women‟s social movement and social welfare are strictly 
followed. Bedouin culture demands by and large the protection for tribes‟ womenfolk as they 
are considered to be weak. This weakness translates into their being viewed as a burden rather 
than an asset to the tribe. Male children are more highly valued than female children. If a 
woman fails in her reproduction, by producing no or too few sons, she can be divorced and 
send back to her family. 
          Honour remains the key to the constraints on a women‟s behaviour and to her 
entitlement to the social welfare provisions which come with tribal protection. Honour is of 
importance to all the members of the tribe: it governs the decisions and social movements of 
all the members of the tribe and the family, both male and female. Violation of the codes for 
honourable behaviour is punishable for both males and females. However, females are more 
harshly punished than males. For example the inappropriate personal behaviour of a married 
woman, or even just the suspicion of such behaviour, can cause her to be divorced by her 
husband and sent back to her family. While she loses her home, her children and her status, 
her housing needs continue to be met by the family or tribe (but not the state). Women will 
receive this protection and security as long as they follow the family‟s line of moral conduct 
and are totally submissive to the family‟s will.  
. 
4.6.   Honour Crimes: State, Tribe and Culture 
            In some cases women are even killed for reasons of the honour of the tribe and the 
family within it. Mostly this takes place within poorer families and Bedouins, but it has 
become a contentious aspect of wider Jordanian society as the tribal custom proliferates under 
the complicit eye of the state itself. Where a familie‟s honour is considered to have been 
diminished by immoral behaviour of a woman, a price must be paid, even if the woman was 
herself a victim of unwanted male attentions. In some cases compensation is accepted but this 
will depends on what sort of crime has been committed and extensive negotiation takes place 
between males of the respective families before any punishment is meted out or compensation 
is paid. “if a woman should be killed in a non-honour crime, the blood money “diyya” is four 
or eight times what it would be for a man. And if, while she is pregnant, she is exposed to 
injury that triggers a miscarriage, the “diyya” for the fetus is that of a full man. Again, these 
practices involve several implicit assumptions about women: their primary worth as deriving 
 from their reproductive power; their presumed weakens; and their families and not they 
themselves bear responsibility for their actions‟, Brand explains”. (47)  
            Male relatives execute this customary law which is called “j‟ari‟mat al –Sh‟araf”. (48)  
The precise number of honour killings is unknown as official figures are generally considered 
unreliable under-estimates. The Ministry of Interior proposed figures of 19 in 2001, 15 in 
2002 and 22 in 2003 but the Christian Science Monitor reported that since around a third of 
all violent deaths in Jordan are honour-related, the real figures are likely to be much higher. 
(49)  
           Men who commit a crime in the form of the murder of a female relative will invariably 
themselves get only a light punishment from the state courts in their turn, suggesting that the 
state not only endorses the concept of honour (and all that implies for the control of women) 
as a guide to social behaviour but ultimately places less value on a woman‟s life than on a 
man‟s. This is one very clear illustration of how the cemented relation between the state and 
the tribe in Jordan reflects on women‟s status, welfare provision and social development. 
Social values such as honour, the subordinate position of females in the family, and 
segregation of the sexes ultimately remain the terrain of tribal customary rather than civil or 
criminal laws. In the words of one interviewee: 
 “the social heritage of segregation is extremely deep in the Jordanian society, it cannot be 
uprooted easily”. (50)  
            Not surprisingly then, women‟s activists in Jordan argue that the continuation of 
honour crimes and the liberal legal attitudes taken in dealing with those who carry them out, 
represents an outstanding failure of the state to honour the article in the constitution that 
asserts the equality of all  Jordanian citizens,  regardless sex, religion and class.  As Shadha 
Mahmoud, a young activist in women‟s issues said: 
 “Honour crimes are not punishable and therefore this tribal custom persists. It only 
demonstrates the fallacy that the State protects women‟s dignity”. (51)  
             Honour crimes are specifically a Bedouin tribal practice. The roots of the customary 
law which underpins it lies in Bedouin gender ideology as Leila Abu –Lughod argues in 
“Veiled Sentiments”. This ideology is based on values associated with modesty and the 
autonomy of individuals. Masculinity (maleness) is associated with autonomy and femininity 
with dependence and modesty. This reflects in turn the socio-economic reality of Bedouin 
nomadic lifestyles in which “senior men control resources and provide for others and women 
are the quintessential dependents”. Bedouin thought frames gender differentials such that 
women have a secondary status based on their economic and thus moral inferiority and 
 measured by the standards of their conformity with the code of honour. (52)  
           In Bedouin culture, the male and the female are by nature opposed to each other. 
Menstruation, procreation and sexuality are all related to the biologically-derived female 
nature. Females are associated first and foremost with child-bearing function and their social 
roles as mothers. This gender ideology is closely associated with the concept of nature, that it 
is made by God, and that God‟s will must not be challenged or disregarded. This perspective 
is printed in the mind of each male and female from early childhood, embedded through the 
range of socialization mechanisms and institutions. The honour of a female, and thus of her 
family, is tied to her sexuality and more specifically bound within her physical body. The 
preservation of her honour has been materialized in the fine membranes which constitute her 
virginity, membranes which have become the literal symbol of her families honour. This 
membrane is the only evidence of her innocence – without it a woman is guilty until she can 
prove otherwise. The only time that a woman can ultimately prove her innocence is on her 
wedding night, when the sheets of the marriage bed are examined by the family for signs of 
the tearing of the hymen – the surrendering of virginity. If a woman bleeds then she proves 
her innocence and that she is not guilty. If she does not bleed, for whatever reason, she is 
considered to have come to the marriage bed already dishonoured. She is therefore considered 
to have dishonoured her family and she must face severe consequences. She either will be 
sent back to her family to be punished by its member‟s or she will be divorced and bring 
shame upon the family. If a woman is thought to have engaged in sexual intercourse, or even 
in any kind of immoral behaviour which can be as little as talking to an un-related man, she is 
considered to have equally brought dishonour to the family. Suspicion is as much a crime as 
an actual crime in this regard, and it is perhaps even harder to prove one‟s innocence against a 
mere suspicion. If a female is considered to have behaved “immorally” outside of marriage, 
whether or not she herself if married, she is liable to be punished by the members of the 
family. In the Bedouin culture, this punishment is of vital  importance to wash clean the 
family‟s honour. Since the family honour is embodied in the woman‟s body rather than the 
man‟s, the actions of the man are not of equal consequence and he is unlikely to suffer a 
comparable punishment from his own family, although the female‟s family may demand 
either vengeance or compensation.  
          Nawal El Sadawi argues from a feminist socialist perspective that “moral values are in 
fact, the product of social systems or, precisely, of the social system imposed by the ruling 
class with the aim of serving certain economic and political interests, and ensuring the 
situation from which that class draws benefit and power is maintained”.(53)  In her view the 
 concept of honour has been distorted within Arab society in order to sustain the social 
structures which privilege men and the vertical tribal structures which persist. A man‟s honour 
lies in the female‟s hymen and in her public behaviour. Therefore, if a man behaves 
indecently his family honour is not necessarily in danger and he can escape any consequences 
for his actions. A man‟s sexual experience is even a source of pride and a symbol of his 
virility whilst a woman‟s is a “source of shame and a symbol of degradation”. (54) The entire 
society is, thus, driven by and structured around a double standard of moral concepts. To 
protect women, and the family from dishonouring the family, it becomes legitimate to marry 
them off at a young age, to practice polygamy, and to endorse punishment of women who 
flaunt the tribal norms. Bedouin practices have spread from the rural to the urban areas, and 
have become indicative of social and economic status: where a family can afford to seclude 
its women, to protect them from the perils of mixing with non-family males, it is all the more 
honourable to do so. Thus the practice becomes a pillar of the prevailing socio-economic 
hierarchy. 
           The killing of females by men from their families as an effort to wipe clean their 
family‟s honour is not regarded as equivalent to murder. A man found guilty of an honour 
killing is unlikely to face more than three to six months of a jail sentence. (55) Indeed, often 
the broader society instead condemns the woman and endorses the killing as a necessary 
component of maintaining social cohesion and order. (56) “When an 18 year old rape victim 
was murdered by her 17-year old brother in 1994, a neighbour told the media that the girl's 
family was “relaxed, happy and satisfied after hearing the news that she was killed”. (57) 
Therefore, the culprits of so-called “honour crimes” are rarely heavily punished by the courts. 
Because they so directly contradict the constitutional rights of women, and serve to uphold 
traditional rather than modern constructions of society, they have become a sensitive social 
issue and one which the state is reluctant to confront. In an interview by the researcher with 
one senior Jordanian woman, she was told that each time women‟s organizations present the 
issue of honour crimes to the House of Representatives (most of whom are associated with 
strong tribal roots) to debate on and hopefully prohibit, the issue is always pushed aside and 
never receives a fair chance or discussion. (58)   
           Abla Amawi, a prominent Jordanian defender of women‟s social rights, believes that 
honour crimes have been a persistent feature of Jordanian life even in the 21
st
 century because 
of the contradiction that exists in the provisions of the criminal law of Jordan. There is an 
apparent leniency in the punishment of such crimes in favour of men. She explains that the 
Jordanian criminal law in regard to women is based on the Ottoman Law of 1858, which in 
 turn originated from the French Criminal Law of 1810, and from the Lebanese Criminal Law 
of 1943. The law is inherently gendered when it comes to crimes committed out of anger or 
passion. According to Article 340, a man who commits a crime in the name of honour 
receives a degree of understanding or sympathy from the law and receives a very lenient 
punishment. The law states that: “a husband or close blood relative that kills a woman caught 
in a situation highly suspicious of adultery will be totally exempt from sentence”. Article 98 
guarantees a lighter sentence for male killers of female relatives who have committed an act 
which “is illicit in the eyes of the perpetrator” and which has led to the killer acting in “a fit of 
fury”. However, if a woman commits a crime out of “fury” or humiliation, perhaps for 
example when she discovers her husband in the act of adultery, she receives no such 
sympathy but instead a heavy punishment. Thus a man or his family can actually use the 
criminal law to endorse their crime. They may even use the claim of having committed the 
crime for reasons of honour to disguise a crime committed for other purposes, for example for 
the purposes of stealing a woman‟s money, or her inheritance. Investigations have shown that 
many women killed in supposed honour crimes have in fact still been virgins. (59)                
             Amawi asks the question whether this gendering of the provisions of the Jordanian 
Criminal Law is compatible with the provisions of the Jordanian constitution, the “Sha‟ria”‟ 
and international conventions; 'The answer would seem to be resoundingly negative. The 
Jordanian Constitution guarantees equality to all Jordanians (males and females) in rights and 
responsibilities, whereas the “Sha‟ria” provides no basis for discriminatory treatment of 
adulterous males and females. The “Shr‟ria” stipulates equal punishments for both. Similarly, 
international conventions such as the International Declaration of Human rights clearly 
emphasize equality and no discrimination based on sex (General Assembly of the United 
Nations 1967, arts.1, 2). (60)  The leniency accorded by the law to perpetrators of so-called 
honour crimes demonstrates how conservative, traditional, tribal values are able to over-rule 
the constitutional rights of women in practice. Thus the most basic of women‟s social 
provisions – the right to life – is still a long way from being fulfilled. The very thought that a 
woman‟s life is worthless for bringing shame to the family or the tribe, demonstrates that the 
depth of  patriarchal  norms in Jordanian society which both undermine women‟s 
empowerment projects but more crucially slow down the entire process of embedding the 
concept of the equality of  men and women.  
          Efforts to alter the law, or appeal Articles 340 and 98 entirely, have repeatedly been 
blocked by the lower house of the Jordanian Parliament. In 1999, King Abdullah responded to 
pressure by women‟s activists by initiating a special committee to examine gender 
 discrimination with the law. 
          The committee recommended the repealing of both laws and the Cabinet endorsed this 
recommendation. However, it took the lower house of the Parliament just three minutes in 
February 2000 to dismiss the recommendation. The then leading party, the Islamic Action 
Front, denounced efforts to repeal the law as seeking “to destroy our Islamic social and family 
values by stripping the man from his humanity”. (61) Further efforts to repeal the law in 2001 
and 2003 were similarly rejected, despite public campaigns which raised 15,000 signatures in 
support and brought 5,000 people out on the streets, including members of the Royal family. 
The parliament is heavily weighted in favour of the tribes and conservative social elements 
and, in this instance, its capacity to resist pressure from the Monarchy and to retain the 
patriarchal character of the state itself, was clearly demonstrated. 
           The passive endorsement by the state of honour crimes reflects two key dimensions of 
the state‟s role in women‟s social welfare provisions. Firstly, the tribal, Bedouin culture of 
honour remains strongly intact and has become embedded within the formal political and 
legal institutions of the country regardless of the latter‟s constitutional commitments to the 
equal status and social welfare of women. Secondly, the dependence of the Monarchy on the 
loyalty of the tribes to secure its survival means that there is little incentive or room for the 
state to challenge such tribal norms even if it wants to. The reciprocity of interest between 
state and tribes leaves women as the victims of their mutual interests.  
 
4.7.   Family, Women and Social Change 
            In her interviews with Jordanian women, the researcher sought to examine whether 
this relationship, and women‟ subsequent vulnerability, it changing as a result of the pressures 
of modernization and related social change. In some cases, the belief was expressed that little 
is changing. 
Mrs. Salaw Nasir, an activist in women‟s issues, stated that: “when it comes to applying 
women‟s social provisions or protection, there is a lack of will on the part of the senior 
members of the parliament”. Moreover: “women‟s social needs are not a priority in the state‟s 
social policies. Projects targeting women are not followed up”. She added: “the media is not 
supporting women, political and economic issues are not related to women, although social 
issues are. There have been senior women occupying senior positions in the government, but 
they were appointed and can do little for women”. In her view “it is only through economic 
independence that women can strengthen their power, push themselves forward and make 
their voices heard”. (62)  
            A similar pessimism was expressed in a focus group formatted interview which took 
place with 25 Jordanian women from all parts of Jordan on 9 July, 2005 in Amman. The 
researcher was told by participants that: “there is a lack of will on the part of the state to 
enforce equal laws in the light of women‟s social provisions”. Moreover, “the culture of 
shame, family honour and men being better is the prevailing order regardless of economic and 
political progress”. For women, their “family role plays a negative part in their progression in 
the society”. At the same time, “they have no choice but to rely on the family for their 
economic and social needs”. The majority of the group participants were pessimistic 
regarding the potential for economic or political changes to improve the provisions of 
women‟s social welfare or that women would be treated as human beings rather than as the 
subjects of traditional and conservatism norms.  Ms. Shadha Mahmoud, a young activist in 
women‟s issues and who works for the United Nations office “UNIFEM” in Amman, Jordan 
(2005-2007) discussed the unlikelihood that “something better can take place for Jordanian 
women in the short term”. In sum, despite the economic and political changes taking place in 
Jordan as a result of globalization, modernization and international obligations, social and 
state attitudes towards women were considered to be actually regressing. The interviews 
suggested five areas where economic and political changes which have impacted upon the 
family since the late 1980s have not had the anticipated benefits for women‟s social welfare 
provisions either within the family or by the state. 
 
a) Migration 
         One of the key consequences of the weak economic performance of Jordan has been the 
lack of working opportunities for rural and young men, resulting in urban and international 
labour migration. Cities began to expand as a result of labour remittances pouring in from the 
Jordanian semi-skilled workers who left for the Gulf where the post 1970s oil boom created a 
wealth of employment opportunities. The first Gulf War between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s 
brought job opportunities in Iraq as well as new wealth (and consequently jobs)  to Amman, 
whilst the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990/91 brought a wave of  wealthy returnee  
Palestinians into Jordan, with capital to invest in property (causing a construction boom). 
Finally, the 1993 Oslo peace process and the 1994 peace treaty with Israel brought new waves 
of tourists to Jordan, again prompting internal migration in search of jobs. 
           Movement in both directions, internal and international labour migration, brought 
changes to the tribe and family (from provisions and man power side) and consequently for 
women. The tribes and the family lost their young men. The old (both men and women) were 
 left to care for the young of the family. With the old unable to work, women were often left to 
be the sole provider of care for the family members and the wage-earner if the absent men 
were unable to remit sufficient financial resources, or if they died or disappeared. Women 
started to carry the full burden of responsibilities for looking after their families in the absence 
of their men, be it fathers, brothers, or husbands. They lost their partial security of protection 
and financial support from the tribe and the family and were forced to engage in public in 
place of their men. 
          For many women this has meant a harsh new reality. Whilst they are required to take on 
new public roles, and have less support and provision from the tribe or family, they 
nonetheless find themselves discriminated against in the work place, subjected to sexual 
harassment and excluded from good opportunities in the wage labour market because of their 
gender. The crucial reality is that traditional and tribal family values have not changed along 
with women‟s roles or their status as independent individuals, and society has not 
accommodated their altered roles in the way in which it treats them. The actual tribal or 
family structures are being eroded by migration but the role, status and behaviour which they 
impose upon women have not. Thus these changes did not bring about a change in the social 
status of Jordanian women; rather it remains intact and even worsened. When the subject is 
approached with senior Jordanian men, they reply that this is a tradition, and tradition cannot 
be challenged so easily, but needs more time to adapt. (63)  
  
b) Education 
          Education plays a key role in enhancing women‟s life and work prospects but at the 
same time, it weakens the power of the tribe/ family over its female members. Families push 
their female children to improve their education since this offers them better opportunities for 
work, especially in fields like health provision and education which are conventionally seen 
as female professions. Perhaps more importantly, a tribe or family gains prestige from the 
educational status of its children, including its women. The greatest prestige comes from 
achieving a higher degree from university, even if the family does not require the woman to 
work once she has graduated. Indeed, women from middle and upper class backgrounds are 
under less pressure to move into the job market early to bring income into the family and are 
therefore more likely to remain in education for as long as possible. As educational 
opportunities for women have improved, and with the possibility of university education and 
– if they are allowed by their family – professional employment thereafter, more women are 
delaying the age of marriage.  
          Women‟s expectations are changing as a result. It becomes less desirable to have many 
children (not only since they start married life later but also because they may work outside 
the home). When they marry later, they may have more confidence in resisting the intrusion 
of the family into their married life and decision-making. Highly educated women demand 
more expensive dowries when they do marry (which can also inhibit marriage itself). The 
pressure on educated women to accept their father‟s choice of a suitable man becomes less 
effective. Similarly their willingness to accept lesser jobs than similarly qualified men is 
progressively reduced. 
        However, these higher expectations and capacities become frustrated as they do not 
translate into an equal opportunity in the labour market. A large number of the interviewees 
for this study were young women graduates, some of whom had masters degrees. However, 
they were not employed in wage labour but rather stayed with their families, which provided 
for their welfare, while they waited for an appropriate suitor to marry.  In their views, 
education had worsened their social position. Employers would still rather choose for a man 
over a woman with the same or even better qualifications to fill a vacancy.  Men with lower 
qualifications were the first to fill gaps in the labour market, the discrimination being based 
on the patriarchal pretext that men are more likely to be the primary breadwinner of a family 
and they should thus have first pick of the jobs. Thus the expectations which women are 
developing through their higher educational attainment are still unfulfilled. Even worse, their 
education becomes a marriage commodity, increasing their worth to the men of their family, 
rather than being respected in its own right. 
          A report in the Jordanian newspaper, Al Rai, explains the devastating social anomalies 
this has created as the ratio of men to women in state universities has been steadily decreased. 
In 2008, women constituted 80% of university enrolments and men just 20%. The report 
argues that this has had a gloomy impact on developing the required supply of male teachers, 
doctors, nurses and engineers in the future. There is already a lack of 400 male specialists in 
the teaching of physics and mathematics in the remote areas and villages. At the same time 
there is an excess of female specialists in those two subjects. The result of this skewed 
educational profile is that the notion that some jobs such as teaching and nursing, traditionally 
defined as “female” because of their nurturing role, is being reinforced rather than eroded. 
The report “the authorities are not paying substantial attention to this alarming result as fear 
of opening up debates regarding being biased for men”. (64) In other words, the state focuses 
on the quantitative provision of education for women as being sufficient for it to fulfil its 
obligations to women as citizens, even when the qualitative aspects of social attitudes erode 
 the substantive achievements of such policies. 
 
c) Employment   
            The interviews demonstrated that, even when they do join the wage-labour force, 
Jordanian women‟s hopes for economic independence and an increased ability to be her own 
decision-maker, are regularly disappointed.  
            For a start, women quickly find that the institutional and infrastructural support for 
employed women is insufficient, especially when it comes to child care. The lack of 
affordable childcare, combined with very short periods of maternity leave, forces many 
women to opt for part-time work only, allowing them to combine work with domestic chores 
and to be home in time to collect children from school. Similarly, the lack of reliable public 
transport often makes it impossible for them to combine reasonable working hours with 
domestic and child-care duties. Part-time work is lower paid, has less protection and is of a 
lower social status than full-time work. 
             The interviewees also asserted that influential tribal elites have strengthened the 
social obstacles regarding women‟s education and wage labour by emphasizing traditional 
religious and conservative values. The pretext of the traditionalist is that women are taking 
the work of men who are the principal bread winners. Women‟s “proper” work is stay at home 
to bring up children and look after the elderly. The religious conservatists argue that wage 
labour gives women the freedom to mix with men at work and in public, tempting both 
genders away from moral behaviour and putting family honour at risk. Employed women 
therefore represent the possibilities for moral and social corruption. Given this pressure, many 
working environments are segregated, imposing additional costs on employers and making 
the employment of women more costly for them. In the words of three interviewees: 
 “each time I apply for a Job, I find out that they employ a man who is less qualified than me. 
When I protest, the employer said: why do you want to work? Your man is working and you 
have two children, it is rather you stay home and bring your children up”. (65) 
 
 “no one wants to employ a woman first, because they tell us there are few jobs. Those few 
jobs must be filled by men, because, one day, you will be married and you want a man who 
has a job. If we give you the job, there are no jobs left for your future husband”. (66) 
 
 “I should stay and wait for a man to marry and therefore, there is no need to look for a job”. 
(67) 
          The need to constantly challenge conservative attitudes towards women‟s wage labour, 
as well as the “lack of transportation, absence of child facilities and ignorance of available job 
opportunities” (68) undermines women‟s incentives to fight for employment equality. It is 
often easier for them to choose to stay at home under the protection which is offered by their 
families.  
 
d)  Sedentarization 
             Settling the nomadic tribes in designated territories has become a priority of the state 
of Jordan since World War 11. This settlement has been driven by the need to consolidate the 
state, to solidify its national borders, and to regularize the relationship between citizens and 
the state itself.  Moreover, by settling the tribes, it becomes possible to recruit their young 
men away from the land and into the army. This sedentarisation has affected the tribes in two 
ways. Firstly, the “relationship to the traditional tribal territory has decreased” and secondly, it 
has “diluted lineage solidarity and cohesiveness”. (69) The government appoints its 
representatives to the villages to be in charge of the administrative and infrastructure tasks 
whilst the Sheikh remains to act as an advisor and consultant in family and social matters. 
Ironically, this means that the connection between traditional nomadic lifestyles and the 
provisions for women becomes dis-jointed. The Sheikh is confirmed in his role in 
determining how traditional tribal values and norms for society should be upheld 
(subordinating women) but the role of provider for women‟s social provisions transfers to the 
administration and infrastructure of the state. When the  young men leave and join the army, 
or when they find alternative work in the construction or other industries, women are left 
alone to carry out the domestic duties and care for the elderly, as well as care for remaining 
livestock and dealing with the public administration. Tribal cohesion is weakened and they 
lose the protection since promised them by its traditional lifestyle. Yet the constraints on their 
behaviour remain.  
 
e) Political Change and Democratization 
          The impact of the political reforms which supposedly are advancing democratization in 
Jordan since 1989 are perceived as having has little impact on the relationship between the 
state and the tribes. Critical voices in the 1980s suggested that the King‟s dependence on the 
tribal loyalties, and his support of tribal influence, was contrary to democratic norms. When 
the 1989 reforms led to the first parliamentary elections in decades the relationship was tested 
as opposition candidates from Islamist, leftist and independent groupings won 59% of the 80 
 seats in the parliament‟s lower house.  The electoral laws were subsequently Gerry-mandered 
and manipulated so that in the subsequent 1993, 1997, 2003 and 2007 elections the rural 
(tribal) areas were allotted more seats relative to their share of the population than the urban 
areas from which the Islamist, leftist and genuinely independent candidates are elected. Thus 
in former-prime minister Rawabeh‟s district it takes only 3,000 votes for a candidate to be 
elected to the parliament, but in Amman city it takes 95,000 votes. Not surprisingly in the 
1997 elections, 68 of the 80 parliamentarians were tribal chiefs. The impact of this has 
undermined the apparent gains which should have materialized when women were allocated a 
quota of seats in subsequent elections. Despite this quota of seats, they cannot challenge the 
overall dominance of tribal influence within the parliament. Moreover, despite his proclaimed 
determination to advance political reforms, King Abdullah has continued the trend of 
reinforcing the strength of tribal influence in parliament begun by his father. In 2001 he 
suspended the parliament entirely, ruling by decree and selecting his government on the basis 
of traditional tribal loyalties rather than merit or electoral popularity. When elections were r-
introduced in 2003 and 2007, the pattern of manipulating electoral districts to favour tribes 
was maintained.  
          Whilst this failure to genuinely democratize the political system brings criticism, it in 
fact reflects as much a continuing identification with the tribe rather than just the suppression 
of political parties and their activities. A 1998 opinion poll, held after the 1997 elections 
which saw the return of tribal primacy to the parliament, showed that tribal affiliations 
remained stronger than political party affiliations in Jordan. In the all, only 1.3% of 
respondents claimed to be members of political parties. Yet 40.4% claimed to be active in 
tribal affairs. Of the latter 63.4% attended regular tribal assemblies, 69.9% attended marriage 
and engagement celebrations within the tribe, 76.4% attended condolence events and a total 
of 51.7% of respondents recognised the legitimate existence of tribal “diwans” as places for 
conflict resolution, negotiations, and rule-making. (70) 
           The interviewees endorsed the idea that the combined effects of political reform, 
migration, sedentarisation, education and employment have not weakened the influential role 
of tribal values and traditions on gender relations.  Patriarchal  values  still prevail with a 
woman still being regarded as weak, physically and mentally, and more likely an emotional 
creature ruled by her heart rather than her mind. The interviewees expressed their grievances 
regarding male treatment towards them in both the public and private spheres. Despite the 
fading cohesion of the tribe, their traditional values are strongly practised and defended 
because the tribe embodies the state and is the security backbone for the state. This 
 relationship of mutual dependency between the state and the tribe makes it difficult for 
women to strive for their empowerment, let alone the provision of their social needs. Political 
and economic amendments to their lives are accommodated by men, but accompanying social 
change is strongly resisted. Tradition becomes ever more un-changeable as it is viewed as 
essential for social stability in the face of modernization rather than something which much 
be eroded as a result of that modernization. This is not just about protecting social stability 
but about protecting the state itself. 
       …the   legitimacy   of   traditions,  considered  almost 
       synonymous with Bedouin or tribal culture,  has been   
       defended  as  part  of  the  near sacrosanct foundations 
       of   the  state  and  as  central to cultural heritage”.(71)  
 
             Interestingly, Islam per se was not regarded by interviewees as the source of 
conservative traditions which discriminated against women, but rather patriarchal attitudes in 
general. 
             In the group interview in Karak, which included 18 women, the participants were 
keen to outline what they saw as the crucial measures which are needed to change this 
situation. These included: the amendment of family-related laws, the removal of any legal 
requirements for male permissions for travel or employment, improvement of transport 
infrastructures to reduce travel times and make travel safer for women, and state-sponsored 
improvement of employment opportunities for women to enhance their financial security. 
 
 
4.8.   Conclusion         
           The chapter has argued that the family and tribe continue to be of crucial importance 
for the women of Jordan. Social organization rests on the family, the extended family and the 
tribe, the values of which are based on a biologically-based division of labour between men 
and women. Men are stronger, physically and mentally, and therefore take on the primary role 
as breadwinner. In return for obedience, and according to their weaker, emotional and 
nurturing nature, women remain in the private realm taking care of their children and elderly 
relatives, but in turn being provided for by their husbands and male relatives. This form of 
social organization has been reinforced by the relationship between the tribes and the 
Monarchy. Their reciprocal support of one another has provided security for the state, in 
return for which the state has repeatedly endorsed the social values of the tribal system and 
even integrated them into its institutions and laws. Thus a paradox has arisen whereby on the 
one hand the state has assumed a constitutional commitment to women‟s equality and to state 
 provisions of their social welfare needs as citizens, and on the other it has maintained a 
normative system where women‟s social welfare needs remain the concern of the family and 
where she has access to provisions only if she conforms to the norms of obedience, 
subordination, and moral purity such that she does not bring shame or dishonour on the 
family. Women are caught between the contradictions of this: while the state provides 
quantitative aspects of her social welfare provision (more school enrolments, increasing 
entitlements to welfare support, supporting more women into employment etc), women‟s 
actual ability to access these, or to gain advantage from them, remains circumscribed by her 
familie‟s control over her and by social restrictions resulting from the “nationalization” of 
tribal values and practices. 
              Economic and social changes occurring within Jordan as a result of economic 
pressures, integration with global society, and political imperatives for reform, are not having 
the effect that women might hope for in improving their situation. The changes have certainly 
impacted on the cohesion of the tribe and the family, reducing the protection which they can 
offer women and which is supposed to guarantee the provision of their social welfare needs. 
However, the changes have not reduced the dependence of the state on the tribes but rather 
increased it, and the social values of traditional life which circumscribe women‟s behaviour 
and choices are only getting stronger. Patriarchal attitudes are stronger than ever as society 
seeks to stave off the perceived threats of profound social and economic change. Women 
continue to be faced with discrimination and seclusion in many major aspects of life.  
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                                                            CHAPTER FIVE 
  
  Women’s Civil Society Organisations in Jordan 
                                                                             
 
5.1.  Introduction 
            As women have struggled to deal with the multiple challenges facing them as a result of 
patriarchy within both the state and the family and tribe, they have increasingly engaged in public 
activities which seek to protest against, or advocate change of, their subordinated status. They 
have done this through organizations and associations which can be described as civil society 
organizations (CSOs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  Such CSOs have developed to 
offer support for women in demanding that either the family or the state improves social welfare 
provisions, or even to offer that social welfare provisions themselves. 
           This chapter examines the role played by women‟s CSOs in Jordan, as well as the 
constraints under which they continue to operate. To do this, the chapter must first examine the 
status and structures of civil society in Jordan as a whole, locating this within the broader 
historical experience of Arab civil society. The chapter seeks to offer a working definition of civil 
society for the area, and to examine the extent to which it has been able to take its proper place in 
the state-market-family nexus. The chapter demonstrates that, despite significant achievements in 
the development of civil society in Jordan, the continuing limits placed upon it by a non-self-
limiting and essentially patriarchal state, mean that its autonomy of action and therefore its ability 
to exert an influence for social and political change, remain seriously limited. Through the study 
of the legal status of CSOs, their funding arrangements and continuing interference from the state, 
the chapter will expose the fundamental weaknesses of women‟s CSOs. 
           The second part of the chapter will examine what kind of social welfare provision they are 
still able to offer through data collected from interviews conducted by the researcher with 
prominent women‟s CSO activists in Jordan and recipients of the support of CSOs. Four case-
studies will be presented of women‟s CSOs currently operating in Jordan. The selection of 
interviewees in this case was restricted to only the heads or the general secretaries of selected 
CSOs.  I chose the type of “structured interview”, in which the researcher prepares a set of specific 
questions associated to the goals of the CSOs and accepts the answers as they are without further 
(subjective) interference by the researcher. This offered greater neutrality to the data gathered, in 
the sense that it allowed interviewees to have greater control over the conversation rather than 
 being controlled by the interviewer. May argues that “the rules of conducting such interviews are, 
therefore, standardizations of explanations, leaving little room for deviation from the schedule; 
eliciting only the responses of the person with whom the interview is being conducted; not 
promoting or providing a personal view; not interpreting meanings and simply repeating the 
questions and finally not improvising”.(1) The decision was taken by the researcher to conduct 
this form of interview based on the reality of their various activities especially in regard to their 
presence and the time they can offer. As the interviewees had heavy schedules and were engaged 
in many activities such as organizing meetings and travelling to attend national or international 
conferences and governmental meetings and celebrations, their time was limited. The researcher 
therefore allowed them to select the most convenient place for them in which to conduct the 
interview. With this reality, the researcher conducted interviews with the following: Princess 
Basma Bint Talal, (Chairperson of the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development, 
(JOUHD), interviewed in her office in Amman),  Ms. Asma Khudr, (Head of the Jordanian 
National Commission for Women, (JNCW), interviewed in her office in Amman),  Mrs. Am‟nha 
Al- Zughabi, (Head of the Jordanian Women Union, (JWU), interviewed in her office Amman), 
and Mrs. Nadia Bushnaq,(Head of The Housewives Association Family Guidance & Awareness 
Centre, interviewed at her own house and in a public place because of her schedule and 
movements). In order to confirm the information provided by interviewees, who obviously had the 
reputation and interests of their organisations to protect, the research cross-checked information as 
far as was possible either through study of information material provided by the organisations, or 
through her semi-structured interviews with other academics, analysts and civil society activists.  
 
5.2.   Defining Civil Society 
            It is not necessary here to examine the origins or lineage of the term “civil society”. It 
is used here to refer to the collection of autonomous, voluntaristic organizations and 
associations which pursue public ends in relation to (but not seeking to overthrow) the state. 
This grouping, which exists in the public space, is neither state nor market, but rather stands 
between them and the family/private realm. As Michael Walzer explains: 
                            the words „civil society‟ name the sphere of  un  coerced 
                            human  association  and  also  the  set  of   relational  net  
                            works formed for the sake of  family faith, interest and 
                            ideology that  fill this space.(2) 
 
            Such organizations might include trade unions, NGOs, social movements, universities, 
the press, professional bodies and religious institutions, but not political parties which – 
 although voluntary – seek to capture the state and its coercive instruments for their own ends. 
The objectives of civil society organizations include but are not exclusively the improvement 
of the performance of the state (both in terms of its relationship with society and its provisions 
for society). Jorgensen argues that civil society consists of groups or individuals work for the 
welfare of their society without the influence of a state or business. He writes that: 
                            Civil  society  allows  the  citizens of a country to act for  
               what  they think is the benefit of society‟s; it gives room 
       for  debate  on  the  direction of social development, it is 
             possible     for   people   to   influence   government  and  
       business.   The  basis  of  civil society is the workings of  
        society,  and   the  recognition  that   periodical elections,  
       and   referendums,   if   these   are   held   at  all,  are not  
                 sufficient. (3) 
 
            Jorgensen argues that one key objective of a civil society is to improve the life of the 
disadvantaged and the poor. It acts in relation to the other two social components - the state 
and the market. Each has a function different from the other but if they work together they can 
serve to benefit the whole of society. The function of the state is to make laws and enforces 
them; the market provides goods and a ground for exchange, and the civil society provides the 
ground for raising the issues, debates and proposals as to how best society should be 
organized, the state directed, and the market managed. More importantly, he emphasizes that a 
strong civil society reflects a strong and legitimate state and better development in economics 
and business.  For him, they form a chain in which each component depends on the other. 
            The state is key in determining the condition of civil society. On the one hand, a strong 
state is needed to establish and protect the “rules” of public debate, preventing civil society 
organisations from behaving “uncivily” towards each other and ensuring that they do not seek 
to dominate one another, or exclude one another from the debate.  Without a strong state, civil 
society is rather anarchy. At the same time, however, the state must be self-limiting: it must 
not seek to impose its own domination over the pubic space but must allow room for 
independent discussion, challenges, and mobilization by civil society organizations. 
            Civil society organizations are not profit-seeking (they are not market organizations) 
nor do they seek to capture power (they are not political parties).  They are defined by their 
efforts to improve society and its relationship with the state for normative purposes. They 
complement both family/household and state in promoting the fundamental “requirement for 
strong companionship, care and welfare”. (4)  To this end, the state must allow them room to 
organize, raise funds to facilitate their activities, establish structures of managers, employees 
and (if necessary) volunteers, conduct their activities free from interference or state direction, 
 and when appropriate develop relationships with both the state and the market in order to 
advance their programmes. Where such organizations are able to develop freely and to 
proliferate, it can be argued that they contribute to, and play a vital role, in transitions to 
democratization. 
 
5. 3.  Civil Society in the Arab World 
             However, civil society in the Middle East, and in particular the Arab World, exists in a 
very different world from that described above. Although the number of CSOs has 
proliferated rapidly in recent decades,(5) and despite the language and terminology of civil 
society having been incorporated into government discourses, it is very clear that the Arab 
state is neither self-limiting nor committed to enabling a thriving civil society to exist. 
Authoritarian government remains the norm in the Arab countries and the state remains 
dominant over public space. 
              This has been explained in a number of ways. Authoritarianism has been attributed to 
the combined effects of the domination and then the fall of Ottoman imperial rule, 
colonialism, the fighting of 1
st
 and 2
nd
 World Wars on regional battle fields followed by the 
imperatives of Cold War rivalries, state-led development strategies in the era of independence, 
the discovery of oil and the development of rentier/distributive states, and the establishment 
of the State of Israel. Alternatively, some researchers have argued that civil society itself is not 
an analytical category appropriate to the Arab region, at least not without amendment. 
              As Tim Niblock has pointed out, the most prominent group structures to have filled 
the space between the state and the family in the Arab world have been informal, primordial 
groups like the tribe or clan. (6) Thus if we extended our definition of civil society to include 
these groups, we might see a more vibrant picture of activity than is perhaps suggested. This 
line of thinking has two problems: firstly, it ignores the importance of voluntarism to the 
analytical power of the term. Civil society requires that its participants place rational 
deliberation over the best route forward for society (and the state within it) before their 
ascriptive interests. In other words, tribes or clans are exclusivist whilst civil society is 
inclusivist of all society. Secondly, it risks endorsing the argument that the interests of 
developing societies can best be protected within the context of a similarly  tribal, 
traditionalist, religious and conservative type of regime  rather than by a freely elected and 
democratic government. The democratic developed world becomes mute towards non-
democratic process and practices in the Arab World. As Norton says, “the vocal advocates of 
elections and political participation are suddenly mute when they step to the Middle East”. (7) 
             Norton explains that “civil society is more than an admixture of various forms of 
association, it also refers to a quality, civility, without which the milieu consists of feuding 
factions, cliques and cabals”. (8)  He writes that “civility implies tolerance, the willingness of 
individuals to accept disparate political views and social attitudes; to accept the profoundly 
important idea that there is no right answer”. (9)  In other words, they must move beyond the 
ascriptive “social cages” of tribe or clan, and acknowledge the equality of other actors, the 
possibilities of rational debate, and the need to tolerate pluralism and diversity. 
              Norton is consequently disappointed that this concept of civility is missing in great 
parts of the Middle East. He argues that “civil society is undermined by a deficit in political 
tolerance and constructed by arbitrary government regulation. The absence of civility 
counsels scepticism about the short-term prospects for democracy in the region. When groups 
and movements do emerge as a result, they often come in the form of human rights and 
women‟s movements. Both assert fundamental moral claims, namely the dignity of the person 
and the quality of the individual. Since the claims of such groups are truly basic ones, they are 
not easily assailed, at least explicitly, by the authorities of the state”. (10)  However, without a 
final quality of civility, freedom, even these organisations are restricted in their activities and 
achievement. The state seeks to impose its own definitions of what constitute appropriate 
human rights or women‟s rights, co-opting CSOs to become quasi-nongovernmental 
organizations which are unable to resist its domination. 
             Not everyone is happy with this notion of an inevitably absent civility or a lack of 
autonomy on the part of Arab civil society. Saad Eddin Ibrahim has argued that autonomous 
civil society thrived in the form of guilds, merchants and the ulema in the pre-modern period, 
whilst Lisa Anderson has argued that Arab culture has not been either homogenous or static, 
and that the values associated with civility – trust, skilful organisation, reasoned debate, can 
be found in spatial and temporary locations throughout the region. (11) They argue against the 
idea that Arab political culture is to blame for the weakness of civil society, attributing it 
instead to the range of historical and structural factors mentioned above. However, patriarchal 
culture does play a role in another way. 
            Robert Putnam has argued that civil society organizations work best when they are 
“horizontal” structures. “Networks of civil engagement” need to foster trust, information-
sharing and reciprocity. This is more likely to happen when CSOs are themselves democratic, 
transparent, and inclusive. CSOs which are run in non-democratic, heriarchical, personalized 
ways, do not foster this kind of value or behaviour. (12)  Patrimonial or patriarchally-run 
CSOs tend to be opportunistic and more interested in rivalry than co-operation. (13) In other 
 words, Arab CSOs must escape both the domination of the state and the constraints of 
patriarchal political culture, if they are to serve their purpose in supporting the welfare of the 
society properly. 
             James Sater view takes another, more optimistic, approach to Arab civil society. He 
views civil society as being in opposition to the state, and in particular to authoritarian states 
within the context of “transitional politics”. In his dichotomizing view of state-civil society 
relations, civil society will oppose the authoritarian practices of a regime whenever it sees the 
opportunity to do so. Referring to a number of examples in the Arab World, he argues that a 
“resurrection of civil society is likely to occur when an initial political opening has taken 
place”. (14) Civil societies are therefore considered to be “a counter weigh to the state and 
more importantly, a pro-democracy movement”. (15)  He writes that: 
      The  linkage  between  civil society and democratisation  
      should  be  obvious. Democracy after all is a set of rules 
      and   institutions   of   governance   through  a  peaceful  
       management  of   competing  groups and / or conflicting 
      interests.     Thus     the      normative     component    of 
    “civil s society”   is   essential   the   same as  of  that of 
    democracy. (16) 
 
           Sater‟s second argument is that civil society should be looked upon as an 
“intermediary” between the state and the society. Referring to Gramsci‟s concept of the state-
civil society relationship, he says: 
      The medium of state power – domination and coercion- 
      needs  to be sustained through hegemony. Civil society 
      is powerful system of fortress and earth works situated  
       behind the state, giving the state its stability and power. (17) 
 
            Hegemony refers to the ideological construction which draws citizens into a 
conviction of the legitimacy of the state: it is “the entire complex of practical and theoretical 
activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but 
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules”. (18)  Sater argues that in the 
Middle East, and due to lack of “hegemony” of any particular class, politics is characterized 
by “acts of capturing the state and acts of resisting its attempts at controlling the populace 
through its means of administration and policing”. (19)  In this regard, the state attempts two 
types of power control: it seeks either to preserve the status quo and the privileges of 
whichever group is dominant at the time, or it attempts to use strategies of political isolation 
and political co-option to adjust the status quo in favour of that dominant group. In this 
scenario, civil society is excluded and becomes nothing but “the servant of the state”, being 
 denied “the possibility of constituting an autonomous sphere”. Sater refers to this as “neo-
patrimonialism”. (20)    
            He admits this is not much different from Hisham Sharabi‟s notion of Arab neo-
patriarchy. It rests on a political tradition of “patrimonialism”, in which the authority of rulers 
rest on their serving as the “father” of the community, protecting and providing for the 
community in return for its loyalty and obedience.  Sharabi has developed this idea in the 
context of the Arab region into the concept of contemporary neo-patriarchy, a modern version 
of the traditional patriarchal sultanate. The modern Arab state is described as being based on: 
      The   dominance  of   the   father  (patriarch),   the centre  
     around   which   the   national    as well as   the  natural 
      family   are   recognised.  Thus between  ruler and ruled  
      between   father   and   child,   there  exist  only vertical 
      relations:   in   both   settings   the   paternal  well  is the  
     absolute  will,  mediated   in   both   the  society and the  
     family   by   a   forced   consensus   based  on  ritual and  
     coercion.    Significantly,     the    most    advanced   and  
     functional    aspect    of    the     neopatriarchal   state (in  
     both  conservative and „progressive‟ regimes)     is      its  
     security  apparatus,  the  mukhbarat. A two state systems  
     prevails   in   all   neopatriachal    regimes,   a    military-  
     bureaucratic structure alongside a secret police structure, 
     and   the   latter   dominates   everyday  life,  serving the  
     ultimate regulator of civil and political existence.   Thus, 
     in   social   practice  , ordinary   citizens   not   only   are 
     arbitrarily  deprived   of  some  their basic rights, but are  
     the   virtual   prisoners   of  the  state,   the  objects of its 
     capricious  and   ever   present violence, much as citizens 
     once were under the classical or Ottomans Sultanate.(21) 
 
            The core of the neo-patriarchal system is the distribution of favour and protectionism. 
Mediation is the function of this patronage system and provides security and protection of 
each individual and groups and even “strengthens the sense of identity and cohesion”. More 
importantly, neo-patriarchy preserves stability but “its laws do not provide justice and 
protection for the ones who seek help from the state”. (22)  It, in effect, render “public 
institutions superfluous and displaces legality”. In short, it takes away the right for an 
autonomous establishment of any kind. Therefore state-civil society relations within the 
context of the neo-patriarchal state are dependent and lacking in the necessary autonomy 
which would allow them to serve the function of protecting society, even from the state.  
CSOs become a sort of a quango, or quasi-governmental non-governmental organisation. 
They are allowed, even encouraged, when their agenda and objectives supports the prevailing 
status quo, or enables the state to co-opt new groups or exclude others. But they are 
 constrained from actively seeking to challenge the state, its allies, or the culture which 
sustains the status quo. Institutions become empty shells, the formal structures and languages 
of which disguise the reality of sustained “primordial links consisting of families, tribes, and 
religious orders”. Such a “civil society”  “puts conformity above originality and obedience 
before autonomy; it crushes creative talent and encourages only those power that help to 
maintain it”. (23) 
 
5.4.   Civil Society Organizations in Jordan 
            The Jordanian constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and speech within the 
limits of the law and indeed Jordan presents slightly a different perspective than that 
described above. It can be argued that Sater was right to say that political reforms (however 
limited) have offered the opportunity for CSOs to push forward their interests and agendas, to 
organize themselves better, and to find a place for themselves in Jordanian life which has 
some degree of room for manoeuvre. Consequently, the UNDP‟s Programme on Governance 
in the Arab Region has argued that “The Jordanian civil society organizations (CSOs) enjoy 
one of the most favourable political environments in the Arab world for participating in their 
country‟s political liberalization”. (24) 
            Civil society organizations really began organizing effectively in Jordan in the 1990s 
when democratic political reforms opened the space for them to do so and as economic 
liberalization reduced the social welfare provision of the state for society. They were also 
encouraged by their collective opposition to the 1991 Gulf War. When professional 
associations organized protests against the goals of the war against Iraq, the Jordanian 
government did not interfere, despite criticism of its own pro-war positioning.  By 2009 it was 
estimated that there were 2000 CSOs in Jordan, with nearly 800,000 registered members (or 
15% of the population). (25)  A key component of the new freedom included the National 
Charter, adopted in 1991, which ensured citizens had the right to organize within a framework 
of pluralism and rule of law (although the state retained wide discretionary powers to refuse 
licenses, revoke them, and dissolve organizations). 
                           Nevertheless,  civil  society flourished some -what in the  
                           1990s   and   early  2000s, in part because of the  relative    
                           withdrawal   of   the   government   from    certain  social   
                           spheres,   and    in   part   because   of an   uncertain legal 
              and   political      environment     that   created  numerous  
                           “gray areas”   that    civic groups learned  to  exploit. But 
                           the    government   was   also   able  to  manipulate  those   
                           gray   areas    to   bend  civil  society  organizations to  its   
                            own    purposes    and    to   limit      their   independence.      
                           Today,      efforts    by     the   government      to     clarify      
                the       legal   environment    are  having  the   effect    of 
    constraining      civil     society,      just     at    a  moment       
    when       non  -   governmental   organizations    (NGOs) 
    are    primed  to support the next stage of political reform 
    in   Jordan. (26) 
 
               Jarrah asserts that most CSOs and NGOs are non-political, precisely because the 
state continues to circumscribe CSO activity in that area, introducing, for example, a 
restrictive Civil Society Law in 2008 which, whilst ultimately not signed by the King, remains 
on the books for reintroduction. This has been the result of both Government fears of allowing 
cleavages between Jordanians and Palestinians to re-open in the wake of the failing Arab-
Israeli peace process, and as a result of perceived security threats after the 2005 Al-Qaidia 
attacks on two hotels in Amman. The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2006, the Public 
Assemblies Law, and the amendments to the Press and Publications and Political Parties laws, 
have served to place new constraints on the rights and freedoms of charities, CSOs and 
NGOs, including on their rights to rally or protest, their abilities to take part in political 
activitism or work with overtly political groups, their freedom to accept donations, their 
ability to contest rescinding of a license and a number of other areas. 
             Norton disagrees with the pessimistic scenario. He suggests that, whilst so far, most 
groups and organizations are oriented towards the interests of non-political groups such as 
business groups or women, these groups serve not only to present their own economic or 
social interests assertively, but  at the same time provide an “organizational pattern which can 
be adapted to other types of group”.(27) Norton is consequently optimistic regarding an 
opening up in Middle Eastern political society and rejects the views that those societies 
appear to remain “backward and traditional”.(28) Jarrah disagrees, arguing: 
                          Perhaps  the greatest shortcoming of  Jordanian NGOs  is 
                          their internal structure.  The fact  that NGOs   themselves 
              are    not     necessarily democratic  and lack  transparency 
              and  good  governance practices,  such as   oversight,  has 
              eroded    their     credibility     and     blunted   the  impact     
              of     their     work     and      advocacy.    Ironically,  many  
    organizations   do    not   differ    in   their    structure    or   
  methods    of    operation  from    the  ruling  parties.  The 
              inability    to   harness   the   energy   and     potential   of     
              their     members     and    the    reliance    on      decision- 
  making    and    strategizing    of    a   select few, helps  to 
  explain    the    weakness    of   NGOP‟s   strategies    and    
  their      failure    to     develop    alternative   programs of  
   democratic       reform.    Employees     lack       important    
  organizational   skills,   and    there    is   no    clear career  
  track   or   professional   training   for  NGO  workers   or 
  leaders.  Activists        report    that      skill   requirements   
  for      hiring     are    weak,     which   means   that   many   
  organisation    have     staff     who   are   deficient   in  the   
  minimum    expertise   necessary   to    play   a  role   in  a  
  democratic transition. (29) 
 
 
          Their shortcomings are widely recognized: “Management, institutionalization and 
professionalization” are key obstacles in the development of CSOs, where “traditional 
leadership reflected on kinship and/or tribalism is the most prominent style”. Some CSOs are 
fraught with conflicts between and among extended families and members of those families 
dominate their activities. Other small families are excluded and they subsequently seek to 
undermine the activities of the CSOs. (30)   
          In sum, we can say that, whilst Jordan has a developing civil society which has a 
greater degree of freedom than in much of the Arab world, it remains hampered by both 
continuing state interference and by internal organizational weaknesses that reflect – in 
Sater‟s terms, on-going neo-patrimonial cultural practices. Therefore, there are already limits 
on the degree to which civil society can fill a space between state, market and family, and in 
doing so provide for the welfare of citizens. Whilst they are increasingly relied upon to fulfil 
this role because the state is withdrawing from it, and the market cannot provide for those 
who cannot pay, both the state and the family (through the extension of its own traditional, 
patriarchal culture in the form of neo-patrimonial behaviour) continue to erode its autonomy. 
 
5.5.    Women’s Organizations in Jordan 
           The history of women‟s organizations in Jordan precedes this more recent civil society 
development, the earliest forms of organisation to service women‟s social interests taking 
place at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. 
            To begin with, women‟s organizations in Jordan were established by both middle and 
upper class Palestinian and Jordanian. The first women‟s NGOs were a reflection of the 
political and social turmoil that engulfed the whole Arab world after the First World War and 
coincided with the victory of the Western allies against the Ottomans. The social interests of 
women‟s NGO‟s at the time were articulated through charitable and voluntary organisations. 
Hammed has identified five historical periods in the evolution of Jordanian women‟s NGOs. 
His typology mirrors the political, economic and social development of Jordan, and shows 
 how the goals of the Jordanian Women NGOs have developed accordingly over time. 
 
1. Pre-1937: This period is well known for the arrival of Palestinian refugees in Jordan as a 
consequence of the influx of European Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine, which 
was then occupied under the British mandate rule. Jordanian women‟s public activities 
interests were principally for charitable purposes and sought to provide social services to the 
poor among the refugees. The tribal nature of the Jordanian society, which emphasizes 
generosity and hospitality, led to voluntary efforts to support the newcomers. At this stage, 
NGOs were largely gender-neutral and particularly sectarian. They were often established by 
the educated elites of sects such the Orthodox Christian community and their goals were to 
aid these specific communities, especially the poor among them. The “Dar El Ihsan” charity 
house was one such example. 
 
2.  1937-1948: During this period women began to organize specifically for their own 
interests and to establish women‟s organizations devoted to servicing women‟s welfare needs. 
Although this period was characterized by a depressing status quo in the situation of women, 
there was a noticeable shift away from serving sectarian interests and towards serving the 
interests of women as a whole. This period was characterized by a growing consciousness 
among educated women of the issues facing them, both socially and in terms of political 
challenges. Nonetheless the objectives of women‟s NGOs this time remained as providing 
assistance to the poor, caring for children and providing them with shelter. Some of these 
NGOs were supported by members of the Royal family, for example, the “Jami‟yyat al-
Tadamun al-Nisa‟ al –Ijtima‟ iyyah” (The Women‟s Solidarity Society).  Women‟s Federation 
also emerged and carried out work associated with the goals of meeting women‟s social 
needs, ranging from health and hygiene, to education, child care and support for  mothers in 
need. 
 
3.   1948-1969: This period was dominated by the arrival of a new influx of Palestinian 
refugees due to the defeat of the Arabs during the Israeli-Arab War at the hands of the Israelis, 
the partition of the land of Palestine and the UN recognition of the State of Israel. Women‟s 
NGOs consequently began a new phase.  The members of the Young Women‟s Christian 
Association, who had fled from Jaffa and Jerusalem in Palestine, formed a new “Al-Ahilyah” 
school in Amman to accommodate the Palestinian refugees. They also converted private 
schools into hospitals, initiating a new form of re-organized voluntary. Two women‟s 
 organizations, the Women‟s Solidarity Society and the Women‟s Union, were reorganized into 
one society named the Hashemite Jordanian Women‟s Society in 1949. At the same year, a 
special department was established at the Ministry of Social Affairs. This was the first time 
that what had previously been confined to voluntary work officially became the affair of the 
government. All NGOs social work became a governmental issue and under the “auspices of 
governmental supervision”. In this period a prominent Arab Women‟s Federation was 
established in 1954.  Its targets were to fight illiteracy, encourage education and support 
women‟s participation, fostering international relations among women and subsequently 
supporting peace. Those goals were later developed to include seeking amendments to the 
Personal Status Law and the Labor Law in favor of women‟s social needs. They achieved 
some objectives such as enabling women to take part in military and civil training. This 
organization was later dissolved by the government for having been too explicitly engaged in 
political issues such as the Algerian struggle against the French and supporting the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal during the period of Jamal Abd El Naser in Egypt. 
 
4.  1967-1981: This period was shaped by yet more political turmoil which left its impact on 
women‟s organizations, both in terms of their social aims and the political context within 
which they worked.  The Jordanian Arabs lost a second war against the Israelis in 1967 and 
the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were subsequently occupied by Israel. Women‟s 
organizations took a strong political line in mobilizing support for the Arab armies as well as 
looking after the new influx of refugees from Palestine. As the Jordanian regime reeled from 
the political instabilities caused by both the war and the radicalization of Palestinians within 
its own border, it increasingly sought to impose limitations on liberties and political freedoms, 
banning political parties, cancelling elections, and ruling through Royal decree. The 
implications of this latter were reflected in women‟s activities, many of which were focused 
on Palestinian solidarity (or alternatively East Bank solidarity) and on taking the Arab cause 
into the international context via the women‟s movement. An International Year of Women 
was declared by the UN in 1975 and the Women‟s Federation Organization was recognized by 
the Ministry of Interior. 
 
5.  1981 till Present: This period has seen a dramatic shift in the activities and aims of 
women‟s NGOs in Jordan, especially since the disengagement of Jordan from the West Bank 
and its impact on Women‟s organizations. Jordanian women‟s organizations have become 
separated from Palestinians organisations and their activities have become centred around 
 more of a dialogue with other Jordanian organizations in the effort to advance women‟s social 
needs. This redirection coincided with the Nairobi International Conference on women in 
1985, after which issues concerning women became more prominent in wider political and 
social debates internationally. The key feature of this period has been the proliferation of 
women‟s organizations, notably including the Jordanian National Committee for Women‟s 
Affairs established in 1992 whose aim is to introduce government policy and legislation to 
meet women‟s social needs. 
In sum, Hammed writes that, 
                            Voluntary   non governmental    work   in    Jordan    has   
     witnessed fluctuations in both the quality of  work   and 
     in   the   require   services.   During periods of   political  
     upheaval   and   mass-migration,  efforts   were directed  
     towards   solving the  short-term problems of  displaced  
                             persons,   refugees   and   victims  of  war,  while during  
     periods  of  stability   the  main objective was to provide 
     welfare   services    that   could  not  be  provided by the 
     authorities. (31) 
        
     
5.6.   The Legal Status of NGOs in Jordan 
           Women‟s organizations generally fall into the category of Non-Governmental 
Organisations, since they pursue social and development objectives rather than political goals. 
Legally speaking, under Law 33 of 1966, the majority of the NGOs in Jordan are registered 
with the Ministry of Social Development or at any other ministries such as the Ministry of 
Youth, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Planning etc. The law explicitly prohibits 
NGOs from pursuing political goals and does not distinguish between charity and 
development. The social work of NGOs is viewed as complementing the government‟s role 
and not competing with it. NGOs are only permitted to work in their specialized filed of work, 
after presenting a detailed description of their work and budget plans, to the relevant ministry, 
and receive their Registration Certificate from the related ministry (Global Development 
Forum, 2000). The NGOs registered with the Ministry of Social Development automatically 
become members of the General Union of Voluntary Societies, an umbrella organization that 
is supposed to give training and support to the NGOs and to coordinate their activities. (32) 
          However there are several Royal NGOs (RINGOs) in Jordan, which have a separate 
legal status than the above. The law does not restrict them, as they are founded by Royal 
degree. These NGOs are led by Royal patrons such as Princess Basma Bint Talal, the 
president of the Queen Alia Fund, Queen Noor, the president of the Noor al-Hussain 
 Foundation, and Queen Rania Al-Abdullah being president of the Jordan River Foundation. 
They have special relationships with the authorities and do not report to the Ministry of Social 
Development. This gives them much more freedom, not only in their decisions over their 
activities, but also in direct access to foreign donors, which the other NGOs officially are not 
allowed to pursue. Therefore they are more flexible and can accumulate funds, very much to 
the disadvantage of smaller NGOs. The Ministry of Social Development describes the 
relationship with the RINGOs as one of competition and complains about a lack of 
cooperation from their side. (33) 
 
5.7.  The Role of NGOs in the Development 
           NGOs in Jordan are classified according to their aims and the focus of their activities. 
Some are engaged in charitable functions such as cultural and literary work, while others 
pursue more substantial women‟s interests. According to Hammed, the data suggests that 
about 42.5 % of women‟s NGOs concentrate their activities in the rural areas and 39 % in 
urban areas. About 19.2 % of women‟s organizations are concerned with childcare; 17.8% are 
engaged in charity work; 12.3 % in training; 11% in women‟s issues and 39.7 % are not 
interested in women‟s issues; about 83.6 % are not interested in rural development and 82.2 % 
are not interested in urban development. The data shows that about 39.9 % of women who are 
in charge of NGOs are university graduates with a bachelor degree; 23.3 % are post graduates, 
23.3 % hold a secondary school diploma, and 5.5 % do not have their primary school 
diploma. (34)     
 
5.8.  The State and NGOs in Jordan 
            As with all CSOs, the relationship between the state and women‟s NGOs is identified 
within the provisions of the Law no. 33 of 1966. In theory, the Ministry of Social 
Development has the legal right to oversee the activities of the NGOs such as visiting, 
reviewing its performance in relation to its goals or to review its financial status against its 
expenditure. Every NGO, like all CSOs, has to submit its annual report to the minister, which 
includes a financial statement and balance sheet. Jordanian NGOs who focus on political 
activities are under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. The state can interfere with, or 
even close down NGOs if the issues they deal with, or their activities, appear to be, in the 
view of the government, a threat to national security or to the traditions of the society. The 
relationship between the two is a supervisory one dependent on activity: the less politically 
important the goals of the NGO, the less supervision is exercised and vice versa.  This is 
 illustrated in the case of women‟s NGOs, the majority of women‟s organizations (50.70 %) 
stating that it is essential to have a good and supportive relationship with the state. About 41.1 
of women‟s NGOs think that the state responds to their demands while 37 % thinks 
differently; 39.7 % regard themselves independent. 21.9 % of women‟s organizations have 
experienced some state interference in modifying their activities and 20.5 % being forced to 
either cancel some (35) or all of their activities. Recently, Jordan has “introduced a new 
Societies law that would give government power over how an NGO is funded as well as its 
decision making processes and activity‟‟. (36) 
              State support for women‟s NGOs comes in shape of funds. NGO funding is of 
importance for both the continuation and disappearance of the organization. NGOs whose 
activities are more in line with the state‟s political and social policies apparently receive more 
funds than the ones which are not. Funds are withheld if NGOs activities become too far from 
state objectives. If women‟s NGOs want to continue, then they need to remain within the 
framework of the state‟s political and social interests. But it is not only the state which 
imposes its agenda on Jordanian women‟s NGOs. External donors, Simadi and Almomani 
writes, impose their own social agendas without taking into account the authentic needs of the 
community. Foreign funding in Jordan has consequently become a controversial issue. The 
increased access of civil society organizations to external funding , and the sometimes 
sensitive issues for which funds have been allocated – such as human rights, press freedoms 
or gender equality- occasionally provoke acrimonious debates about the desirability of foreign 
funding.(37)  About 31.5 % of NGO income come from the Jordanian state  and 70. % comes 
from the private sector.  Donors have, however, geographical preferences. NGOs in Amman 
and Zarqa receive more support and financial aid than other districts and areas. It suggests 
that the NGOs in Amman and Zarqa enjoy the availability of sources of support and 
reinforcement over others.   In fact, 14% of all NGOs are situated in the capital, Amman. The 
very specialized and big ones have branches in all the 12 governorates in Jordan and are 
registered in the Union of Voluntary Societies (UVS).   
 
5.9.  Women’s NGOs in Jordan: Case Studies 
           In order to examine the role which  NGOs, and particularly women‟s NGOs, play in 
meeting the social welfare  needs of Jordanian women, the researcher has concentrated on a 
limited number of NGOs, examining their objectives, activities, and views on the challenges 
that they, and the women they help, face in meeting those needs. 
          The profiles of the NGOs selected will be discussed below, followed by a summary of 
 and analysis the data gathered from interviews with their managers, workers and 
beneficiaries. 
 
5.9.1. The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD). (Non-
Governmental NGO) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
          JOHUD is Jordan‟s largest and oldest non-profit NGO dedicated to promoting rights-
based sustainable human development. It was established over 50 years ago and runs a 
network of 50 community development centres located in poor, underdeveloped areas of 
Jordan. Among its wide range of development activities, it runs the Regional Economic 
Empowerment for Women Project, and the empowerment of women features prominently 
throughout its other activities. The theme of support for women runs through all five of its 
five activity areas: community development, capacity building, project implementation, 
advocacy and fund raising. As well as employing over 450 staff, it draws on a network of over 
4,000 women, youths and men, and works with a wide range of other NGOs, “jamaiyyas, 
local communities and other key stakeholders”.(38) Its key objective is to support people so 
as to enable each citizen to have  access to provision for their social and economic needs. In 
this light, JOHUD‟s key function for women is providing channels of support in order to 
enable them to participate in the political, economic and social sectors, at a local level. 
JOHUD‟s efforts focus on providing centres of training, consultancy and research. Projects of 
JOHUD target specific problems, and especially the ones which undermine women‟s 
empowerment. It also “mobilizes resources from individuals and organizations, to provide a 
„safety net‟ for the most vulnerable”. (39) 
           In order to achieve this, JOHUD established its community development centres with 
the majority of its managers being women. They equally focus on young people, however, and 
young people are by and large encouraged to take part in the centres‟ activities and to be 
engaged in advocating policies and programmes, that respond to community needs, especially 
those of the poor. The programmes are set up to promote “social, economic, political and 
cultural empowerment” and, in effect to build up an alliance at all level of the community. In 
 short, JOHUD supports local communities to work with municipal and governmental leaders 
so as to enable the community to establish its own priorities, to promote them within 
government planning, and to have budgets allocated accordingly. They aims to find solutions 
that are achievable and seek “win-win” scenarios for social change, strengthening solidarity 
rather encouraging conflict.   
          Amongst the projects JOHUD helps to establish and through which it supports local 
communities are the following: the Small Business Development Centre provides micro-
entrepreneurs with non financial services such as training in feasibility plans, business 
management and product development as well as advice on how to manage credit; The 
Princess Basma Youth Resource Centre (PBYRC) provides advice in youth-friendly 
programmes and trains peer-to-peer volunteers who mobilise young people to play a leading 
role in local development processes; Beit al Bawadi helps in encouraging the production and 
marketing of handicrafts ; JOHUD‟s Technical Support Group helps farmers to improve 
irrigation techniques and rehabilitates water harvesting, and to adopt innovations such as grey 
water recycled systems, drip irrigation, home gardens, and perm culture systems. (40) Other 
key actions include combating child labour, mitigating against the impact of privatization, 
helping the poor claim land rights, and raising awareness of the impact on poverty of things 
like fuel price rises and the lack of equity in access to services. 
            JOHUD‟s mainstream activities in terms of women‟s social needs and more 
importantly women‟s empowerment are kindergartens, children‟s clubs, youth clubs, parents 
groups, ICT centres, vocational training, and special needs programmes. They aid the local 
community and women in particular, to build up women‟s self confidence, women‟s ability to 
take part, and in effect to participate actively in building up the society within the context of 
human and Islamic solidarity. It also provides direct assistance to women facing immediate 
acute problems such as death of a bread winner, the loss of employment or ill health, offering 
families in a vulnerable position by means of food, furniture and household goods. The so-
called “good will” campaigns help almost 10,000 families each year. In this, JOHUD receives 
immense support from the government, the private sector, national and international business, 
as well as universities, hospitals, professional associations and the Greater Amman 
Municipality. Working with women‟s groups, JOHUD tackles issues such as the personal 
status law, inheritance rights and domestic violence. (41)   
            The researcher interviewed both the chairperson, and patron of the Fund, HRH 
Princess Basma Bint Talal, the Deputy Executive Director, Mrs. Eman Nimri, and Mrs Wilkie 
Williamson, the Strategic Advisor to the fund, to ascertain the nature of JOHUD‟s 
 engagement with women‟s social welfare issues, their objectives, and their achievements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.9.2.  The Jordanian National Commission for Women. (JNCW). 
        
 
 
  
     
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
            The JNCW was founded in 1992 on the basis of a Cabinet decision. It brings together 
public and private institutions and individuals with the key objective being to formulate a 
“national strategy” for women‟s issues in Jordan. With the support of the Cabinet, it has 
sought to widen its area of responsibilities beyond this, identifying the priorities of women, 
and forming plans and programmes in order to enable women to achieve what is required to 
fulfil the needs they identify for themselves. The JNCW is headed by HRH Princes Basma 
Bint Talal and considers itself as representing Jordanian women at the national, regional and 
international levels. 
            The JNCW‟s main mission is to achieve the legal equality of women in all areas of 
government policy-making.  It explains this as follows: “improving the status of women and 
enhancing their role in national development, increasing and encouraging the participation of 
 women in economy, politics, and decision making; and strengthening women‟s legal status”. 
(42) 
           To achieve its aims, the JNCW, works with governmental and legislative institutions, 
reviewing their policies and processes to eradicate gender discrimination against women at 
the formal and legislative levels. The JNCW‟s key approach is collaborative. Its strategy is to 
focus on the major areas that can be of critical importance in the provision of women‟s social 
needs such as: “economic empowerment, legislation, participation in public life, information 
and communication and human security and social protection”.(43)  
            Human security in this context is interpreted as meaning that: “the state in which 
individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to threats to 
their human, environmental, and social rights and are able to actively participate in attaining 
these options”. (44)  The four activities the JNCW engages in are as follows: “women and 
parliamentary elections, updating the national strategy for women, gender mainstreaming in 
the civil service commissions; and finally the promotion of gender equity through 
organizational development programme”.(45) 
            The researcher interviewed Dr. Amel Al-Sabagh, the Former - General Secretary of the 
JNCW and Ms. Asma Khudr, a lawyer who is the current General Secretary. 
 
5.9.3. The Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU) 
           The JWU is a non-governmental organisation, was established in 1954, but later 
dissolved due to the emergency law that was applied to all organizations and political 
associations. It was re-established in 1974 under the name of The Women‟s Union of Jordan. 
Its status and operations were nonetheless precarious until 1990 when, following the 
government‟s declared intentions of returning to elections and democratic processes, it was 
able to consolidate itself. 
          The JWU describes its key objectives as being: “Recognizing women‟s rights first and 
making efforts to ensure that the empowerment of women enables them to achieve these equal 
rights based on equality, justice, equal opportunities and respect”.(46) This objective is further 
broken down: 
1.   Human rights must be enhanced and especially those of women and children. 
2.   Protecting the national culture and encouraging democracy are the keys to protecting and 
achieve the rights of women. 
3.  Jordanian women must support all Arab women and in particular the Palestinians.(47) 
          Between 1993-1999, the JWU exerted pressure on both public opinion and policy 
 makers regarding the adjustment of gender discriminatory laws in the areas of citizenship, 
elections, family status, passport rights, social security and punitive (honour) crimes. 
           More recently their major activity has been to raise consciousness of women‟s issues 
such as literacy, law literacy, and health and parental consciousness. They have also sought to 
assist women in entering the labour market by establishing trainee centres where women learn 
skills in areas such as information and technology, beauty services, or sewing and embroidery. 
They have established free legal advice centres for women, where lawyers offer voluntary 
services to assist women with legal difficulties. Much of the work relates to assisting women 
who are victims of domestic violence and protecting women from violent abuse by their 
husbands or male relatives. The Union runs a women‟s hostel for women seeking refuge from 
domestic violence and is a member in the provisional Arab Women Court which was 
established in Rabat in Morocco in 1996. The aim of this court is to fight bodily, political and 
legal violence against women in all Arab countries. It was initiated by a number of Arab 
women NGOs in the Arab World as well as individuals. It now consists of organizations and 
individuals from 13 Arab countries. 
            The JWU also works with and for children. It has three projects, including a 
parliament for children between the ages of 13 and 18 years old. Using children to teach 
children, the JWU projects work with children who have behavioural problems, children who 
have dropped out of school and require other forms of education, and in teaching children 
about the concepts of human rights and democracy. It promotes gender equality through all 
these projects. 
            The JWU has local branches in Irbid, Ma‟daba and Al-Bugah. It is self-supported, 
accepting no donations from donors who imposes their agenda on the JWU or from high 
foreign civil servants who work in Jordan. The researcher interviewed Mrs. Zughabi, the 
elected head of the JWU. 
            The researcher interviewed Mrs. Amaal Qwsmha the head of the JWU in Ajloun, and 
Mrs. Fatima Ubaydat, the head of the JWU in Irbid. 
 
5.9.4. The Housewives Association Family Guidance & Awareness Centre 
            The Housewives Association was established in 1996. It is supported by donations 
from foreign as well as local organizations. Their brochure states that: “the Family Guidance 
and Awareness Centre‟‟ is affiliated to the Housewives Association in Zarqa, which was 
established by virtue of the decision no. 639 issued by the Ministry of Social Development for 
the year 1982. The association aims at “economic and social empowerment of Jordanian 
 women and their integration into development programmes, enabling them to contribute to 
and support the national economy, and thereby to promote the Jordanian Families.”(48)  
            The key objective of the Association is help women in the context of their families, 
assisting families with managing economic and health-related burdens.  The Family Guidance 
and Awareness Centre offers services and programmes in the fields of education, social and 
family support, psychological support, health, legal advice, scientific research, referral 
services, and follow-up support. For women, additional counselling is offered for professional 
growth, marriage and family issues, divorce, sexual problems, educational support and legal 
advice. (49) 
           The Association also focuses on domestic violence and in 2004 it established a 
“permanent headquarters for confronting domestic violence and rehabilitation of victims”. 
(50) This is a complementary component of the National Family Protection Project which 
aims at “maintaining a safe society and a sound united family in which all can enjoy their 
human rights.”(51) In addition, it established a “productive kitchen” to help women develop 
their financial independence, and an Information Technology and Community Service Centre 
in 2001 and a Women‟s Development Centre in 2002. (52) The researcher interviewed Mrs 
Nadia Bushnaq, the Head of the Housewives Association. 
 
5.9.5. The View from Within: Interview Evidence 
           The interviewees identified a number of key areas which they need to address, 
individually and collectively. 
A)  The Political Empowerment of Women, and the establishment of their equal rights in the 
legal and public processes is clearly a major imperative if women.  Mrs. Eman Nimri 
(JOHUD) stated that “the main gap lies in the perception of the state on the one hand; and on 
the other, how to translate the state policy and legislation into action in order to influence the 
daily life of women”. (53) 
            Achieving this is repeatedly seen as only being possible if it is supported by the 
community as a whole. Women‟s projects are framed within community development, having 
the benefit of community support but also consequently having to negotiate traditional or 
conservative constraints. Mrs. Eman Nimri described one of JOHUD‟s achievements as 
“transferring women from the stage of non-participation in social, economic and political life, 
into mobilizing all the community members and changing all dimensions within the social 
context in order to provide women with the right space for women to participate and to 
become a member in the network of community centres, to encourage them in forming 
 women‟s committees and to act as a link between the community and centres in order to 
provide the right services. This process itself encourages women to take part, by and large, in 
all aspects of social, economic and political life”. (54) 
Mrs. Nimri explained that:  
The mission of JOHUD is to act directly with local members of the community and more 
importantly, the key to their continuation for already over thirty years is their existence in the 
community through the network of economic development centres reaching directly women, 
young people and children. The JOHUD‟s main mission is to empower Jordanians as local 
communities to take an effective part in the development of women and their community. 
This is very much is linked to citizenship issue and that they act as citizens to have duties and 
rights and eventually to claim for themselves their social entitlements from the state. (55) 
 
             Changing the wider environment is a difficult task, as explained by HRH Princess 
Basma.  
            HRH Princess Basma Bint Talal, is the chairperson of JOHUD. In an interview with 
the researcher, she spoke of the many challenges which Jordanian women are facing: 
externally-driven challenges such as globalization, regional instability, economic difficulties 
and the volatile position of Jordan; and internally driven challenges such as financial security, 
social barriers, discriminatory allocation of resources, and poverty. HRH Princess Basma Bint 
Talal summarised her views that the “barriers that women of Jordan are facing are not 
mainstream and specific to Jordan only but are a mixture of all”. Moreover she emphasized 
that “one cannot take the individual issues out of its historical context”. However, “to achieve 
women‟s social needs is very difficult without an enabling environment‟‟. “ This takes time. 
The state is changing but the people are not yet equipped to be self reliant, they remain poor 
and very dependent”. In her eyes, therefore, JOHUD has to weigh the cultural reality and 
political difficulties before executing a project. In the end, it is forced “to prepare short-term 
initiatives and projects for women to enable them to stand on their own feet economically and 
achieve their needs”, but is less able to alter the fundamental status quo. However, HRH 
Princess Basma Bint Talal is an optimist. “The political will exits and reforms must take 
place”, thus most of her time is devoted to projects regarding the empowerment of women. 
(56) 
           The importance of wider political reform becoming more firmly embedded was 
reiterated by Mrs. Amnha Zoubi, head of the JWU. She shared HRH Princess Basma Bint 
Talal‟s view that “the people are not yet substantially convinced of the changes which are 
taking place, the openness of the state and the freedom of press. The culture of dependency on 
the others to do things and not to fight for them is the norm among the people”. (57) 
            Mrs. Bushnaq (head of the Housewives Association) explained how, for all its talk of 
democracy, the state remains captive to “a number of forces which undermine women‟s 
advancement”. (58) These include the influence of religious forces which have control over 
the poor majority and those who “use abusive social weapons to hinder women‟s support for 
sustaining women‟s candidates in the elections”. (59) “Democracy is still in its infant stage” 
(60) she said with a sad tone that: 
The state in itself is in a contradictory position regarding the needs of its citizens. The 
contradiction appears in supporting the tribal and family influences on the one hand, and 
on the other demonstrating its will to advance democracy and empower women. The latter 
creates the confusion in the individual‟s daily live. On the level of their personal lives, 
individuals demonstrate their loyalty to the family first; at the pubic level, they contend 
with the language of equal rights and citizen‟s rights. In short, democracy is not yet 
developed in Jordan. An Arab citizen is brought up with two contradictory personalities. 
Two opposites are in one person. The mixture of the above-mentioned contradictions 
creates an Arab personality, which is very difficult to correct. Loyalty to the tribe is 
evidently demonstrated more than loyalty to the state. Parties are tribal too. Tribe is so 
strong in the life of the Jordanian citizens. (61) To illustrate, Mrs. Bushnaq said that, 
“patriarchal and tribal mentality are embodied in the social system and family sexual 
relations. In order to bring about changes in the face of these challenges, time is needed as 
well as a strong will by both the state and the society. (62) 
               
             Again, the suggestion is that these contradictions within the state and the formal 
institutional arrangements in Jordan is reflected in short-termism in the provision of women‟s 
social needs was made by Ms. Asma Khudr, a lawyer and current General Secretary of the 
JNCW. She told that: 
The issue is whether the social needs of women i.e., food, housing, social compensation 
during unemployment, illness and disability are considered a right. If they are, then we 
should request constitutional adjustments so that the state has to provide the basic needs of 
food, housing and work. If the system doesn‟t see these as rights, then we only get what 
the state offers as kindness and aid in cases of urgency.  The existing system is providing a 
short term environment to ensure social peace and stability by giving aid via governmental 
and non-governmental agencies. i.e., the National Aid Fund. This fund is supposed to 
support the very poor families of Jordan. Critical bureaucratic measures exist in this 
process of aid. The people and especially the disadvantages are not equipped with the 
knowledge about it. The various efforts and institutions of aid must follow one clear 
system so as to avoid injustice in the system. Once people begin to have the feeling of 
their social security, it enhances their loyalty to their citizenship. (63) 
             
             Ms. Asma Khudr had strong views as “to who are in effect undermining the attempts 
of the NGOs to improve women‟s social and legal conditions, placing the blame on 
conservative and traditionalist forces who are in strong positions within the government and 
who perpetuate the power of the “culture of shame”. (64) 
 The traditionalists are afraid to lose their power if the power of the individual is enhanced: 
those traditionalists occupy positions in politics, the media, religious hierarchy, tribal groups, 
and the economy. They are very strong. The powerful class does not encounter strong pressure 
group from the society, especially in the majority are very poor and very weak and need the 
support of the powerful groups. The resistance of those groups takes various shapes. For 
instance, the disadvantaged give their votes to the retired officers and ex-ministers in order to 
be helped if they win the elections. (65) 
           
            When it comes to these forces perpetuating the “culture of shame”, this means that to 
do jobs that are considered to be lower than the social and educational background of the 
individual is a major impediment to improving women‟s conditions. 
Therefore, liberating the individual by enhancing his/her legal right to food, housing and 
work would first weaken the power of the intermediary such as the family, the 
traditionalists or others and second it might participates in overcoming the sense of shame 
to do work lower than that of the social background of the individual. Moreover, the taxes 
must be used in the direction of strengthening the social security and should not to be used 
as a channel to accumulate the wealth in the hands of the wealthy persons or families. 
Therefore, the civil society organizations must take the task of enhancing the legal power 
of the individual in order to bring about the social security for all. (66) 
 
            Ms.Asma Khudr sees the force of law as the key weapon to bring about required 
changes in society. Under her leadership, the JNCW promotes the NGO as a mediator 
between the state institutions and citizens with the objective of achieving general goals related 
to democracy, civil rights and human rights. She said: 
The programmes of women‟s NGOs have changed: instead of only focusing on our own 
charitable activities, we started to take on bigger, and by and large very substantial, issues of 
a political, economic and social nature. The JNCW arranges training courses and workshops 
to spread juridical education, training on the styles of pressure and negotiation and lobbying, 
and raising consciousness. Some women‟s organizations began delivering direct services for 
victims of domestic violence, guidance regarding the family status law; some of the 
organisations began to employ lawyers to defend women in the courtrooms. 10.000 women 
were trained during ten years in legal rights for women. The quantity of women who were 
trained does not necessarily mean that the progress is huge. There is a need for extra efforts 
and other programmes in order to reach the level of quantity and quality of women‟s 
empowerment and participation in the political, economic and social levels. (67) 
 
There has been a change in terms of attitude from the Jordanian state towards women‟s 
issues. This change came from an open minded leadership which realized the importance 
and necessity of women‟s rights and their participation; but, this openness is faced with 
social obstacles. The women‟s NGOs support this change of the state, by exercising social 
pressure to bring about the change. The move of openness of the state is faced with 
resistance by the ones who are against the principle of total recognition of women‟s equal 
rights which is written in the Jordanian constitution. The JNCW managed to fight to get 
women employed as judges and now there are 23 women judges. In short, the Royal will 
and the society‟s movement has met with the goal to empower women. (68) 
  
            In sum, for Ms. Asma Khudr, “changes are gradually happening. The old debates used 
to be whether or not women are fit to work. Now a day, the debate is over what position a 
woman a woman can hold in the work place”. (69) 
             Nonetheless, her analysis offers insights into the tensions within the state which exist 
as a result of the contradictions between a modernizing citizenship agenda and political 
reliance on traditionalist and conservative social forces. NGOs have consequently broadened 
their agendas from focusing on specific needs of women to addressing issues pertaining to 
citizenship itself, in the hope of affecting change in the state away from short-term political 
compromises and towards more long-term policies for women‟s social provision. 
           The interviews highlighted, however, that it is not just the state which must be 
changed. As Ms. Asma Khudr went on to say: 
Still there are more other steps to be taken. The society, men and women, who seriously 
see, the importance of bringing a change, must carry the new project forward. Women 
have succeeded in building their alliance with the official side in dealing with women‟s 
issues; but unfortunately we have failed at the level of the popular ground (70) 
 
           The first group who need to be convinced are women themselves. “In our society, 
women want things without exercising enough efforts to obtain them (being dependents)”, 
(71) she stated. “There is now more of an increased of self-awareness among young women: 
that they have the right to be equal to men in the working place. They need to take their issues 
in their hands and defend them. There should be no more silent majority especially among 
women. The cooperation between the officials, NGOs, and individuals would bring the 
change. Women should stop being hypocrite. That‟s can be done by forcing the law. Yes, 
women are afraid of social consequences but with the law in force, they would feel safer to 
fight for their rights. The time will come when women feel that the law is at their side. 
Education is a key tool in this regard”. (72) 
          This was mirrored in the comments of Mrs. Eman Nimri (JOHUD), who stated that her 
organisation‟s approach had been inadequate when, originally, it operated from the top-down. 
However, following the findings of the 2004 Arab Human Development Report on 
empowering women, the organization has changed its approach. It has started to operate with 
local women in order to understand more of their social, political, environmental, cultural and 
economic issues.  However, they have found that the majority of women in Jordan, regardless 
their social and economic status, are not yet ready to express themselves freely, if ever they 
do, they remain very cautious of the social consequences from the family and the society. 
 Although they can express themselves freely with people from outside their own social 
environment, women in Jordan live with constant anxiety regarding the social implications 
that could directly or indirectly affect their family‟s position within their own community as a 
result of their words or actions. Fear is still the key element impacting on what and how 
should women say or behave. When asked by the researcher whether women are too protected 
by their families, Mrs. Eman Nimri replied: “The organization‟s task (with emphasis) is to 
enable women to stand on their own feet on an economic level in order to enable women to 
feel themselves as strong citizens”.(73) For Mrs.Eman Nimri, economic power holds the key 
to wider forms of empowerment for women and will eventually give them the confidence and 
freedom to express their wishes and wills without consideration for what might happen to the 
family name and their position. Mrs. Eman Nimri added that: 
 It is very hard to change attitudes. We need to work with men too. At least, it is our task to 
push the citizens to think about it. Dialogue is the key. Both social boundaries and lack of a 
real developed infrastructure are equal in hindering women‟s empowerment and it is slowing 
down the efforts of our NGO as organisations working for women, and for all Jordanian 
citizens in general. Last but not least, the NGO works with other organizations and with the 
state policy makers to reach the goal of empowering women in all aspects. (74) 
 
            The question of women‟s self-awareness, and their willingness to step beyond family 
conventions and constraints, was raised in another interview, this time with Ms. Winkie 
Williamson, a strategic advisor to JOHUD. She was commenting on “Maka‟neh”, a JOHUD 
project which aims specifically to enhance women‟s skills in discussing, articulating and 
advocating for their needs. In Ms. Winkie Williamson‟s view, the project promotes women to 
be in power. 
 It is a practical model especially in that it engages women to sit down and talk collectively 
about their problems and to identify common cause; moreover they find out about themselves 
and what they can do for themselves and the community. (75) 
 
           She acknowledges that this is essentially a western individualistic model whereas in 
reality Jordanian women chose for the common good rather than the individual. They focus 
on issues like health and education.  In her view, “it is an interesting issue to pay attention to; 
the distinction they make between public and private issues. They would choose the social 
good rather than individual”. (76) However, what is frustrating for Ms. Williamson is that “a 
fundamental requirement for the struggle of empowering women is to face up to yourself and 
your own disempowerment, fight for yourself and stand up for yourself and for the others. 
The Jordanian elite women are very reluctant. They are still not up to this stage”. (77) She 
identifies once again the role played by fear of social stigma and shame attached to the family. 
 For example: “the abuse issue is a major one in Jordan but not more than anywhere else in the 
world”. (78)  However, women are still not confronting it directly; she confirms that “the 
family‟s name plays a role in the reluctant position of women in Jordan. The fear of the family 
and social consequence are key constraints as a matter of fact, here, in Jordan; which we do 
not have it in the West”. (79) 
          When the researcher suggested that democratic government and economic development 
in the West had made it possible for women to struggle for their rights without fear, however, 
Ms. Winkie Williamson argued that: 
Regardless of that, women in the West decided to fight for their rights and they 
demonstrated. They were subjected to punishment either by the state or the family. 
Without taking decisions and committing mistakes, sometimes a major one, there cannot 
be much change. (80) 
 
           However, she did identify that “there has been a change in Jordan over the last ten 
years”. (81) 
The moment of change came when the professionals working in the  NGOs started to 
realize what they are fighting for, that it  should be for themselves, not masking it by 
saying `I am fighting for other people‟; because that replaced themselves with other,  that‟s 
actually destroying solidarity. Because what they are saying actually then is that „the other 
people are poor and ignorant and I am helping them, me as an elite person, I do not have a 
problem‟. The reality is that they do have problem. Women of all classes are abused by 
way or another. Therefore, women must fight for themselves even if this fight will bring 
them into conflict with their sons, fathers, and husbands. (82)   
 
             The impact of family considerations on attitude towards women‟s rights was 
reinforced by Mrs. Nadi Bushnaq, head of the Housewives Association, although this time in 
the context of wider social attitudes. 
             The Housewives Association is an NGO which specifically targets the welfare of the 
Jordanian family, and women‟s welfare within it. Mrs. Bushnaq told the researcher that, 
regardless of the NGO‟s achievements for women at a local level, women are still suffering 
from the pressure of the family, its fears of their independence, and fears of the social 
consequences of women‟s emancipation.  She argues that the will of the state is inadequate 
compared to the importance of these issues for society as a whole. 
When it comes to issues related to the family and women, the House of Representatives 
delay making decisions or put the issues aside. The context of the particular or personal 
interests of well-known tribes or families, and traditional mentalities or attitudes towards 
patriarchal authority, as well as the Islamic movement are all playing role in this regard. 
(83) 
 
              Therefore, the driving force of the Association is to work on changing laws relating 
 to work and family status and to achieve recognition of the obstacles which current legislation 
poses to women‟s empowerment. 
In this regard, the patriarchal system is still in force. There were many stories told regarding 
the domestic violence, divorced women who are denied all financial and moral support by 
their divorcees or the society, the sacrifices of women for their homes, children and husbands 
and the denial of self interest for the sake of the family.  (84) 
 
             For Mrs. Bushnaq, “changing the unjust reality is an achievement for the women‟s 
NGOs. It takes time. The need for a planning of 5 to 10 years achieves some steps forward for 
women”. (85) 
             Dr. Amel Al-Sabagh, a former General Secretary of the JNCW NGO, is a strikingly 
outspoken advocate for women, who spoke further about the gap that exists between the goals 
of her NGO to effect change in the legal regime that would enable women‟s empowerment 
and how much can realistically be achieved. She argued that Jordan is facing numerous 
economic difficulties such as poverty. She told that: 
The family‟s role is no longer positive in many ways regarding women; even non-
educated women see the family is an obstacle. Families allow their daughters to work as 
civil servants but not in the private sector. But the public sector cannot take all the females 
who want to work and the private sector is not encouraging them either. Women lack 
access to social security, especially the divorced and widows. Women, even at the age of 
40 or more, need their father‟s permission of their fathers. In spite of all the serious efforts 
made by women‟s NGOs and the long way that women have come social obstacles are 
still in force undermining most efforts to enact legal change, especially of that family law. 
There are general social barriers; women belong to the private sphere, the private sphere is 
holy and secretive; And money is a big issue. Donors decide the agenda and the issues, 
issues which are sometimes not in accord 
with women‟s social needs. The private sector spends its resources on various channels 
which are not benefiting women. (86) 
 
            Like Mrs. Nadia Bushnaq, Dr. Al Sabagh was hopeful that social barriers are gradually 
being diminished but she agreed that this is likely to take a very long time.  For her, “it is not 
easy to just ignore the rooted patriarchal system and the strong resistance of the forces of 
traditionalist and conservatism. Legal issues need to be treated with cautiousness and we need 
to pay considerable attention to in order not to create an opposite camp which may lead to 
anarchy”. (87) 
            The realization that change is likely to be only slowly-realised and that social attitudes 
need to change along with the law and political structures, can be seen in the work of the 
NGOs. The JNCW, for example, has established a centre to develop leadership skills among 
young women. The centre aims to work with girls of high and secondary schools and 
universities in order to build a new generation of young women who are able to express their 
 view and work for their needs consistently. Once again, however, the need to work with the 
society, rather than against it is emphasized. Ms. Asma Khudr said: 
     There is a need to be careful, because Jordan does not need a generational move from a 
very traditional into suddenly a very free society. Women‟s NGOs are responsible to 
protect this change. (88) 
 
           Mrs. Am‟nha Al-Zughabi of the JWC also spoke of her organization‟s projects to 
educate children about democracy as a way of creating a new generation for whom women‟s 
rights are an essential component of the national project. She said that “democracy is a social 
attitude” (89) and that “the base of the Arab society is tribal, patriarchal and hierarchal where 
religious and social oppressions as well the political oppression are the norms”. (90)  
Therefore, “teaching democracy to children and bring them up within this context would 
bring a healthy generation of men and women for the future of Jordan.”(91) As Ms. Asma 
Khudr would have it, “the real development of a society and especially the Arab one is that 
women become the key part in this change”. (92) 
 
5.10.  Conclusion 
              All the NGO representatives interviewed articulated the need for NGOs to work with 
the state and its institutions if they are to affect change, but equally that their efforts to 
enhance the provision for women‟s social welfare needs were limited because of the state‟s 
relationships with traditionalist conservative political allies and because of the patriarchal 
culture which subordinates women within and to the male-led family. 
            As CSOs, women‟s NGOs are constrained by the government‟s determination to 
control all political and public activity. Those which are most able to effect change by 
collaborating with state institutions are those with Royal patronage.  But they are the least 
likely to challenge the basis of the regime itself – the monarchy‟s alliance with traditional 
social forces such as the tribes or the religious establishment. Even the independent NGOs are 
unable to do so substantively within the framework of current laws relating to CSOs. 
Therefore women‟s NGOs have to adopt an incrementalist approach, attempting to work with 
the state and its institutions to bring about democratic reforms which will benefit society as a 
whole and in doing so free up space to challenge the patriarchal political culture which 
currently pervades the state, its legal and institutional infrastructure. In the meantime, their 
projects are – like those of the state itself – often short-term and directed at alleviating the 
worst impacts upon women rather than altering the structures which make women vulnerable 
in the first place. 
           Women‟s NGOs are also constrained by the attitudes of women themselves, although 
this is changing both in general and within NGOs themselves. Women remain constrained by 
a culture of fear – fear of vulnerability, fear of shame, and fear of the anger of their families. 
There is hope in the way which women‟s NGOs in recent years have altered their own 
agendas away from patronizing elite charity towards less privileged women, and more 
towards a common struggle which is based on  a bottom-up definition of needs, participation 
in their own provision and empowerment by women themselves, and a new sense of 
solidarity. 
          This analysis suggests that women‟s NGOs, or civil society in general, cannot alone fill 
the gaps in women‟s social welfare provisions left by patriarchal state and family structures. 
They are themselves victims to both the state and its traditionalist allies, and to the on-going 
patriarchy of the Jordanian family. However, they can and are identifying where changes need 
to be made to the broader political structures of the country to enable women to address their 
social welfare needs themselves, and they are training new generations of both women and 
men to the idea that societal development as a whole depends on enabling women to play a 
full and equal part. 
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                                                             CONCLUSION 
 
                               This study attempts to answer the question how - and to what extent - women‟s social 
welfare needs are provided for in Jordan. Whilst the Jordanian constitution suggests that the 
state has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the needs of all citizens are met, and explicitly 
states the equality of all citizens regardless of gender, the thesis demonstrates that it has in 
fact failed unequivocally to ensure that this is the case. Instead, the state is engaged in a 
complicated set of arrangements – formal and informal – with traditional conservative and 
social forces – which act upon it to infuse state institutions, policies and provisions with 
patriarchal norms and contradictory legal obligations. The result is that women remain largely 
dependent on their families and tribes to provide for their social welfare needs, and continue 
to find it enormously difficult to gain any form of independence as citizens because of 
institutional and social patriarchal obstructions.    
                                 At the heart of the problem lies the relationship between the state, with the monarchy 
at its head, and conservative elements of significant tribes which, through manipulations of 
the electoral “democratic” processes, remain disproportionately in positions of policy-making 
power. At the same time, these conservative elements form the backbone of the army on 
which the monarchy depends.  Thus, the state of Jordan is dependent on and empowered by 
the conservative and religious elements of significant tribes. Its political and national security 
depends on them. The implications of this latter have included the weakening of the state 
when it tries to introduce serious measures to empower women and enhance their social 
welfare provisions independently of the tribes and the family-based norms which sustain 
them.  Thus, while the constitution promises equality between men and women, family laws 
are determined according to the conservative patriarchal interpretation of Shari á Islamic law 
and traditional “Urf” laws.  These pay little heed to contemporary economic realities which 
compel women to seek education, employment, and movement beyond the closed walls of the 
family. The prevailing social patriarchy ensures that women are systematically discriminated 
at all levels, made the state‟s theme of empowering women empty of its purpose. The study 
studies the symptoms of the state‟s failure in order to determine their origins. In doing so, the 
study adopts a research method that offers firstly a theoretical approach which understands 
women‟s social welfare provisions through the role of the state, family and market. 
           The first chapter demonstrated that the historical and political experience of any state is 
of importance in determining its will and capacity to develop a healthy social policy regarding 
citizen‟s welfare. Social policies which advance equal citizenship rights can effectively 
reduce the gap between men and women in terms of equal opportunities and enhanced 
standard of living. It can be said that social stability stems from executing a social policy that 
brings equality to all citizen, male and female.  The force of law is in this regard of immense 
importance. It also demonstrated that the relationship between the welfare state and its citizen 
must be direct, with the role of alternative actors such as the family or the church being 
minimised. The role of the state in organizing the relationship between the family and the 
market is also of importance. The state plays a role in minimizing the effects of cultural norms 
which inhibit the welfare of women through its laws and regulations.  The chapter 
demonstrated that the experience of Western industrialised countries has shown that 
democratic rule, equal constitutional rights, and progressive legal can work to minimize the 
cultural biases and discrimination against women at all levels, political, economic and social. 
Other players such the family and the church can play a beneficial role but cannot and should 
not replace the state.  Nonetheless, the relations between them are important. In this regard, 
the chapter also showed that the specific historical experiences of less developed countries 
can result in very different relations between state, family and market and thus make the 
development of a welfare state specifically more difficult. 
         The second chapter explored exactly how this has been the case for Jordan.  The 
historical political experience of Jordan is very different from that of the Western 
industrialised states which have developed progressive social policies towards women. It 
demonstrated that the state of Jordan relies on its close alliances with traditional 
Transjordanian tribal groups in order to secure its fragile regional location and its dependence 
on dependence on external political and economic support. The state in this regard has created 
a contradictory position for itself. On the one hand, it has developed in such a way that its 
legitimacy rests in part on a modern written constitution that recognises all citizens as equal 
before the law; on the other hands, it depend on conservative tribal and influential family 
players to ensure its security and social stability. Women are the first causality in this regard 
as they are caught between the developmental ambitions of the state and its own political 
structures.  When the economy suffered from a labour shortage as men migrated to work in 
the more prosperous Gulf, the state urged women to join the labour market and to contribute 
to the economic welfare of the entire country, and it put in place various institutions and legal 
 measures to promote this. But this took place when most of the male Jordanian left Jordan to 
the Gulf States to work. As soon as the labour market changed, the state was urged by its 
more conservative elements to push women out of work and to stay at home. This 
instrumentalist approach, which derives from the inability to resolve its own contradictions, 
leaves women without real social security and their social welfare needs do not have a 
significant place within the hierarchy of social welfare consideration and are rather 
undermined despite the constitutional obligations of the state to its female citizens.   
          Chapter three shows just how the social welfare rights of Jordanian suffer from this 
fundamental contradiction between the equality in the constitution and the profoundly 
patriarchal system of laws and influences which derive from a combination of religious 
institutions and laws. The contradiction extends into the fabric of law making itself, which 
applies a fundamentally gendered approach rather than the equitable approach promised by 
the constitution of citizenship itself. The discrimination is even more evident in the Personal 
Status Laws which govern women‟s rights in marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance. Here, 
Islamic law prevails and, where this does not apply, traditions and customs fill in and are 
gendered. Islamic laws are also profoundly gendered and based on biological determinism, 
while traditional law believes that women are less and therefore they are treated less. This is 
demonstrated clearly through the state‟s response to the increase in domestic violence against 
women. Honour crimes are the essence of this violation of women‟s dignity as human beings. 
The effective endorsement of them stems from the prevailing patriarchal understanding of 
women‟s position in the society and is enhanced by religious teachings in the country. The 
state, although officially claiming to want to eradicate honour crime, does not interfering in 
traditional legal endorsement of it because the political system is strengthen by religious 
institutions and vice versa.  
          Since by now it has become clear that the state is failing to provide for women‟s social 
welfare needs, influenced by a traditional conservative social culture which locates women 
within the family rather than the public arena, Chapter four examines more closely the role of 
the Arab family, and specifically the Jordanian family, in meeting those needs.  The status of 
the family is endorsed and reproduced through culture and religion, and also by the state 
itself, to the point of being regarded as a “holy” institution. Family members are sacrificed to 
the needs of this “holy family”, working for and assisting each other. With “God‟s will” 
involved, there is little room for moderating or amending the concept of what the family can 
or should be. In this model, women are condemned to an eternal “lessens” than men, to 
 biologically determined functions which focus on the home and child-rearing, and which 
exchange provision of their social welfare needs for obedience, subservience and a 
subordinate status. Women have no choice but to submit and accept for to be condemned as 
disobedient to the males, the family and God‟s will is to be at risk of expulsion from the 
family and the protection it offers.  Even when women move beyond the family into the 
private arena through employment and education, the norms and expectations of their role 
within the family, follow them and continue to constrain their access to resources, 
employment, freedom of movement, and political activity. In this system, there are no 
guarantees, women are subject to arbitrary decisions of others and are constantly vulnerable 
and insecure. Yet the chapter demonstrated that the family and tribe remain of importance in 
ensuring the social and economic security of women of Jordan simply because they can, and 
because the normative system requires them to do so.  
        The reality for Jordanian women is that they are systematically discriminated against 
both inside the family and in the public arena.  
        The strong patriarchal upbringing inside the family, however, is encouraged by the 
strong bond between the state of Jordan and its tribal allies. Political elites, including 
members of parliament, are heavily weighted in favour of tribal and large family associations. 
With such a structural inter-dependence between the state and tribe, it is unsurprising that the 
traditions and norms of the tribe and the family have permeated the infrastructures, legal 
framework, policy orientations and implementations of the state. Patriarchal notions of honour 
and shame, embodied in the behaviour of women and the expectations placed upon them by 
men, determine how women actually interact with the state and the public sphere to a much 
greater degree than the official statements of the state of a progressive status for women. The 
state endorses this influence informally and formally. 
          Consequently the efforts of the state to empower women via channels of education and 
participation in the labour market have focused on quantity rather than quality, on meeting 
targets of numbers of female school enrolments or numbers of women employed.  The state 
has resisted any attempt to weaken the relationship between itself and the tribes that might 
have required it to improve the quality of provision for women, the substantive access that 
they can have to equitable education, employment, social security or legal protection. This 
contradictory approach has led to a sort of personal dilemma for most men and women in 
Jordanian society. Female and male individuals live a double-life, with two personalities, one 
 inside the home and another outside. Although the psychological impacts of this situation are 
beyond the scope of the thesis, the interviewees made clear the sharp dichotomies between 
their public acquiescence and their private aspirations.  
         Following the methodology suggested by our first chapter, chapter five examined the 
role of CSOs, those voluntarist associations which try to fill the gap in social welfare 
provisions left by the failing state and the patriarchal family. The chapter showed how civil 
society as a whole in Jordan can only operate within certain parameters which do not 
fundamentally challenge the prevailing political structures, or the traditional social forces 
which uphold them. By detailed profiling of the work, ambitions and strategies of CSOs 
working to improve women‟s social provisions, the chapter showed again how conservative 
patriarchal social influences limit the range of activities they can engage in and how they are 
dependent on the patronage of influential regime elites, particularly members of the Royal 
family, in order to find “space” for improving women‟s lives. This arrangement prohibits 
them from significantly challenging existing patriarchal social norms and forces them to focus 
on educating women (and men) towards a longer-term adjustment in social understandings of 
the role of women, their rights as citizens, and the developmental benefits of their improved 
financial and human security. This was not to deny the significant achievements being made 
in the development of civil society in Jordan, but recognises that its autonomy of action and 
therefore its ability to exert influence for social and political change remain seriously limited. 
The state uses civil society organisations to tentatively promote developmental agendas which 
include improving the status of women and provision for them, but constantly balances this 
with preserving the important support that comes for it from traditional social forces. In this 
regard, HRH Princess Basma „s sincere wishes to bring about a real change in the life of 
women of Jordan were not explicitly revealed during the researcher interview with her. 
Especially, on the issue of equal citizenship, the issue is fundamentally political and 
associated to the plight of the Palestinians. Therefore, HRH was very sensitive and careful in 
answering it. In regard to the power of the traditionalists and conservatives in undermining the 
efforts of the NGOs, she revealed some careful frustration, but she chooses the moderate and 
pragmatic approach to answer. Her views remain optimistic and very understanding of the 
political position of the state of Jordan as well her position as a member of the Royal family is 
also limited. Nonetheless, she remains highly optimistic that a gradual change to women‟s 
position will arrive in an historical moment regarding the new technology and vast 
communication via the Internet. 
  
 The answer to our original question then, is that women‟s social welfare needs in 
Jordan are not being consistently met, although there is a muddled and inconsistent possibility 
that some or all needs of individual women may be met. Even this is subject to arbitrary 
decisions by agents beyond her control, whether it is the males in her family, the tribal and 
religious elites who influence state policy, or broader social forces informed by the patriarchal 
social norms. She has no control over whether her welfare needs will be met, and the law 
provides no guarantees or consistency to which she can appeal when they are not.  
 The fact that the state has failed to fulfil its role here is due, as the first chapter 
suggested it would be, to the particular historical and political circumstances in which the 
state was born and developed, including specifically the construction of the state of Jordan out 
of a colonial past, its on-going military vulnerability to regional conflict and the influx of 
Palestinian refugees over time which always has the possibility of destabilising the politics of 
the country and the vulnerabilities of the its economy to both these regional instabilities but 
also to global processes. The thesis shows that when a state is subject to such constant threats 
to its own security and stability, it takes refuge in building alliances with supportive social 
forces but in doing so loses its autonomy to act with its citizens as it chooses. Indeed, 
citizenship itself becomes a negotiable issue. In this case, the rights to social welfare 
provisions which a modern state accords to its citizens become negotiable too. In Jordan‟s 
case, this negotiation has taken the form of traditionalist patriarchal allies of the state 
influencing public policy to accord women less than full citizenship rights and in doing so to 
restrict the social welfare provisions accorded to them by the state. The liberal feminist 
emphasis on the state and citizenry taken by this thesis is therefore justified.  
         The irony of this is that in the long term, states are more secure when they have full 
legitimacy embedded in direct relations between the state and ALL its citizens which are not 
interfered with by other forces. In short, until full political democracy is properly enacted in 
Jordan, the state will remain insecure, and women will remain discriminated against. It is 
perhaps no accident then that the literature referred to in chapter one developed the concept of 
the welfare state out of the experiences of the developed democratic west. It also suggests that 
the women activists of CSOs in Jordan have little choice other than to pursue their current 
strategy of seeking broader political and democratic reform as the means to unlock the 
dilemmas of the state in its dealings with women.  
           As a final note on this, the thesis also ultimately suggests that developing states cannot 
fully “modernise” without democracy – a lesson which will be unwelcome to those who 
aspire to an “authentic Arab alternative” to democracy. 
          Of course, by focusing on selected aspects of women‟s social provision, particularly 
their legal status, educational opportunities and employment prospects, this thesis has not 
presented the full-story of women‟s experiences in Jordan. Some women have indeed 
overcome the obstacles described here and overall if one takes a long-term view, one can say 
categorically that the status of women and the opportunities available to them have improved 
in Jordan over the last decades. However, this thesis hopes to make a contribution to our 
understanding of why that progress has not been as great as it might have been, or as many 
women have aspired for it to be.  
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 APPENDIX 1 
                                           Names & Functions of Interviewees 
 
1. Miss Abla Hrout. Graduate, single and unemployed from Maádaba. Interviewed on 
July 2007, at the Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute for Development (Zenid), Amman, 
Jordan. 
 
2. Mrs. Amaal Qwasmha. Head of JWU (The Jordanian Women Union) in Ajloun. 
Interviewed on July, 16
th
, 2005, at the JWU Office in Ajloun, Jordan. 
 
3. Dr. Amel Al-Sabagh. Former General Secretary of the JNCW (The Jordanian National 
Committee for Women). Interviewed in July 13
th
, 2005, at her office of the JNCW, 
Amman, Jordan. 
 
4. Mrs. Am‟nha Al-Zughabi. Head of JWU (The Jordanian Women Union) in Amman. 
Interviewed on August 2007, at the office of JWU in Amman, Jordan. 
 
5. HRH Princess Basma Bint Talal. Chairperson of the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for 
Human Development (JOHUD). Interviewed on July 27
th
, 2005, at her office at 
(JOHUD), Amman, Jordan. 
 
6. Mrs. Eman Nimri. Former Deputy Executive Director at (JOHUD). Interviewed on 
July 2005 & 2007, at JOHUD office, Amman, Jordan. 
 
7. Miss Eman Zobi. Graduate and single from Jeresh, Jordan. Interviewed on July, 2007, 
at the Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute for Development (Zenid), Amman, Jordan. 
 
8. Miss Etidal Atyat. Graduate, single from Jeresh, Jordan. Interviewed on July 2007, at 
the Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute for Development (Zenid), Amman, Jordan. 
 
9. Mrs. Fatima Ubaydat. Head of the JWU (The Jordanian Women Union) in Irbid. 
Interviewed on July 25
th
, 2005, at the JWU office in Irbid, Jordan. 
 
10. Miss. Gharam El Nawiyasha. Young, single and unemployed. Interviewed on July 
2007, at the Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute for Development (Zenid), Amman, Jordan. 
 
11. Dr. Hassan Barari. Former –Deputy Director of the CSS (Centre for Strategic Studies) 
of the University of Jordan. He is currently an International fellow at Washington 
Institute. Interviewed on July, 2004 & 2005 at the office of CSS, University of Jordan, 
Amman, Jordan. 
 
 12. Dr. Hussein Uthman. Sociologist, and Development, social Policy, welfare & Poverty 
analyst in (Jordanian family & Domestic Violence) at the National Council for family 
centre of HER Highness of the Queen Rania. Interviewed on July 9
th,
 2005, at the 
office of her Highness the Queen Rania, Amman, Jordan. 
 
13. Dr. Khaled Al Wa‟zni. Head of the Social Security Directory. Interviewed on August, 
12
th
, 2004, at the office, Amman, Jordan. 
 
14. Dr. Mahmoud Káffwayen. Head of the National Aid Fund. Interviewed on August 
11
th
, 2004, at the office in Amman, Jordan. 
 
15. Dr. Majdi  ELDin Khayri. Sociologist at the University of Jordan. Interviewed on July 
2004 & 2005 at his office, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan. 
 
16. Mrs. May Abu Al Samen. Senator at the Jordanian Lower House and activist for 
women‟s political rights at the JNCW. Interviewed on July 17th, 2005, at her office, 
Amman, Jordan.    
 
17. Mrs. Menal El Qatawanha. Graduate, married and unemployed. Interviewed on July 
2007, at the Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute doe Development (Zenid), Amman, 
Jordan. 
 
18. Dr. Mohammed El M‟usallha. Former Deputy Leader of the Jordanian Lower House 
& Political Scientist. He teaches political science at the Jordanian Universities. He 
also works on environmental issues. Interviewed on July, 20
th
, 2005, in Amman, 
Jordan. 
 
19. Dr. Mousa Shetewi. Sociologist at the University of Jordan & director of the Social 
Development Journal in Amman, Jordan. Interviewed on July 2004 &2005, at the 
Centre of Social Development in Amman. Jordan. 
 
20. Dr. Mustafa Hamã‟rnha. Former Director of the CSS of the University of Jordan, 
Amman, Jordan. Interviewed on July 2004, at the office of the CSS, University of 
Jordan, Amman, Jordan. 
 
21. Mrs. Nadia Bushnaq. Head of the Housewives Association, family Guidance & 
Awareness Centre in Arbid. Interviewed on July 2004, at the Centre in Irbid, and on 
July 18
th
, 2005 & 2007 at her home, Amman, Jordan. 
 
22. Mrs. Nawal al fa‟aouri. A civil servant at the Ministry of Social Welfare. She is an 
Islamist activist of the Welfare of the Jordanian Family & a member of the Islamic 
party. She is an advisor at the advisory Council in Ma‟daba. Interviewed on July 20th, 
2005, at office of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Amman, Jordan. 
 
 23. Dr. Rubaa Al-Turk, Manager Director of Social Security at the Ministry of Planning. 
Interviewed on August 16
th
, at the Ministry of Planning, Amman, Jordan. 
 
24. Mrs. Salaw Nasir. Former Journalist & Women‟s Right‟s Activist. Interviewed on July 
8
th
, 2005, at her home , Amman, Jordan. 
 
25. Miss. Shadha Mahmoud. A young women‟s rights activist works at the Archive 
section, at the (UNIFEM) Centre. Interviewed on July 12
th
 , 2005, UUNIFEM office, 
Amman, Jordan. 
 
26. Druud Dawoud El Barari. Director of Family & Social Security Department of the 
Ministry of Social Welfare Development. Interviewed on July 28
th
, 2005, at the 
Library premise of the University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan. 
 
27. Mrs. Zakiya Jameel El Sarayrha. Graduate, married and unemployed from Karak, 
Jordan. Interviewd on July 2007, at the Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute for 
Development (Zenid), Amman, Jordan. 
 
28. Ms. Winkie Williamson. Strategic Advisor at “Beit Al Bawadi”, Amman, Jordan. 
Interviewed on July 2005, at the Centre of “Beit Al Bawadi”, Amman, Jordan. 
 
29. Mr. Zayad Al‟wnha. Head of Local NGO called “LHAP”. He is a consultant and 
researcher in the field of Environment Protection and Development. Interviewed on 
July 2004, 2005 & 2007, at office, Amman Jordan. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
